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ABSTRACT

About 130 miles northwest of Minneapolis, lies the
farming community of Farwell, Minnesota (pop. 103).

This

is the case of Joe Sauter, a sheep farmer who in 1958
filed a claim against the Atomic Energy Commission for
loss of livestock, damage to trees, and personal injuries
that he believed were the result of radioactive fallout.
This case will detail the efforts of the AEC to cut short
the claim of radiation injury by suppressing key
radiological data which would have substantiated Sauter's
claim and proved damaging to the AEC.
Officials within the AEC knowingly and willfully made
false statements and representations, not only to Sauter,
but to the agricultural representatives who investigated
the sheep deaths on Sauter's farm on behalf of the AEC.
Later, Sen. Clinton Anderson (D-MN), chairman of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and Sen. Hubert
H. Humphrey, chairman of two subcommittees on disarmament
and international health, both made specific requests to
the AEC for radioactive hotspots in Minnesota and North
Dakota.

The AEC withheld the information learned on

Sauter's farm in order to protect the broader interests of
the AEC in producing nuclear warheads and promoting
nuclear energy.
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CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The dawn of the nuclear age can be seen as the product
of three points on a triangle; 1) an idea that it was
possible to build an atomic bomb; 2) a country rich enough
to devote vast sums of money in turning that idea into a
reality; and 3) the power to keep the idea secret while the
bomb was being made.

Fully explaining any one of these

three points on the triangle that led to the successful
explosion of the Trinity shot on July 16th, 1945
book in itself.

could be a

The first two points of the triangle are

richly illustrated in the government's own official
historical accounting of the times (see Hewlett and
Anderson, Jr. : 1962).

While much as been written on the

first two points, little has been written on the systematic
use of secrecy and coverup to influence the direction and
momentum in the development of the American nuclear
programs.

There are several obvious reasons for this, the

most obvious reason of course being the difficulty in
gaining complete access to the necessary information, even
thirty years after the fact.

For instance, it was necessary

to initiate and direct a Congressional investigation to
obtain much of the material contained in this thesis.

As

1

this thesis will point out, the full story is still being
withheld.
The heart of the thesis is a detailed case study of
Joseph August Sauter, an obscure Minnesotan sheep farmer.
The case will be presented in the historical context of the
atomic fallout issue in the state of Minnesota. The study
will focus on a socio-historical account of one man's
struggle with the Atomic Energy Commission in gaining the
truth about fallout with its possible damaging effects to
both livestock and vegetation.

The AEC was charged with the

impossible duty of both protecting the health and safety of
the American public against the deleterious effects
resulting from nuclear weapons testing, as well as the
creation, production and testing of new nuclear weapons for
the US atomic arsenal.

This thesis will demonstrate how

Atomic Energy Commission officials broke specific laws in in
order to protect their own organization.

They failed not

only in the area of protecting the health and safety of the
American public, but committed transgressions against
American citizens' basic rights of due process as guaranteed
under the US constitution.
It should be noted the subject at hand is an extremely
difficult one to study without getting immersed in
scientific and technical details, from the makeup of the
bomb, to the process of a fissionable chain reaction, to the
radiobiological effect of ionizing radiation as it
2

penetrates the human body.

Since it is important to

understand the scientific rudiments of the story, technical
explanations will be given in lay terms.

The study will

demonstrate that high ranking officials of the Atomic Energy
Commission, in their capacity as "scientific experts" made
political decisions based on questionable scientific
grounds, at best.
I will begin with a very brief history of the
development of the atomic bomb and the subsequent
development of the Atomic Energy Commission.
The Men Behind the Bomb
The two men most credited with the idea that the bomb
could be built were Leo Szilard a Hungarian born physicist
and Albert Einstein.

Szilard became convinced 1) that an

atomic bomb could be built that would release tremendous
amounts of energy and 2) that Hitler, who controlled the
only known large uranium mine (located in Czechslovakia) was
working on developing it.

In 1939, he went to France and

England with his ideas, but was scoffed at by the military
officials.

He then came to America and convinced Albert
Einstein to write to President Roosevelt on his idea. 1
After a meeting with Einstein, Roosevelt appointed
secret advisory

scientific committee

to determine the

1see Pringle and Spigelman (198 1) for a more
comprehensive overview of this period.

a

feasibility and funding of an atomic weapon program.
1942, the S-1 Committee so recommended

In

in order to

guarantee that Hitler would not be the only one to have an
atomic bomb.

In September,

1942, General Leslie Groves

became director of the top secret bomb-building project
code-named "Manhattan Engineer District" (MED).

The best

and brightest scientists in the field of physics,
engineering, and radiobiology were lifted from their various
fields and drawn together for the single greatest experiment
of mankind.

The prestige and challange that the project

offered were unparalleled. The design and machining of the
bomb began in ernest.

MED was given a "blank check" for

expenses.
The Manhattan project would become the most expensive
and the most secretly conducted government program in
history.
The Manhattan Project was the most expensive
single program ever financed by public funds. The
physicists' bill for working out the theories had been
paid in modest sums of $100, 000 here and there, but the
engineer's bill to construct the first atomic bomb came
to more than $2 billion (Pringle and Spigelman, 198 1:
16) •
For men like General Leslie Groves, the director, the
project had to succeed, or else they would be spending the
rest of their lives explaining their failures.
Despite massive operations in Oak Ridge (Tennessee),
Chicago, Hanford (Washington), and Los Alamos (New Mexico),
the thousands upon thousands of workers, scientists,
4

engineers, doctors, truck drivers were all sworn to secrecy
as to their immediate occupational tasks, and most did not
know their own ultimate role.

Work was compartmentalized so

that one group of people did not know what other people were
doing.

Massive redundancy between the different sites was a

byproduct of the compartmentalization of knowledge.

Some of

the top physicists risked their security clearances in a
visit to Oak Ridge by telling the Oak Ridge scientist that a
particular experiment they were conducting was no good. The
same experiment

had been tried at Argonne and simply didn't

work (personal interview with Allan Kline, March, 1986).
In April, 1944, the allies became aware that the Reich
had not come close to creating an atomic weapon but had
merely begun the chain reaction process in a graphite pile
reactor, a "first step" technically.

But the momentum to

complete building the bomb was great, spurred by the
problems of how to win the war in the Pacific decisively and
quickly.
The first continental test of an atomic bomb, code
named Trinity, was on July 16, 1945.

The bomb was set on

top of a 100 foot tower in the New Mexico desert called
Jornado del Muerto (Journey of Death) and detonated •just
before dawn.

There was some debate that the oxygen in the

Earth's atmosphere would ignite, but scientists set the odds
at 3 in 1, 000 and decided to chance it.

Wagers were made

between the physicist on the explosive force of the bomb.
5

After the first explosion of a nuclear bomb J . Robert
Oppenheimer made the remark that has oft been quoted "I am
become death, shaterer of worlds . " Historical accounts of
this event often color the event in sorrowful, somber tones .
Personal interviews with two physicists on the team that
developed the Nagasaki bomb painted a different picture to
this author . One responded,
Our first reaction was one of elation, 'it works, we
did it!' Our second reaction was, the war is over .
Simple as that . We were elated over both facts . The
first thing that we did was go into town, get our
haircut almost down to the scalp [hot particles from
the blast had stuck in their hair] and go have a beer
(interview with Allan Kline March, 1986) .
The nuclear arms race between the USSR and the US
began six hours after the Trinity shot on July 16, 1945,
when, over the table at Potsdam, Truman decided not to tell
Stalin of the Allies' atomic success .

A coded message

arrived from General Groves, informing him that the baby had
been born and was larger than all previous estimates .

What

Truman did not know was that Stalin was kept apprised of
every step of the development of the bomb by a Soviet spy on
the Los Alamos team of physicists, Dr . Klaus Fuchs (Pilat,
1952) .
The campaign of secrecy worked extremely well with both
the Japanese and American populace. The two bombs dropped on
populated areas in Japan were chosen for their symbolic
value so as to demorilize the enemy.

People in Hiroshima

did not even seek cover when the Enola Gay flew overhead.
6

A

single B-29 plane, they thought it was simply a weather
.
reconnaisance p 1ane. 2 Americans were equally shocked, but
they were elated that a long and painful war had come to an
end.
No less surprised by the revelation of the bomb was the
United States Congress.

It had never been officially

informed of the Project.

Even Vice President Truman had not

been told of the project until Roosevelt was on his death
bed.

The bomb was dropped when Congress was in summer

recess.

Upon their return however, there was a flurry of

activity on how to control the awesome force of the atom.
Between September and December, 1945, no less than fifty
bills were introduced by legislators on the control of the
new nuclear weapons and power program.

The central issue of

contention was whether the military should continue control,
or whether control should be turned over to the civilians.
The issue was settled in a characteristically politically
expedient compromise:

the ultimate control of the new

program would rest in the hands of civilians, while the
military would oversee the production, development and
testing of nuclear weapons ( Ball, 1986: 20) . 3
2For a graphic, unforgettable account of the human
destruction of the nuclear bomb, see Hersey (1946) .
3For a more comprehensive look at struggle over
civilian versus military control of the nuclear weapons and
(Footnote Continued)
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Immediately after war, the government went to great
pains to control adverse information about radioactive
"after effect" of the bomb.

MacArthur imposed a ban on any

Japanese newspaper articles dealing with reports of A-bomb
damage, calling them

"inflammable" and "needling." However,

others found that "in the long run, the radiation from the
bomb was more significant than the blast or the thermal
effects" (Miller, 1986: pg 61).
Many of the scientists at Los Alamos who were on the
teams that developed the first atomic bombs returned to
their positions at universities or went on to prestigious
positions in industry.

Though they could now tell their

relatives, friends and colleagues that they had worked on
the bomb, they could tell no one the specifics of the making
of the bomb.

The penalty for disclosure--up to life in

prison.
Some, embittered over their involvement in the project
left the field of nuclear physics altogether.
By August 1, 1946 Truman signed the McMahan bill,
creating the Atomic Energy Commission law.

Five civilian

commissioners would make up the board of the AEC.

The

commissioners gave broad latitude to the field managers in
the day to day operations of the directed operations offices
(Footnote Continued)
energy program, see the debate in Congress over the McMahan
bill and the May-Johnson bill, in Smith (1965).
8

across the country.

At the time of its inception, the

combined operations of the AEC were larger than even those
of General Motors.

The chairman of the AEC, according to H.

Peter Metzger was head of the "glamour agency" and was
number four on the protocol list in DC. This entitled him to
appear at state functions just after the Vice-President, the
Secretary of State, and the Speaker of the House (Metzger,
1972: 8 1) .4
In 1946, two months before the AEC bill was signed into
law, the military set up the first, publically announced
nuclear weapons test in the Pacific Marshall islands.
Code-named "Crossroads, " the test involved the detonation of
two nuclear bombs, with 42, 000 servicemen watching from
ships eight miles away.

The tests created so much

radioactivity that a third nuclear explosion was cancelled.
According to Congressional records, the Radiation Safety
Officer was threatened with a court martial for his stand
that the third shot be cancelled due to the radiological
"nightmare" created by the fallout.5 Nevertheless the
42, 000 men at the test were told they received an insig
nificant amount of radiation and were soon shipped home.
4see also Ball (1986) , for a discussion of the
development of the new agency and the management problems
soon encountered because of the enormous size of the agency.
5

See Bradley (1948) for an account of the Crossroads
experiment.
9

The logistical difficulties of moving over 5, 000 miles
precision equipment, with thousands of men and support
material, led the military to find a site closer to home for
"proof-testing" their newly designed nuclear bombs.

In

January, 1951, the AEC began testing of nuclear weapons at
the Nevada Test Site.

The above ground testing at Nevada

would continue for over a dozen years.

In all, over 110

nuclear explosions were detonated in the twelve year period.
More than a quarter million servicemen participated in the
atmospheric nuclear weapons tests. Some viewed the tests
from airplanes, others from trenches eight miles away.

A

few in volunteer programs were stationed as close as five
hundred yards from ground zero. The explosive force of some
of the nuclear shots were as little as 400 pounds (Titania
10/30/58, in the Operation Hardtack I I series) others topped
the scales at a walloping 74 kt (Hood 7/5/57 in Operation
Plumbbob series) or over three times the explosive force of
the bomb that decimated Hiroshima (Allen et al, vs USA,
1984: Appendix C of the Memorandum Opinion) .
An inevitable byproduct of the nuclear weapons test
program was radioactive fallout.

It was known from the days

of Madame Curie (discoverer of Radium) that radiation caused
injury to human cells and tissue.

Radiation can affect a

living human cell in one of three ways.

In the case of

gamma rays, the ionizing radiation may pass directly through
a cell, causing no damage whatsoever. Or, the radiation may
10

pass through the cell, destroying everything in its path.
In either of these two cases, no long term harm is done.
The damage is done when the radiation passes through a cell
and partially destroys the genetic code of the cell.
cell may lie dormant for a number of years.

The

Then, for

reasons that are still not clear, the cell will begin
replicating at a fantastically rapid pace under the new
genetically altered code.
"cancer 11 • 6

The altered cells are known as

Scientists, legislators, and citizens in the 1950's
were extremely concerned about fallout from the nuclear
weapons test site in Nevada.

Of the short lived isotopes,

Iodine 131 was the most damaging.

By mimicking stable

iodine, the I-131 bombarded the thyroid and could later lead
to thyroid cancer, or diseases and disabilities related to
thyroid destruction.7
The isotope that worried most people however, was
strontium 90.

Sr90 is chemically similar to calcium.

The

6For a more scientific explanation of radiation and the
carcinogenic process, see the opening chapters of Gofman
(1981) and Allen Vs USA, a Memorandum Opinion "II.
Background: Basic Principles of radiation and Nuclear
Physics, " 10-50; 98-129; and 318-406.
7see Ball (1986) "Association Between Radiation
Exposure from Nuclear Fallout and Cancer: the Medical
Controversy, 1961-1985, " particularly references to the
Knapp study (1963) and the Rallison study (1974) on
radioactive iodine and cancer induction.
11

predicted pathway to humans was that fallout would settle on
vegetation which grazing cows would then consume. Strontium
90 would then concentrate 50-100 times above normal in the
cows' milk. 8 The strontium 90 would again concentrate in
the bones and teeth of children drinking the milk by factors
of 50-100.

With its relatively long biological half-life of

28.3 years, and its tendency to deposit in the bones,
Americans were extremely concerned that the weapons testing
would lead to increases in bone related cancers such as
leukemia and osteosarcoma.9
Managing the fallout, both physically and politically
was the most difficult obstacle in the carrying out of the
nuclear weapons testing program by the Atomic Energy
Commission.

Max Weber (1946) warned of bureaucracy's

natural tendency to centralize power for its own benefit.
The response of the AEC to potential political conflict and
redirection of its goals was the use of secrecy and

8 11Above normal" is really a misnomer, since strontium
90 does not occur naturally in nature; there is no "normal"
or "natural background" level of strontium 90.
9on the concern Minnesota scientists had over strontium
in Minnesota wheat, see chapter four below; at the national,
Congressional level, see the discussions of concern over
strontium throughout the 1957 hearings on the "Nature of
Radioactive Fallout and its Effect on Man" before the
Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the JCAE May 27 through
June 3, 1957, particularly 141-161.

12

classification of information as a means of self
protection.

Such control of knowledge is a form of power.

As has been indicated by

Edelman (1964) and Muller (1973) ,

government bureaucrats have the resources to reconstruct
"reality" in their own interest through the suppression of
information and the manipulation of politically charged
symbols.
I

will return to this historical account in the

concluding section, in which I will apply Lukes (1975)
conception of power in an analysis of how the Atomic Energy
Commission became one of the most powerful governmental
institutions in American history.

By rigidly controlling

the flow of information and the production of knowledge on
fallout, the AEC was able to persuade the public, Congress,
and the Courts as to the safety of the nuclear weapons
testing program despite, evidence to the contrary.

As this

thesis points out, however, intellectual dishonesty and
political expediency often got in the way of the true facts
of fallout and its effect on livestock, vegetation and
ultimately man.

13

CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
"Special Cases: " Congressional Investigations
The work for this thesis began over three years ago,
when I discovered a unique set of files in the personal
collection of Dr. Stafford Warren, MD., in the Radiological
Archives of the University of Tennessee.

Dr. Warren was the

medical director for the Manhattan Division from 1943
through 1945.

In 1946, he turned down the position of

director of the Division of Biology and Medicine for the
Atomic Energy Commission, and instead opted for heading the
Los Angeles Atomic Energy Project at the University of
California, Los Angeles.
and S0's, Dr.

From time to time, in the 1940's

Warren was called by the AEC to act as a

medical consultant on cases where individuals claimed injury
to radiation.
The set of files that I discovered

dealt with

approximately 20 individuals: some atomic workers from the
Manhattan Project days; some people downwind from nuclear
tests who claimed injury from weapons fallout; others were
servicemen who took part in the Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons
Tests.

Many of the people in the files exhibited classic

symptoms of radiation injury.

All the cases were denied

diagnosis, treatment, or compensation for their radiation
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injury.

However, in some cases the radiological records

documented overexposures, and/or individuals were
surreptitiously studied as "research cases."

Physical exams

were set up by the Atomic Energy Commission, in their own
words "Solely for Public relations."
In some cases, individuals who claimed injury
repeatedly requested the radiological information.

After

conferences, telexes, phone calls, and internal agency
memos, one very meritorious claimant was told that the
records he requested simply did not exist; if the records
which he requested were collected at all, they were
collected out of personal curiosity of the scientists
involved, the records simply no longer existed.

Yet the

records to which the top level AEC officials referred to
were found in the 250+ page AEC medical/legal dossier kept
on this man.

The chief medical consultant directing the

investigation of the case, Dr.

Stafford Warren, had copies

of both the letter denying the existence of the records, and
the non-existing records in his file.
The policies and practices found in the files touched
on the lives of the 250, 000 servicemen who were participants
in the nuclear weapons tests from 1945-1962; the countless
number of people exposed to radiation downwind from nuclear
tests; and the 600, 000 people who have worked in nuclear
weapons facilities across the country including the 120, 000
people currently employed. There are over a thousand
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lawsuits in today' s courts that have been brought by people
alleging radiation injury from past government nuclear
operations.

Most cases are lost by the plaintiffs for lack

of evidence.

Radiation injuries, in most cases, leave no

smoking guns.

Radiation affects the human cellular

structure in one of three ways. Two of the three ways are
not harmful.

The first way, is that a wave of gamma

radiation, for example, may pass cleanly through a cell and
not cause any cell disruption. The second way is that the
cell may be completely destroyed by a burst of radiation, in
which case, new cells are produced to replace the old one.
The third way radiation disrupts the cell is by passing
through and destroying pieces of the DNA structure.
doing so, it changes the code of the DNA.

By

The cell might

lie dormant for twenty years, then begin replicating itself
with the altered DNA code.

That altered code may result in

any of a number of cancers.
Unlike other diseases such as asbestosis, bysinossis
which can be traced back to their origin, and

sillicosis,

radiation induced cancers are nearly impossible to prove.
That is why complete, honest accounts of one's exposure to
radiation are so important to literally thousands of people
in today's society.
After reviewing the hundreds of pages of documents in
the set of Warren files, I concluded there was at least an
unspoken policy to protect the interests of the Government
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in radiation injury cases in the 1940' s and S0' s .

The

1940' s and S0' s were a time of rapid development of both
America' s nuclear weapons and nuclear energy programs .
"Adverse publicity" as a result of these, and other
documented cases of radiation injury coming under public
scrutiny could have hindered the momentum of these two areas
vital to the development of America' s national security .
So, in the interests of broader American interests, certain
government officials chose to subvert the rights and due
process of American citizens by withholding crucial
information .
That is why the conclusion of every case in the files
closed with words to the effect that there was "no
connection between your condition and exposure to radiation"
despite the fact that some of the cases had documented
records showing over-exposure to radiation .
In persuing my research, I later discovered the file of
Joe Sauter which became the main focus of this study . His
case is a classic example of governmental abuse in
suppressing critical radiological information .
I chose to do my master' s thesis on this subject
because I thought it would be helpful not only to the 1100+
people with over 2 billion dollars of claims against the
government for radiation injuries, but I thought it would be
extremely important to have an accurate account of what
happened during the formative years of both the American
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nuclear weapons and power programs.

I realized that getting

more information than what existed in the original files I
had found would be difficult to impossible.

Going through

the process of the Freedom of Information Act would be
vitually useless, as the Privacy Act of 1974 forbade the
government from releasing documents that contained
information that would consitute invasions of privacy of
American citizens.

Needless to say, sensitive medical and

legal records fall under the provisions of the Privacy Act.
I wanted to get into the central repositories of the
Department of Energy's predessor agency, the Atomic Energy
Commission.

If consultants to the AEC kept their files on

radiation injury cases, surely the government would have
them housed in their main repository in Washington, DC.
The only governmental agency that could help me, I
decided, was a Congressional committee or subcommittee
assigned as a watchdog to the Department of Energy.

On the

recommendation of an executive director from one of the
foundations that has funded my work in the past, I went to
the Energy, Conservation and Power subcommittee. Before
meeting with them, I had written, for their review,
summaries on cases from the files that represented the
government's treatment of a nuclear worker, an atomic
veteran, and an individual claiming injury from fallout.
On April 24, 1984, I met with Jeannine Hull and Allison
Freeman of the Energy, Conservation and Power Subcommittee,
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chaired by Representative Richard Ottinger (D-NY), of the
House Energy and Commerce Committee.

I invited Geoff Sea,

health and stafety representative of the Oil, Chemical, and
Atomic Workers Local 3-689, Piketon, Ohio, and Atty. Cooper
Brown, general counsel of the Washington, DC, office of the
National Association of Atomic Veterans.

I asked them to

speak on how the research affected the rights of nuclear
workers and atomic veterans.
I requested the assistance of the subcommittee in
gaining access to the central files of the AEC, in order to
not only document the cases (such as the Sauter case) which
we already had, but to attempt and uncover any policy papers
which justified or ordered the suppression of critical
information from alleged radiation victims. The number one
priority that I had set for working with the subcommitee was
that no information would be released prematurely, otherwise
DOE would be given a virtual "roadmap" on where to find
similar incriminating documents and bury them even deeper in
their respositories, if not destroy them altogether.

The

subcommittee staff agreed.
The initial response of the subcommittee to my findings
was overwhelming.

Within an hour after our meeting, they

drafted a letter to the DOE Secretary Donald Hodel, stating
that a Congressional investigation was now underway on the
entire medical/radiological record keeping system of the
Atomic Energy Commission.

They requested that I come to
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Washington and lead a Congressional investigation on the
matter, and they would lend me the needed subcommittee staff
to do the job.

I accepted.

Three weeks later, I joined the subcommittee on an
unpaid/temporary basis; I would lead the research effort
into the AEC/DOE Division of Biology and Medicine (DBM)
archives.

DBM was the leading branch in the AEC responsible

for evaluating, and subsequently suppressing the critical
radiological and medical information from the public. The
division within DOE that had assumed the responsibility of
the AEC's Division of Biology and Medicine was the Office of
Health, Environment and Research (OHER) .
Dr. Charles Eddington. 1

OHER was headed by

I met, along with two staffers from the subcommittee,
with Dr.

Eddington, his assistant Dr. Thiessen, and the

head of records for OHER, Mr. Joe Diel. The meeting took
place the last week of May, 1984, in the DOE complex in
Germantown, MD.

The complex, built during the the 1950's,

1Dr. Eddington had been with the DOE and AEC for over
two decades. He was involved in the 1960's human
experiments in which prisoners from Washington and Oregon
had their testicles irradiated, some up to 600 rads. The
experiments were designed to simulate the effects of cosmic
radiation that future NASA astronauts might incur from space
flights. The only other place that experiments of this type
were conducted on humans was in Nazi Germany in the early
40's. Dr. Eddington had been involved in getting the
experiments funded (ABC World Evening News Special by Karen
Burns, November 19, 1984) .
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originally housed the Atomic Energy Commission central
offices.

In the lobby, a scaled-down model of the Trinity

bomb commemorates the development of the atomic bomb.
For an hour, we discussed the record keeping policies
of the AEC/ERDA/DOE.

Each of the officials assured us that

records were scrupulously kept on individuals working in the
DOE facilities.

All the while, the officials asked

indirect, and finally directly, what exactly was it that we
wanted?

At the end of the hour, we answered with a

question: "Where are the records of the Division of Biology
and Medicine. "
Each DOE official looked at the other, waiting for the
other to respond.

Finally, almost in unison they answered

that they did not know where they were.

This is despite the

fact that three men had worked in the AEC, had risen from
the ranks of the Division of Biology and Medicine since the
1950's and 60's.

They said they would research the matter

and get back with us.

Without telling them what we wanted,

they had still gotten more information out of us than we had
gotten out of them.
The next day, I unwittingly broke Congressional
"protocol" by setting up a meeting with the Chief Historian
of the Department of Energy, Dr. Jack Holl. Congressional
protocol is an unwritten code of ethics that is applied to
Congressional investigations.

When setting up the meeting

with Dr. Holl, the correct procedure would have been to
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first contact the Congressional Liaison office of DOE and
have them not only set up the meeting, but have a person
from their office attending the meeting. The liaison
official would take notes of the conversation, often
interjecting on behalf of the DOE official in fielding
difficult questions.
Being with the subcommittee less than week, I was not
aware of the unwritten laws of Congressional protocol. Dr.
Holl met with me and after a 30 minute chat told me the
exact location of the files I was seeking.

Dr. Holl is in

the same office complex as Dr. Eddington, Thiessen, and
Diel.
According to Dr. Holl, one of the last acts of the
Atomic Energy Commission was to appoint a custodian to the
old AEC records.

Holl is the successor to the original

custodian of the files.

When asked of the location of the

DBM files, Dr. Holl said they were stored in 17 different
vaults and secured areas within the DOE complex in
Gernmantown.

In addition to the 17 areas, records were kept

in the DOE Records Center, also in the Germantown complex.
The files in the Records Center were in transition, being
sent from the central DOE archives to one of the regional
Federal Archive Records Centers. Within each Division in the
AEC, there was a custodian of the records who was
responsible for keeping an index of the files which went
from the Records Center to the regional Federal Archive
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Repositories.

Given the length of time which Eddington,

Thessen and Diel had been with the DOE/AEC and given the
fact that Diel was the head of records for that Division
which was responsibile for the DBM files, it was hard to
believe they did not know of the location of their own
files, only three floors away from their own offices.
The subcommittee notified Dr. Eddington and the. DOE
Congressional Affairs office that we had located the files.
DOE's response was surprising.

I did not expect DOE to

contratulate me for so quickly locating the fiels, but
neither did I expect a DOE attorney to call up the staff
director of the Energy Conservation and Power subcommittee
and admonish him for letting his staff people contract DOE
personnel without first going through the DOE Congressional
Affairs office.

The subcommittee informed the DOE attorney

that I was new on the staff and would not do it again.
Though the subcommittee requested immediate access to
the files, the DOE denied access for over two weeks. On June
8, 198 4 , I drew up a procedure paper for reviewing the files

once DOE had given us access to them.

Conflict was

beginning to rise between me, DOE and the subcommittee.

I

believed that DOE was not justified in delaying the
subcommittee access to 25-38 year-old files; I believed that
the subcommittee was not pushing hard enough to gain quicker
access to the files.

I felt that if the AEC had in the past

systematically suppressed information which would prove
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damaging to the agency, then the DOE would be very hesitant
to come forward with that information, even though over
twenty years had elapsed.
In the procedure paper, I outlined the "best of all
possible worlds" method that the subcommittee should have
used when reviewing the files:

first, a congressional

investigator security-cleared for reviewing classified
documents should go over the papers--a close accounting
should be taken of the number of pages in the file folders
so as to make it harder for the DOE to lift material from
the files; second, the subcommittee staff should have the
right to copy the material rather than have a DOE employee
copy it; third, the subcommittee should have the right to
bring the material directly from the DOE secured vaults to
the reviewing rooms to insure that DOE did not take material
out of the files.
I felt that these procedures, if used, would increase
our chances of obtaining unaltered files, but I told the
subcommittee there was a good chance the files were already
in the process of being reviewed and gutted by the DOE.

I

was told by the subcommittee that DOE had never stalled more
in providing the subcommittee with records this old, and
that there was nothing the subcommittee could do but wait.
I called up Rep. Ottinger's personal secretary to set up a
meeting with him, in order 1) to find out if he was even
aware this investigation was underway; and 2) to confirm
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that the subcommittee was doing all it possibly could in
gaining immediate access to the files .

However, I was

informed by Ottinger' s secretary that since I was now part
of the subcommittee staff I would have to go through the
staff director of the subcommittee to have an appointment
made.

I immediately requested a meeting to be set up with

Ottinger through the staff director, but he refused to set
up the meeting.

I was openly critical of the way the

investigation was being handled, and the staff director
seemed not to want this dissension to reach Rep.

Ottinger.

On June 12, 1984, the subcommittee was given access to
the AEC' s Divison of Biology and Medicine files.

It was

clear that DOE had already gone through the files and taken
out incriminating information.

The subcommittee has both

direct and indirect proof of this.

The physical appearance

of the folders was the first indication the files might not
be complete.

Folders which were over 30 years old had what

appeared to be brand new metal prong brief fassteners
attaching the papers to the folders. Indentations in some of
the file folders told of an earlier time in which the
folders held many more papers than the single page which
they now held.
Examples of questionable files included:

A file

labeled ''Medicine Health and Safety Medical Services, Case
Histories'' contained in it a single page with the partial
details of a single case history of a worker suffering from
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exposure to beryllium (Box 3354, File 20).

Yet, in another

file labeled "Treatment and Illness, " this research found
references to 21 other beryllium cases in AEC or AEC
contracted facilities for the same time period as that
covered in the "Case Histories" file ; another file entitled
"Medicine Health and Safety Claims--1953" held only a single
claim.
Material was also improperly filed.

A man claiming he

was exposed to radioactive fallout while prospecting for
uranium in 1955 was found in the file folder "Embalming and
Autopsy Procedures--1953."
Despite the brand new brief fasteners; despite the
files labeled "Case Histories" and "Claims" each containing
only a single page of paper ; despite the file folders with
creases in the sides which obviously meant the files
previously held much more--despite all this, the assistant
to the director of the DOE History Division, Mr. Prentice
Dean, told me that the files had not been altered in any way
since they had come into the historian's possession (Memo,
Honicker to Hull, 6/20/84) .
I informed the subcommittee in detailed memos of the
evidence strongly suggesting the files had been altered. The
subcommittee staff responded that there was no way we could
"prove" the files had been altered as a result of the
congressional investigation, short of a DOE "whistleblower"
coming forward and admitting that he or she had seen files
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being gutted.

At the end of the two weeks spent in the

files (and with no replacement help forthcoming from the
subcommittee staff after my helper had left to work on the
Mondale campaign), I requested that my wife, Jackie Kittrell
(a lawyer who is also a health and safety technical advisor
to the Atomic Trades Labor Council in Oak Ridge) be brought
into the research, again on a voluntary basis, to help
systematically and thoroughly document the inconsistencies
in the altered files.

The subcommittee rejected the request

out of hand, citing the fact that two people from the same
non-profit organization (the Radiation Research Project),
who were also married, would be viewed as nepotism and would
cast a bad light on the image of the subcommittee.

The

subcommittee offered to look around DC for help, or to have
an intern work on the project, but no one with the proper
qualifications was found.

I questioned their reason of

nepotism as the basis for refusing to bring Ms Kittrell into
the investigation, since nepotism, by the very definition of
the word, implies a paying job; the subcommittee staff, in
effect, turned down free, experienced and qualified help to
work on the investigation, when no other help was to be
found.

My confidence in the subcommittee's direction of the

project was quickly eroding.
At the end of June, 1984, I requested an index of the
Division of Biology and Medicine files from Dr. Eddington's
office, files which were stored at the Federal Artchive
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Center in Suitland, Maryland.

Among the 200+ pages of index

file names were five pages of "Special Cases" listings.
Over 80 "special cases" were listed under the title "ASEV
Central files for 1945-1962" (Radiation Exposure Files) .
Nearly half the cases were classified, confidential,
restricted, or secret.

Other cases were marked "Official

Use Only, " which was not a security classification, but
which nevertheless restricted public access.

Some of the

cases listed in the index were the same as the original
files that launched the investigation.

I knew we had found

what we were looking for.
Given the questionable integrity of the files which the
DOE had already provided to the subcommittee, I thought it
imperative to develop a different strategy whereby the files
could be immediately seized, rather than giving the DOE
ample time to edit out the sensitive papers.
I was informed, however, by my subcommittee supervisor,
Jeanine Hull, that there was no other way to obtain the
files rather than filing a request with the DOE and giving
them a reasonable time to provide the files to the
subcommittee.
To determine what a "reasonable time" was, I called the
Suitland repository and asked how soon the records would be
accessible to the subcommittee.

Mr. Jack Saunders in the

Records Certer informed me that if the material had an
accession number and the subcommittee had the approval of
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the DOE division that "owned" the files, then the files
would be available at the repository for review the
following day.

I immediately called the DOE Congressional

Affairs Liaison, Mr. Harold Kneeland, and asked him how long
it would take to get the files once the request was made.
He replied that it would take no more than a few days.
On July 10, 1984, I drafted a request on official
subcommittee stationary, requesting the specific files and
also requesting specifically that the files not be altered,
removed, or destroyed.

The letter was to be signed by the

Chairman of the subcommittee.

I gave the draft letter to

his subcommittee supervisor, Jeanine Hull. Ms Hull ordered
me to redraft the letter, leaving out the paragraph which
requested DOE not to alter the files.

Her explanation was

that she did not want to offend the Congressional Affairs
Liaison person.

She further instructed me to: 1) direct the

memo, not to Secretary of Energy Donald Hodel, but to the
Congressional Affairs Liaison Harold Kneeland ; 2) not to
have the memo come from the chairman of the subcommittee,
Rep. Ottinger, but from me and her ; and 3) not to have the
memo go over on official Energy, Conservation and Power
Subcommittee stationary, but on a plain sheet of paper.

Her

reasoning was by doing it "informally" through the
congressional affairs person "that things would get done
quicker" than sending over a formal request.
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Rather than providing the files to the subcommittee in
one or two days, DOE took ten days to give the subcommittee
access to four boxes of files which were over twenty years
old and which were within arm's reach of the Suitland
archive records official.

When I expressed frustration with

DOE congressional affairs staffperson Harold Kneeland at
taking so long in providing these files to the subcommittee,
he responded that his reviewers worked hard to get the files
reviewed and to the subcomittee in ten days, and that he did
not know it was an urgent matter.

He said he would have

gotten the material to us sooner had we made an "official"
request, rather than making the "unofficial" request to him
on plain stationary.
Again, unfortunately, it was the same story as with the
files which we had already reviewed from the DOE archives in
Germantown.

It was even harder to justify why twenty- to

forty-year old files would have brand new metal prong
fasteners attaching the files to the folders unless it was
done in an attempt to hide the discrepancy in the bend of
the older fasteners if a large amount of papers had been
removed.

Unlike the other files reviewed earlier, these

four boxes did not contain any box or job classification
numbers which a researcher would normally need to identify
and call up the boxes for research purposes.

For these

reasons, this research believes the DOE gutted the files
provided to the Energy Conservation and Power subcommmittee
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as a direct response to the subcommittee investigation of
1984.
Although DOE provided the subcommittee with the DBM
files marked "Minnesota Fallout Data--1957-1959, " the Sauter
file was not to be found.

This is despite the fact that the

primary AEC official in charge of coordinating the
investigation, suppressing the damaging information, and
denying the claim, was the chief of the Nuclear Weapons Test
Effects Branch which was part of the Divison of Biology and
Medicine.

Much of the information in the second chapter was

gathered through the congressional investigation.

As such,

it can be seen as a reflection of the fallout controversy
from a filtered point of view. The first chapter is more a
reflection of what really happened, how scientists in
government stepped out of their roles as scientists and made
highly charged political, non-scientific decisions.
The subcommittee requested that I file a detailed
report of the investigation, listing specific files and
boxes in other repositories that had not been reviewed.

A

letter would then be sent to DOE by the subcommittee
requesting that they neither remove, alter, or destroy the
additional files listed.
Given both the DOE and subcommittee's track record over
the summer in gaining access to these files, I refused at
first to file a report, on the basis that writing up any
part of the project would only provide the DOE with a better
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roadmap in which to seek out and bury more incriminating
information.
After many insistent phone calls from the subcommittee
staffer Jeanine Hull, I agreed on one condition.

I asked

that she have the chairman of the Subcommittee (Rep.
Ottinger) either write or call an individual whom I wanted
to testify in the hearings.

I would not write a

Congressional report without his permission.
would be a crucial part of the report.

His story

Ms Hull agreed to my

request, and said she would try and get the man's permission
to use his story and participate in the hearings.
I later found out (after the man had again refused
permission to let me use his story for the Congressional
report) that Ms Hull from the subcommittee made no effort to
contract the man: she had not even read the 76 page report
documenting his case which I presented to her in April at
our first meeting.
Given that she had not read the documented reports I
had written earlier, it is clear to see the reason for her
complete lack of understanding as to the thrust of the
investigation.
Despite DOE's being mandated by law to comply with the
subcommittee's requests for information, documents, records
and files, and despite the subcommittee's reputation as
being one of the premier watchdogs of the DOE, the Energy,
Power and Conservation subcommittee failed in its attempt to
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gather the "truth and nothing but the truth" from the DOE in
their investigation.
Any number of reasons can be given for their failure: a
lack of understanding on the part of the subcommittee staff
as to the scope and direction of the investigation; an
ever-present protocol that allows for the government agency
being investigated to have plenty of advance notice so as to
cover their tracks; a lack of resources on the subcommittee
side with which to attack the problem, and an abundance of
resources on the DOE side to obfuscate the issue.
Whatever the reason, a common theme can be drawn from
the experiences of the investigation, to Sauter's attempt to
gain the truth about fallout on his farm, to the state of
Minnesota's attempt to gather information from the AEC about
radioactive hot spots in Minnesota.

When a governmental

agency is unaccountable to the people for its actions, no
amount of letter writing from constituents, meetings with
state and congressional representatives, speeches, articles
in newspapers, or Congressional investigations is going to
make the agency accountable for its actions.
Finally, it should be noted that several questions in
the first chapter remain unanswered.

The man who made the

claim of injury from radioactive fallout, Joseph August
Sauter died in 1971, 13 years before I learned about the
case.

His sole surviving daughter, Mary Lou Sauter Young,

was not living with him in the late 1950's, the time the
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claim was made.

His closest nephews, Joe and Willie Sauter,

only vaguely remembered the details of the claim, and as
they lived more than 50 miles away in Morris, Minnesota, it
is understandable their recollections are hazy at best.
As such, the reconstruction of this case is made
primarily from documents obtained during the Congressional
investigation and subsequent Freedom of Information Act
requests from Mary Lou Young.

Additional information was

obtained in personal interviews with more than 20 people who
knew Sauter or were personally involved in fallout
controversy in the 1950 ' s.

I am indebted to Mary Lou, Joe

and William Sauter for their invaluable help and in sharing
their personal memories of Joseph Sauter with me.
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CHAPTER III
THE CASE OF JOE SAUTER
On April 28, 1900, Joseph August Sauter was born in
Morris, Minnesota.

He was the son the German immigrants,

Joe Sauter and Caroline Hunecke.
farm family.

He was born into a large

He was one of 9 children; two died in their

youth, another child was adopted.

Joe worked on his

father's farm from the time he could walk until he was 16.
To most kids of our generation, 16 marks the turning point
in their lives; the freedom of mobility that comes after
passing the test for a driver's license.

To Joe, it marked

the time when he felt duty-bound to enlist in the U.S.
Army, Infantry Division.
A year after signing up, Joe sent his closest sister,
Barbara a picture postcard of himself and his army "buddy."
The postcard picture was taken in France where he was
mustard gassed by German troops.

He was not a tall man, but

he was broad across the chest, square shouldered. He looked
into the camera with bright brown eyes.
but full.

His face was long,

At 17, he looked proud to have served in the last

months of World War I, even if he did have to lie about his
age to get into the Army.
Joe came back from Europe in 1918 and returned to the
family farm in Morris, a small farming community in western
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central Minnesota.

Joe asked his father to let him have one

of the farm' s outbuildings to live in.
than a one-room tar paper shcack.

It was hardly more

Its only heat was a coal

furnace that Joe kept stoked by shovelling in coal through
the front window of the house.
Joe ' s nephews William and "little Joe" Sauter of
Morris, Minnesota, both saw their uncle as an independent,
self-contained man.
Willie said.

"He didn't like to see you coming, "

He was particular about the way his farm was

run and the way his animals were treated.

He was a man not

to be crossed.

Willie worked the farm the year before Joe

died in 197 1.

Though Joe paid him well, Willie knew he was

extremely demanding about how jobs were to be done on the
farm.

One day Willie plowed an extra field for Joe while he

was in town for supplies.

Joe returned, and instead of

thanking Willie, cussed him out for plowing the field wrong.
Willie had plowed the field from north to south instead of
east to west.

To most farmers that would not make much of a

difference, but to Joe it did.

Willie noted, however, even

though Joe had his notions of how even the smallest job was
to be done, there was almost always a pretty good reason
behind doing the job that particular way.

And if you did a

job wrong, Joe never held back from telling you the mistakes
you had made.
Despite the care and attention he took in running the
farm, or because of it, Joe's small log farmhouse with rough
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clapboard siding was a shambles on the inside. There was not
much more than a large room with only an old woodstove that
was used for heating and cooking (although Joe was never a
very good cook), an ancient Fridgedaire refridgerator with
the electric motor housed in the round casing above the
cooler, a wooden table, a few rickety chairs, magazines,
newspapers and books stacked in the corners around the room.
Off to the sides were two sleeping areas, one used by Joe,
and the other by Joe's closest relative and friend, his
older sister Barbara Sauter.
Barbara taught school in Morris, Minnesota.

She later

became superintendent for county schools in Morris. She made
the fifty mile trip from Morris to Farwell often to visit
her brother.

She cooked for Joe, straightened his house and

cleaned his clothes.
for knowledge.

He also helped satisfy Joe's thirst

Willie was amazed how Joe was always into

something, be it taking correspondence courses in diesel
mechanics, studying animal husbandry, checking for parasites
in his animals' feces with a microscope to studying the
lives of the mid-western Indians.

Barbara brought Joe

books, magazines, and kept him up to date on current affairs
by bringing the major Minnesota newspapers with her on her
trips to his farm.
Most of Joe's life was spent outdoors.

When he wasn't

taking care of the farmwork, Joe was criss-crossing his
forests and pastures, checking his animal traps for mink,
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fox and skunks.

He would skin them and hang the pelts up in

the barn until furriers came from the east to buy them.

He

had more ways to hunt than his newphews had ever seen.

The

few times that Willie had seen Joe so talkative was when he
described tracking, hunting and trapping animals.

Willie

said Joe was the only man he had seen that could skin a
skunk and come away not smelling a bit.

Joe invented traps

that guaranteed an animal would stay caught rather than
chewing its leg off and escaping into the woods for a long,
painful death.
In the winter of 1926 Joe married his hometown girl,
Margaret Rose Hoover.

She was several years younger than

Joe and was impressed by his worldly ways, his directness,
and his affections.

Before the marriage ended, Joe sired

two childred, Mary Lou and John.
Joe's independence, love of the outdoors and his
inattention to his domestic life led to a short-lived
marriage.

When his daughter Mary Lou was only 2 years old,

and her young brother only a todler, Rose left Joe to live
alternately with her parents or her cousins in Alexandria,
Minnesota.

The children were told that Joe was dead and did

not even know of his existence until his actual death in
1971.

After the divorce, Joe continued to work his father's

farm, and with Barbara's help, eventually bought the family
farm.
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In the mid- 1930s, Joe began studying mineralogy. With
the fever of gold in his veins, and his sister's geology
books in the trunk, Joe headed out to California to
prospect.

He mined his own shaft for a few years, then,

longing for Minnesota, returned to the family farm. When he
left, Joe put all his mining tools deep in the tunnel and
blew the entrance closed with dynamite.
He later returned to California in the winter of 1947
to reclaim his mine, but he had disguised the entrance so
well, and the terrain had changed so much in his absence,
that he could not find it.

In the spring of 1948 he

returned once again to Minnesota.
Joe decided to sell the 240-acre family farm in Morris
and look for a farm with plenty of water, forests and
pasture, so that, at the age of 50, he could "retire." He
wanted to do nothing but fish, hunt and raise sheep.
Joe found a beautiful piece of land 26 miles northeast
The 124-acre farm was located in the Holmes City

of Morris.

township, 2 miles north
50).

of the town of Farwell (population

The farm had more woodland and rolling hills than

pastureland.

The largest pastures, about 30 acres were

interspersed among the woods of ash, white oak, elm,
boxelders and other hardwoods.
The farm bordered two lakes called Freeborn and Little
Freeborn.
long.

Freeborn was a half mile wide and a mile and half

Freeborn Lake is a fisherman's dream and a popular
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swimming spot for many kids who lived in the surrounding
community.
Joe didn't retire once he bought the Farwell farm. He
made his living raising sheep.

He started raising sheep in

1938 on the family farm in Morris.
"He was well known in those parts for his sheep, " his
nephew Willie said.

"He had the most beautiful sheep you

could lay your eyes on.

He took care of those sheep and

watched over them as if they were his own children."
Joe was fiercely protective of his livestock and did
not tolerate any trespassers on his land that might threaten
his animals.

The time and place where tracks of dogs or

hunters were found were carefully jotted down on a pocket
notebook that Joe carried withhim in his overalls on his
walks across his land.
Joe was not always popular with his neighbors in the
Farwell area.

He angered them by threatening to shoot their

dogs if they came onto his land.

Even domestic dogs will

kill sheep if they run in packs.

Joe was known for meeting

trespassing hunters with his old double-barrel Winchester
shotgun.

He wouldn't have any of his traps disturbed or his

sheep shot by mistake.
One spring, the rains came especially hard.

That

summer the lake continually back-filled onto one of Joe ' s
best bottomland pastures.

He told his neighbors to let the

water out of the earthen dam.

But, for one reason or
40

another the neighbors never got around to letting the water
out .

So, one Sunday morning, while all the neighbors were a

half mile down the road in the Oscar Lake Lutheran Church,
Joe took a crate of dynamite out to the dam and blew a hole
in it .

The water ceased flooding his land, and, as his

nephew Willie dryly remarked, "I imagine they all stood up
that Sunday morning . "
But there was one tresspasser that Sauter was helpless
in stopping .

This tresspasser could neither be heard, seen,

felt, nor tracked by ordinary human means .
On June 18th, 1957 at 4:45 a . m . (Pacific Standard Time)
a 10-kiloton bomb was exploded in the Nevada desert as part
of the Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Test series codenamed
"Operation Plurnbbob . " The bomb was suspended at 500 feet
above the ground in a balloon when it was detonated .

The

radiation from the bomb, codenamed "Wilson", was caught in
the trophospheric winds of the atmosphere and were carried
rapidly away towards the north and the east .

Predicted

traj ectory maps, weather maps tracking the path of the
fallout, would later show one layer of the fallout path
going across the Dakotas and ending in the vicinity of Joe
Sauter ' s farm four days later .

Sauter ' s farm was only a

county away from the North Dakota/South Dakota border .
It ' s very likely the reason the traj ectory map (Figure
1) shows the path of the fallout cloud ending in the
vicinity of Sauter ' s farm on the 22nd is that there was a
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large rainstorm on that day, 1.22 inches according to U.S.
Climatological Data for the Alexandria area, which i s less
than 10 miles from Sauter's farm.

About 90% of the fallout

drops out of the atmosphere as a result of rain.

DATES IMOICATE 0900 Ii C.T. POSITIOII

WIIIN 1 145 ll.C.T. -. 18, 1957

Figure 1 .

Traj ectory Map

Less than a week later, on June 28th, Sauter noticed an
unexplained rust or copper discoloration on his clover.
According to Sauter in his claim filed with the AEC, the
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clover developed holes and was "burned" so that it didn't
develop seed, making it nearly worthless to feed the sheep.
On September 1, 1957, Joe's sheep began to die.

The

first dead sheep were found under a grove of white oak
trees.

The sheep had fed heavily on the white oak leaves

after they had mysteriously fallen off--well before the
first frost.

Sauter called his nephew (and namesake) Joe

Sauter, who lived about 50 miles away, to come and look at
the dying sheep and his "petrified trees. "

The nephew

remarked (when interviewed about the incident in 1984) that
he had never seen anything like what happened to those
trees.

"It was just like the fall come too early, like an

early frost coming. "

The leaves withered; most fell off,

while some hung on the trees long after they should have
fallen.
Sauter described the sheep suffering a stiffness in
their joints which led to complete paralysis before their
deaths.

Those sheep that did not die immediately developed

scours (a severe diarrhea) and what Sauter termed "shrinkage
of the flesh. "

With winter and the birthing time of the

sheep, Joe saw no end of the sheep dying.

Sheep were

stillborn, or severely premature, and few of the birthing
survived.
Within a year he had lost 40% of his herd, over 90
sheep.
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Sauter thought the deaths might be connected to the
"burned" clover .

He bought hay from other farmers to

replace his own .

After that, the sheep seemed to improve .

Though barely high school educated, Sauter was a
perceptive man .
summer .

He closely read the Minnesota papers that

He may have read that Operation Plumbbob in 1957

exploded the most and largest nuclear weapons of any test
series to date .

He may have read reports by Minnesota

scientists revealing that predominant wind patterns brought
the radioactive clouds over Minnesota .

Leading scientists

at the University of Minnesota were concerned about the
long-term effect of fallout .

By this time Sauter had raised

sheep for nearly 20 years .

He knew of no other explanation

for the death of his sheep .

By elimination, Sauter deduced

fallout to be the cause .
Believing that radiation on the vegetation had killed
his sheep, Joe took steps to remove the "poison, " as he
called it, from his land .

On April 21, 1958, Sauter

received burns to his hands and eyes after handling
"limbage" grown on his property .

He thought it was caused

by nuclear fallout on his plants .

After this experience,

Joe began the long, slow process of seeking restitution for
the damages to his farm that he believed were caused by the
negligent actions of the Atomic Energy Commission .
Sauter wrote Sen . Hubert Humphrey to seek help in
filing a claim against the AEC for radiation inj ury to his
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sheep and trees.
Star.

Sen. Humphrey contacted the Minneapolis

They ran a story on Sauter on April 14, 1958 (Figure

2) •

Figure 2 .

Newspaper Article on Sauter
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On April 8, 1958, Sen.

Humphrey wrote Lewis Strauss,

Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, that he had
received a letter from Sauter requesting information on how
to go about filing a claim of damage due to radiation from
fallout.

Humphrey wrote:

Mr. Sauter complained of ' petrified trees•.. and
40% loss on 224 lambs... in the fall of 1957.
[ Occurences of ] dumb birth... loss of parental
instinct, and severity in reduction of masculine
sex... 40 birthed... all in error' (Humphrey to
Strauss, 4/8/58) .
After Humphrey wrote Strauss, he informed Sauter he had
notified the AEC of his case.

On April 12, 1958, Joe Sauter

wrote the "Chief" of the AEC.

An AEC employee typed the

handwritten letter to make it more legible.

In the letter

Sauter claimed:
...although complaint was passed to Washington... I
have seen nothing of any... investigation of the facts.
You are hereby advised that certain vegetation,
the evidence of this date chiefly trees, were stricken
or petrified, and to the best of my knowledge they are
both poisonous and Radioactive... I lost a total of 93
lambs and 2 stock animals immediately and following the
leaf shed from the trees, last fall... I am not
prepared for delayed, or tedious negotiations in this
instance, the evidence as spoken, will be properly
disclosed (Sauter to AEC Chief, 4/12/58) .
On April 22, 1958, K.E. Fields, General Manager of the
AEC, acknowledged receipt of Sauter's letter and informed
him that his claim had been referred to the Commission's
Albuquerque Operations office.

Fields told Sauter that he

would hear from them in the near future .
By mid-May, the investigation of Sauter's claim had
begun by the AEC.

On May 16, 1958, Williaim W. Allaire,
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director of the AEC Albuquerque Operations Office, wrote to
Fred Driver, who was the head veterinarian of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture in St. Paul, Minnesota.

Allaire

requested Driver to send his livestock inspectors out to
Sauter's farm in order to find the sheep' s cause of death.
Allaire informed Driver of the allegation of radiation
injury, but he downplayed the validity of Sauter's claim:
Copies of Mr. Sauter's two letters are enclosed. As
you can see, the exact nature of the damage is not
clear. Your as sistance in investigating this alleged
damage is very much appreciated. We have from time to
time called on personnel from the Department of
Agriculture Animal Disease Eradication Branch to give
us a report of their findings after their visit to such
claimants. In most instances, the damage was found to
be of ordinary disease origin, and not radiation
connected (Allaire to Driver, 5/16/58) .
On May 20 , W.W. Allaire wrote Sauter.

Allaire

dismis sed the claim that Sauter's livestock injuries and
deaths could have been caused by exposure to radioactive
fallout.

Allaire made these statements before any facts or

evidence had been gathered in the investigation of the case.
Nevertheles s, Allaire informed him of how to go about making
a claim against the AEC:
As you are probably aware, the Atomic Energy
Commis sion, through cooperation of other agencies, is
kept informed as to the intensity of radioactivity from
' fallout' throughout the United States. The levels of
radioactivity resulting from the 1957 test region (or
any other continental tests) on any place outside of
the Government-controlled test areas in Nevada, could
not have caused the damaging effects or los s of
livestock as described in your letter. However, we
have asked the U.S. Department of Agriculture to visit
you and to give assistance in determining the cause of
your los ses. You should hear from them shortly (Allaire
to Sauter, 5/20/86) .
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Allaire enclosed copies of the AEC claim from which
Sauter could fill out in triplicate if he still thought he
had a claim against the AEC which could be adequately
supported.

Allaire included with the claim forms a copy of

the government pamphlet "Atomic Tests in Nevada. "

The

pamphlet was written to allay the fears of people living
downwind from the nuclear tests.

It claimed no one had been

injured by radioactivity from the fallout of the nuclear
weapons tests.
The AEC routinely denied claims of radiation injury
before investigation of the facts.

Letters such as the one

sent to Sauter were found in several other medical/legal
files in the course of research. The letters effectively cut
short the development of medical/legal suits being brought
against the government and were sent not only to people
downwind from nuclear tests, but to atomic veterans and
atomic workers claiming injury as well.

When a top AEC

official wrote people uneducated in radiation biology or
nuclear physics, emphatically denying their injuries are
radiation related, it effectively chilled their desires of
filing injury compenstation claims against the AEC.

For

instance, Mildred Rogers from Kerville, Texas, wrote to the
AEC complaining of unexplained burns which she thought might
be radiation related.

On August 14, 1958, Dr. H. D.

Bruner,

Chief of the AEC Division of Biology and Medicine's Medical
Research Division responded to her letter without
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investigating any of the circumstances, enrivonrnental
conditions or radiological data for the area.

Dr. Bruner

wrote:
The current level of radiation from fallout is 1/30th
to 1/40th of that which we receive from X-ray machines
for medical purposes and the naturally radioactive
substances occurring in the earth and our bodies
[ emphasis mine ] (Bruner to Rogers, 8/14/58).
In all but a very few cases would a person desist in
filing a claim after receiving the initial denial letter by
the AEC.

Miss Rogers, along with the vast majority of those

who received such denial letters, dropped the matter.
Sauter persisted.
On May 27, 1958, representatives from the U.S.
Department of Agriculture visited Sauter ' s farm to determine
the cause ofthe sheep's death.

Dr. A. Peterson and Leon

Fleisher, Jr., both livestock inspectors, reported their
findings to Dr. Driver the following day. In their report,
they noted the size and location of Sauter's farm.

The

inspectors said that Sauter followed the practice of
periodically sprinkling builders' lime and flowers of
sulphur into the water at the places where the sheep drank.
They said that the lambs were feeding chiefly on fallen oak
and ash tree leaves.

They collected leaves and hay samples

since Sauter thought that they were contiminated by
radioactive fallout.

If was clear to them Sauter believed

the leaves were the cause of his sheep's deaths.

It was

noted by the livestock insprectors the sheep had been raised
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on the same pastures, under the same conditions for a number
of years, concluding that "there would be indications that
other [ unknown ] problems could be involved. "

(Peterson to

Driver, 5/28/58).
On May 29, 1958, Driver sent Allaire a letter which
summarized the report from Peterson and Fleisher.

He sent

the samples which the inspectors and Sauter had collected,
and requested that the leaves be checked for radioactive
fallout ; then Sauter should be informed of the findings. The
inspector believed this would please Sauter.

Driver

concluded the letter to Allaire:
Our inspectors advise that Mr. Sauter said nothing
about claiming any damages during their visit and they
believe that maybe the pamphlet [ "Atomic Tests in
Nevada" ] that you forwarded to him helped (Driver to
Allaire, 5/29/58).
The bottom line of the pamphlet was that the fallout
from the nuclear tests had not caused illness or injury to
anyone living near the Nevada Test Site.

Rosenberg, (1980:

77-78) notes:
The pamphlet, chock full of misleading and inaccurate
information, should be written in the annals of social
psychology as a hallmark in government attempts to
propagandize the populace.
Despite the impressions made upon the livestock
inspectors of Sauter's seeming quiescence, Sauter went ahead
and filed a claim of damages against the AEC on June 12,
1958 (see Appendix A. )
After Sauter filed the claim, the AEC earnestly began
gathering medical, radiological, rain and air monitoring
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data on the Sauter claim.

The vegetation samples collected

by the livestock inspectors and by Sauter were sent to the
AEC' s Health and Safety Labs (HASL) in New York for
analysis.

Allaire thought that a gross beta reading would

be all that was necessary

(Allaire to Dunham, 6/6/58).

That is not surprising, given that they expected to find
only normal background ranges of radiation in the
vegetation.
Although Sauter was over a thousand miles away from the
test site, the AEC, rather than using an in-house physician,
chose Dr. Donald Chadwick to gather the medical information
concerning the personal damage protion of Sauter's claim,
which totalled $15.60 in personal injuries.

Dr. Chadwick

was the Chief of Program Services, Radiological Heath
Medical Program, Division of Special Health Service of the
U.S.

Public Health Services.

He was also a member of the

Federal Radiation Council.
On July 1, 1958, Dr. Chadwick wrote to Sauter. Chadwick
asked for more specific information on the burns--how soon
after handling the "limbage" did the unidentified burns
appear, what was the nature of the burns, and what happened
with the passage of time. Chadwick also requested the name
and address of the physicians who treated Sauter, along with
permission to obtain the medical records and findings for
the consideration of compensation of his personal injury
claim.
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Radioactive Leaves
On July 11, 1958, Dr. John Harley, Chief of the
Analytical Branch of the Health and Safety Labs, wrote a
memo to Dr. Gordon Dunning regarding the Sauter vegetation
samples.

Dunning was the head of the Effects of Nuclear

Weapons Testing Branch within the AEC Division of Biology
and Medicine.

Dunning, a PhD . in Science Education, was a

key figure in evaluating and dismissing radiation injury
claims made against the AEC.

Dr. Harley enclosed the

results of the gross beta counts on the vegetation from the
Sauter farm.

He specifically left the interpretation of the

results up to Dr. Dunning.
Nine samples were collected- -five by Sauter and four by
Peterson, the livestock inspector.
1957 oak and ash tree leaves.

The samples included the

Sauter found the first dead

sheep under the oak and ash trees on September 1, 1957.
Samples of clove, box elder, and rock elm were also
included.

The counts ranged from 730 disintegrations per

minute per gram ash for the mixed 1957-58 leaves to 4900
d/m/g/ash for the 1957 white oak leaf sample.
The counts on the very leaves Sauter said his sheep ate
before they died were more than 100 times above normal
background radiation levels at the time the samples were
taken.

Taking the decay curve into account, the intensity

of the radiation at the time of the initial fallout was even
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higher.
the fact.

Dunning knew he was measuring fallout long after
Had he taken the data and gone backwards,

factoring in the half-life decay rates, the readings on
Sauter's farm on the day of the initial fallout could have
possibly been closer to thousands of times higher than
normal background radiation levels.
Keeping the Lid on a Controversy
The AEC's response to the high levels of radioactivity
in Sauter's vegetation was the opposite of both their duties
and responsibilities to Sauter and the American public.
On July 15, 1958, after the results of the analyses
were obtained from Dr. Harley, W. W. Allaire wrote a memo
which noted the highlights of a telephone conversation with
Dr.

Gordon Dunning.

Of the five points mentioned

concerning Sauter's claim, the first is the most important:
Dunning has data on gross beta counts for foliage
collected in connection with the Sauter claim. This
is a very high number, 75 or 100 times backgroun�
Dunning feels that although the intensity is not
harmful, disclosure of these numbers might be
misinterpreted and thus damaging [ emphasis mine ]
(Allaire memo to files, 7/15/58).
The integrity of the investigation of Sauter's claim
collapsed at the moment these two top AEC officials
knowingly chose to suppress the true levels of radioactivity
on Sauter's farm.

Their decision precluded independent

scientists from making their own interpretations of the
data, mainly calculating back to the time of the fallout to
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determine how much radiation the sheep were exposed to, both
externally and internally. The AEC made endless
pronouncements in press releases, at public hearings, before
congressional and judicial bodies of the AEC's commitment to
Since

release all the available data on fallout in America.

they were the only governmental agency capable of accurately
assessing the dangers of nuclear fallout on a comprehensive
level, the public, courts and congress put great faith in
the AEC's pronouncements.

As early as 195 3 , Richard D.

Elliot, Director of Information in the AEC Santa Fe
Operations Office, delivered a special report which stressed
four major obligations to the AEC:
1. To inform concerned publics of the hazards created
and of preventive action which may be taken;
2. To warn people in advance of potentially hazardous
stiuations, or situations which may alarm them;
3. To report after the fact not only with
reassurances but also with details and
interpretations;
4. And, to the extent of the agency's responsibility,
to reimburse the public for its losses (Hacker, from
draft manuscript, n. d: ch. 10, p. 34).
Given the levels of radiation on Sauter's farm it is
obvious the AEC failed at the very least on the first two
obligations by not telling Sauter what preventative measures
he could take against chronic exposure to low levels of
radiation that would persist for years.

On the third and

fourth obligations, the only part which the AEC fulfilled
was to report back with reassurances, not with details or
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honest interpretations.

At no point did the AEC officials

make any attempt to reconstruct the internal dose rate in
order to determine how much radiation the sheep had received
from eating the radioactive leaves. Their strategy was to
suppress the radiological information, minimize the
finding's importance between themselves, and thus prevent
the "embarrassment" of a medical/legal suit being brought
against the government at a time when the state of Minnesota
and the country was highly sensitive to the issue of fallout
from nuclear weapons testing.
The second and third points of the Allaire memo to the
files dealt with the level of Strontium 90 in the samples.
Sr90 is considered to be one of the most harmful isotopes
from fallout.

Its chemical similarity to calcium makes it a

bone seeker--radiation in the bones can cause leukemia and
osteosarcoma.

With its 29-year biological half-life, Sr90

is a predominant isotope from nuclear weapons fallout after
most of the short-lived isotopes have decayed away.

Allaire

noted that it would take another 6 to 8 weeks before a
reliable result could be obtained on the Strontium 90 levels
in the samples. Allaire quoted Dunning as saying (long
before the results were even known) :
Dunning says that he feels the strontium content is
such could then safely state to Mr. Sauter (or others)
that plant life with this amount of strontium could be
consumed for X number of years without harmful results
(Allaire memo to files , 7/15/58) .
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It was a common saying by AEC officials such as Willard
Libby during the fifties that a cow would have to eat
several tons of hay before they would perceive harmful doses
of radiation.

Consistent with the AEC denial of injury

before the investiation was conducted and the pamphlet
"Atomic Tests in Nevada, " which stated in effect that
radiation from the nuclear tests had not caused a single
injury in or outside of the nuclear tests site, the AEC
first came up with the conclusion of no harm, then sought
facts to support their conclusion.
Dunning and Allaire were not the only officials who
participated in, or knew of, the suppression of key
radiological data damaging to the -AEC.

Copies of Allaire's

memo to the files were sent to Oliver Placak, the USPHS
official responsible for overseeing the Public Health
Service Nevada Test Site offsite radiation monitoring
program in Nevada; M. E. Smith, Chief of the AEC Las Vegas
Branch; and Roscoe Goeke, Radiological Safety Advisor of the
Office of Test Operations.

Any one of these people could

have spoken out against the suppression of the information,
but they kept silent.
Instead, four weeks after the memo recommending
suppression of the information, Roscoe Goeke wrote W. W.
Allaire, head of Nevada operations, in order to further
minimize the radiologcial findings from the Sauter farm.
Goeke's memo reads:
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In order to be able to better evaluate the analysis
of tree leaves, grass, and hay conducted by NYOO in
connection with the Sauter claim, I called Dr. John
Harley and discussed with him the results obtained and
how they compared to results obtained from samples
collected in other parts of the United States.
Dr. Harley indicated that · normal ' background to
them means the background level prior to the start of
weapons testing and that is consisted only of
potassium beta radiation. Using this figure Dr.
Dunning ' s statement that the Sauter sample figures
were about 100 times over background is probably
correct. However, this is not a fair comparison.
Rather, comparison to samples from other parts of the
United States collected after weapons testing started
should be made. Dr. Harley said that results of
sampling last fall in Vermont and lower New Hampshire
were in this same general range. This confirms the
PHS data from Texas given to us by Mel Carter on 12
August by telephone.
NYOO is presently running Sr90 analysis on three
samples having the highest gross beta count. Results
will be sent to us by memorandum by this Friday, the
15th. A preliminary look at the results indicated
that they were in the same range as elsewhere in the
United States (Goeke to Allaire, 8/13/1958).
Goeke ' s logic is absurd.

According to Dr. H.D. Bruner,

the head of Medical Research for the AEC ' s Division of
Biology and Medicine,
The current level of radiation from fallout is l/30th
to 1/40th of that which we receive from x-ray
machines for medical purposes and the naturally
radioactive substances occuring in the earth and our
bodies (Bruner to Rogers, 8/14/58).
Either Goeke or Bruner was seriously misleading. 100
times over background was never considered "normal
background range" by scientists outside of the Atomic Energy
Commission.

Even "fresh" levels of radiation 100 times

background would be news in states like Vermont and Texas.
Of course, the most serious flaw in Goeke's logic is
the fact that the radiological analyses were made a year
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after the fallout.

Goeke was comparing vegetation samples

taken when the fallout was "fresh" with samples taken a year
after the initial fallout.

Although the use of decay curves

was fundamental to men in his position, Goeke omitted this
crucial factor in his analysis of the situation to Allaire.
There is no excuse for this omission.

Goeke's statement of

the Sr90 samples being "in the same range as elsewhere in
the United States" was equally misleading.

Dr. Harley at

the AEC New York Operations Health and Safety Labs (NYOO)
ran Strontium 90 analyses on only three of the samples,
since the cost for running each sample was over $100.

The

counts on the samples ranged from 43.3 + - 2.3 d/m/g ash to
83.6 + - 7.6 d/m/g ash.

Based on their guestimate of the

level of calcium in the samples, Dr. Harley estimated the
level of Strontium 90 in the samples to range from 393 +- 21
micromicrocuries per gram calcium to 760 +- 69
micromicrocuries per gram calcium (uuc/g ca).
One week after the completion of the Strontium 90 tests
Allaire wrote the Chief Veterinarian of the U.S. Department
of Agriculture, erroneously "updating' him on the Sauter
case:
We would like to bring you up to date on what has
transpired on this case since our last letter. The
samples of hay, leaves and branches of trees from the
sheep pastures have been analyzed by the AEC Health
and Safety Laboratory, for gross beta and Strontium 90
activity. The gross beta activity in these samples is
in the same range as normal background levels found in
samples obtained from Vermont, New Hampshire, and
Texas. Three samples were analyzed specificially for
the isotope Strontium 90. Results of this analysis
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were reported in sunshine units [ micromicrocuries Sr90
per gram calcium ] and they are somewhat higher than
the national average, but we do not feel they are high
enough to have caused the damage alleged by Mr.
Sauter [ emphasis mine ] (Allaire to Driver, 9/5/58) .
If one does not take the decay factor into account, the
counts on the Sauter farm could have been in the same range
as post-shot radiation levels found in Vermont, New
Hampshire and Texas.

It may have been "routine" for the AEC

to find levels 100 times above background in scattered
spots across the country following nuclear explosions. But,
as Sauter was never truly informed of the radiation on his
farm, neither were the people of the states of Vermont, New
Hampshire and Texas ever informed.

There is certainly

nothing in the history books, congressional hearing reports,
or newspapers to indicate otherwise.
As to the Strontium 90 counts being "somewhat higher
than the national average, " as Allaire said, or, "the same
range as elsewhere in the United States" as Goeke said, not
only were the counts more than 100 times above the level of
Strontium 90 found in American hay, they were higher than
any Strontium 90 levels found in St. George, Utah, for the
same time.

(St. George is reputed to be the community with

the highest level of exposure to fallout from nuclear
weapons testing in the country.)

The levels of Strontium 90

on Sauter's farm were higher than any levels reported to the
state of Minnesota in its 1958-59 efforts to obtain all the
relevant data on fallout in Minnesota from the Atomic Energy
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Commission.

Finally, the levels of Strontium 90 on Sauter's

farm were higher than any of the levels of Strontium 90
reported to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 1959
comprehensive hearings on fallout.
Despite the fact that the most critical leaf samples
was higher in Strontium 90 than any level reported to
Congress of Strontium 90 in American vegetation, the AEC
could still justify away its existence.

The position of

C.L. Weaver, Radiological Safety Advisor of the Albuquerque
Operations Office was that even though the levels of
Strontium 90 were over 100 times that found in American hay,
and 5-8 times over the maximum permissible limit for safe
human consumption, it was not a serious matter since the
levels were not high enough to cause a rapid death in sheep
as Sauter claimed.

(Weaver to files, 4/2/59: p.4) .

None of

the AEC officials, however, considered the obvious fact,
that at the time of the initial fallout, Strontium 90 made
up a very small fraction of the total radioactivity.
For instance, in the 1959 Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy Hearings on fallout from nuclear weapons tests, the
chairman of the subcommittee conducting the hearings, Rep.
Chet Holifield, requested additional information on Sr90 and
its relation to the whole spectrum of fission products in
nuclear fallout.

In the supplement provided to the

subcommittee, AEC scientists responded to Holifield's
request of Strontium 90 relative to the total level of
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radioactivity from fallout.

The AEC scientists wrote (the

supplement had no author ' s name) that determining the level
of radioactivity could be approximated by finding the level
of Sr90, then finding the approximate time of deposition of
fallout with the use of predicted trajectory maps.

From

these two sets of facts, one could then take the decay
curves into account:
The Strontium 90 content of fission debris is less
than 1/20, 000 of the total radioactivity in the first
two days after detonation and increases gradually to
1/10, 000 in four days, 1/5000 in eight days, and
1/2000 in twenty-five days (Hearings (1959: 2119) .
Weaver and Dunning had the three keys to make the most
basic analysis on the level of radioactivity from the
initial fallout on Sauter ' s farm.

They had Sauter ' s account

of the first abnormal signs on his farm beginning in the
last week of June, 1957.

Dunning had the trajectory maps

from Operation Plumbbob that showed the Wilson shot ending
in the vicinity of Sauter ' s farm on June 22nd.

A simple

phone call to the Minneapolis newspaper would have confirmed
the heavy downpours in the area on that day.
Weaver could have put the facts together.

Dunning and

They knew that

the Sr90 in the one sample on Sauter ' s farm, though higher
than any levels released to the American public, may have
been only 1/10, 000 of the total level of radioactivity.

The

two AEC scientists, Dunning and Weaver, knew that other
isotopes may have posed much more serious threats at the
time of the fallout, but they ignored the other isotopes.
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After Allaire assured the chief livestock veterinarian
inspector for the state of Minnesota that the sheep on
Sauter's farm were not killed by radiation from the nuclear
weapons test, he asked him to have his people come up with
an alternative explanation for their deaths. Ironically, he
wrote:
The burden of proof for this claim is Mr. Sauter's,
however, we need for our record and reply to the
claimant, a statement from your Department on the
possible cause of livestock loss. An additional
investigation by the Veterinary Livestock Inspector
and determination, if possible, of the cause for the
loss of lambs would be appreciated. I t is our opinion
that this loss is not radiation connected, based on
the gross beta and Strontium 90 activity found in the
foilage [ sic ] samples." (Allaire to Driver, 9/5/58).
Allaire concluded the letter by recounting how the AEC
dealt with mysterious livestock losses around the Nevada
Test Site:
We have a Veterinary Officer at the Nevada Test Site
assigned for investigating claims of alleged damage
due to fallout radiation. As a result of numerous
claims received in this area, our experience shows
that the damage is usually the result of livestock or
range management, or a common endemic disease and is
not the result of fallout radiation (Allaire to
Driver, 9/5/58).
The livestock inspectors returned to Sauter's farm at
the request of the AEC, but were unable to make a diagnosis
of the cause of death due to the badly decomposed state of
the carcasses.

Peterson, the livestock inspector who

visited Sauter's farm, concluded:
I do not think it possible to arrive at a definate
[ sic ] diagnosis as to the cause of death. All we have
to go by is what Mr. Sauter can tell us and that is
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somewhat limited and of little value. As stated
before these sheep were being fed cheifly [ sic ] from
falling leaves from trees on his farm togather [ sic ]
will [ sic ] small portions of alfalfa hay. I assume it
possible these sheep could have overeaten on these
leaves (Peterson, Wentworth to Driver, 9/11/58) .
Since the description of the death of the sheep did not
resemble any endemic disease which the livestock inspectors
were familiar with (since they had earlier ruled out
livestock mismanagement) , and since Allaire had effectively
eliminated radiation as a possible cause by conveying false
information on the results and interpretations of the beta
and Strontium 90 activity, the inspectors were at a loss to
explain the cause of death, other than the possiblity of the
sheep overeating on the falling leaves.
An attempt to gather the records of the livestock
inspectors on the Sauter case bore no fruit because, by
1986, Allaire, Peterson and Wentworth, the chief of
livestock veterinary inspection for the state of Minnesota
at that time, were all dead.
On October 23, 1958, Gordon Dunning responded to a
request from Allaire's assistant manager, James E. Reeves.
Reeves wanted Dunning's opinion on Sauter's claim of
radiation damage from fallout.

Dunning's letter is included

as Appendix B.
This letter raised more questions than it answered.
When Dunning stated the exposure in the Farwell, Minnesota ,
area "probably had been less than 100 milliroentgens", where
did he get this information and what was the dose rate?

Was
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it 100 mr/hour, per day, per month, per year?

He stated

that this amount
would not produce any observable effects on humans,
plants, or animals....fallout... that would produce
this external gamma exposure could also produce
external and internal beta exposure (Dunning to Reeves,
10/23/58).
How did he determine these "potential beta doses...
might be...

tens of rads in the plant tissues"?

Since he

calculated the external beta dose to the plants to be in the
"tens of rads", why did ne not go ahead and calculate the
internal beta dose the sheep would have received from eating
the plants?

Again, is he basing this calculation of tens of

rads beta radioactivity without fully extrapolating back to
the time of the initial fallout?
Dunning recommended that more monitoring be done in the
Farwell area if Sauter's case were to come to court, but he
did not suggest more in-depth monitoring should be done
otherwise.

Given the fact the Strontium 90 levels were

higher than the highest levels reported to Congress in 1959,
the AEC clearly failed in its responsibilities to monitor a
known area where there might be future health problems due
to chronic above-background levels of radiation.
Denying Personal Injury
With the "analysis" of the vegetation and livestock
portion of Sauter's claim neatly wrapped up by Dunning and
Allaire, the AEC turned its attention to gathering all the
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evidence against Sauter on the $15.60 portion of his claim
of personal injury.

On December 1, 1958, R. Goeke, Rad

Safety Advisor at Albuquerque Operations Office wrote J.G.
Terrill, Jr., of the USPHS.
in Dr.

He requested the USPHS to send

Chadwick ' s findings of their medical investigation

on Sauter:
Completion of the denial of this claim is pending
until we hear from your office concerning your
investigation and receive the report of your findings.
Other portions relative to this claim have been
completed and our legal staff desires to consummate
this claim as soon as possible [ emphasis mine ] (Goeke
to Terrill, 12/1/58).
Dr. Chadwick had received a two-page letter from Sauter
on July 19, 1958, concerning the injuries he thought were
related to fallout.

Sauter complained of temple and

forehead headaches, socket headaches.

In April of 1958,

Sauter experienced burns on his hands after sawing off
deformed limbs from the trees he said were " stricken" by
fallout in 1957.

Sauter described in detail the wind

patterns, dates, and occurrences of burning eyes, burns on
the " left shoulder swivel leaving brand purple red, pain in
wrist hinge, deep." On June 4th, 1958, with the winds from
the southeast, his wrist joints began hurting and the
headaches returned. He noted that the leaves on the trees,
He

especially the white oaks, were turned over, reversed.
saw evidence the fallout was still coming.
clover were scorched on the ground.

Patches of his

With fallout still

coming, he refused to accept whatever the AEC gave him as a
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final settlement.

He seriously believed his farm was being

hit by radioactive fallout.

Any reports to the contrary by

the AEC would be seen by him as '' (1) stupid or (2) willfull,
premeditated deceit." Sauter wrote Dr. Chadwick, "At best,
you are in serious error with superfluous fallout, in the
settled regions or populace."
Sauter concluded the letter to Chadwick with a call for
taking positive steps to reduce the hazards to radiation
exposure on his farm:
In conclusion, it is believed on my part, that you, of
the great Health Division could well employ,
experimental or otherwise, a calcine, either dust or
spray over this recent stricken areas, and attempt at
least to neutralize some of the evil element, instead
of telling stricken people, the trees are just dying
of old age and other false preachings (Sauter to
Chadwick , 7/9/58).
Dr. Chadwick had requested a report from Sauter's
doctors, Drs. R.D. Letson and G.E. Lee, as to their opinions
of the origins of burns on Sauter' s hands and eyes.
Chadwick received a single paragraph letter from each of the
doctors saying the cause of the non-specific burns were
unknown, but probably not radiation related. The extent of
the eminent Dr. Chadwick' s medical investigation was to get
on record the statement of two country doctors that Joe
Sauter' s burns on his hands and eyes were not radiation
related.
Is it plausible that these two country doctors would
have recognized radiation burns if they had been confronted
which such?

According to Collins and Gauldin (1980) several
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studies have been reported in the late 1960s and 70s of
urban physicians who were unable to detect clas sic symptoms
of radiation burns.

One case in 1974 involved a child with

radiation burns who was examined by 16 physicians over a
20-month period, but whose diagnosis of radiation burns went
unmade.

The authors who wrote up this case study concluded:

An information gap characterizes the two groups of
people whose expertice would bear upon the detection
and prevention of such an incident. From the first
appearance of a change in skin... to the ultimate
recognition of the etiology, some 16 physicians saw
the lesions. It is quite possible that none of them
had ever seen a radiation reaction or radiation
necrosis. Similarly, the custodians of radiation
sources and authorities for licensing and control are
not apt to be aware of... the spectrum of injuries
that might be encountered in the physician ' s office or
the hospital emergency room (Collins and Gaulden,
cited in Fry and Hubner, 1980: 202).
At best, without blood charts, visual examination of
the burns, or more detailed information, the logical and
objective position to be taken by Dr. Chadwick would have
been there was not enough information to decide one way or
another as to the cause of Sauter ' s burns.

Instead, Dr.

Chadwick and the USPHS took the position of vigorously
gathering the information which would refute the claim, in
this case two country doctors ' opinions on radiaiton burns
in western Minnesota in 1958.

Allaire later requested

Chadwick write back to the two country doctors and have them
provide the AEC with an alternative diagnosis, so that the
AEC ' s position on the $ 15.60 portion of Sauter ' s claim for
personal injury would be strengthened (Allaire to Chadwick,
5/21/ 59).

No alternative analysis was found in the file.
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The AEC had gathered a sufficient amouont of evidence
to buttress their case against Sauter.
W.W.

On April 1, 1959,

Allaire sent Sauter a simple, two-paragraph letter:
Dear Mr. Sauter:
Your claim under Section 167, Atomic Energy Act of
1954 for damage to livestock, trees, personal burns,
and paint on your barn submitted June 12, 1958 has
been thoroughly investigated.
We have been unable to find any evidence to support
your claim that the fallout from the Atomic Energy
Commission tests at the Nevada Test Site caused this
alleged damage. On the contrary, all indications are
that such fallout did not cause the alleged damage.
Therefore, we must deny your claim (Allaire to
Sauter, 4/1/59).
On the same day, James Reeves (Allaire's assistant at

the Albuquerque Operations Office) wrote Brig. General
Alfred Starbird concerning the Sauter claim.

Starbird was

the head of the AEC Division of Military Applications and
was kept informed of radiation injury claims due to fallout
being brouhgt against the AEC.

Reeves sent to Starbird a

carbon of the final notice to Sauter denying compensation
"since investigations revealed no evidence to support the
claim.'' (Reeves to Starbird, 4/1/59).

Reeves warned that

Sauter might continue to pursue his case through the support
of his congressmen.

In light of recent news reports on high

levels of Strontium 90 being found in Minnesota wheat
samples, Reeves thought it important that Starbird contact
the AEC Congressional Liaison Office so they could be
prepared in case Sauter took this course of action.

It's

worthwhile to note the Minnesota wheat samples Reeves
referred to in the memo were reported to have contained the
68

highest samples of Strontium 90 in the U.S. (testimony of
Charles Dunham in 1959 JCAE Hearings on Fallout, May 5-9, p.
2 7).

Yet the counts on Sauter ' s farm exceeded the levels of

Strontium 90 reported to Congress only a month after this
letter was written.

Reeves concluded the correspondence

with: "Dr. Dunning of DBM [ Division of Biology and Medicine]
has complete information on this investigation."

(Reeves to

Starbird, 4/1/59).
The day after Reeves wrote his letter to General
Starbird, C.L. Weaver, Radiological Safety Advisor of the
Albuquerque Operaitons Office, drafted an AEC legal defense
position paper.

The seven-page draft was marked "Operation

Test Office Files."

Presumably it would be used in the

event the Sauter case became active litigation.

The

position paper first focused on the fact the sheep died
after drinking the water treated with builder ' s lime and
flowers of sulphur.

The paper did not mention the water had

been treated this way six years previously without ill
effect, and that the first dead sheep were found under the
most radioactive trees and did not have access to the
treated water.

Weaver said the primary defense of the AEC

would focus on a tactic used in the 1954 Nevada sheep trail
cases where they would have experts testify that fallout in
the Minnesota area was:
less than 1 mr/hr during the summer of 1957 [ which]
could not cause sheep death in September and October,
1957. Experimental evidence would be our primary
defense plus the fact Mr. Sauter could not show death
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was not attributable to drinking poisoned water
(Weaver, 4/2/59, p. 2) .
At the very least, if Dunning's estimate of the beta
radioactivity dose being in "the tens of rads in the Farwell
area" (an mr, millirem, is one thousandth of a rem) was
correct, then it is obvious that the "expert" witnesses
could not have been telling the truth.
Weaver then detailed the damages to the trees and
clover on Sauter's farm.

Though listing the levels of beta

activity in the 9 samples from Sauter's farm, Weaver failed
to mention the levels were over 100 times normal background
radiation.

Consistent with Dunning's actions Weaver failed

to do a dose reconstruction, based on the decay of the
radioisotopes from the time of the initial fallout and the
time the samples were analyzed.

For this reason Weaver

concluded the animals could not have died so quickly from
such low levels of radioactivity.
It is clear that in the event of litigation the AEC
would have used the data most suitable to their conclusions.
Weaver minimized the fallout problem in Farwell by comparing
the levels of fallout in air and rainwater samples collected
in Minneapolis (over 130 miles east of Farwell) with those
levels tested at the Nevada

Test Site.

Weaver concluded:

It is difficult to compare results in this case except
to show that the highest activity in rain water
analyzed at NTS [ Nevada Test Site ] was about 5 times
higher than the highest rain water analyzed from
Minneapolis, Minnesota. . . It is not believed than
[ sic ] an investigation of predicted trajectories
furnished by the USWB [ U. S. Weather Bureau ] is
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necessary. The results obtained by the PHS
surveillance Network are much more useable and give
figures which can be compared to other locations
[ emphasis mine ] (Weaver, 4/2/59, p.6) .
The trajectories Weaver was referring to were maps
which traced the fallout paths of the different nuclear
explosions from the Operation Plumbbob series and were sent
to Dunning two months earlier by Lester Machta from the
USWB.

The maps showed over 40% of the fallout paths from

Operation Plumbbob passing over the state of Minnesota with
the fallout from five nuclear explosions passing over the
Farwell, Minnesota, area.

The trajectory maps would have

lent support to Sauter's claim, so they were not to be a
part of the defense used by the AEC in the event Sauter took
the AEC to court.

Given the high counts in Farwell, showing

the fallout path could have only proved detrimental to the
AEC ' s case.

The AEC was more comfortable with using

radiation monitoring results taken over 100 miles away
rather than extrapolating the levels of radiation based on
samples collected on Sauter's farm.
Summary of Laws Broken by AEC
On the AEC claim form which William Allaire, Director
of the AEC Albuquerque Operations Office, sent to Sauter,
two laws were cited which told of severe punishments should
Sauter file a fictitious claim.

Since they are central to

this paper they are quoted in full:
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18 USC Subsection 287--False, fictitious or fraudulent
claims
Whoever makes or prepresents to any person or officer
in the civil, military, or naval service of the United
States, or any department or agency thereof, any claim
upon or against the United States, or any department
or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false,
fictitious, or fraudulent, shall be fined not more
than $10, 000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both (June 25, 1948, ch. 645 62 Stat. 698) .
It is clear Sauter had a strong incentive not to
knowingly make a false claim against the government. Based
on the evidence brought out in this research report, it is
clear Sauter ' s claim of radiation injury had merit. The
other law which appeared on the AEC claim form was similar
to the one quote above, but its generality leads this
researcher to believe it could apply not only to Sauter but
to those evaluating the claim as well:
18 USC Subsection 10001--Statements or entries
generally
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States knowingly or
willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any
trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any
false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or
representations, or makes or uses any false writing or
document knowing the same to contain any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statements or entry, shall be
fined not more than $10, 000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62
Stat . 749) .
When the first law was written to protect the interest
of the United States Government against those who would make
false claims, the lawmakers decided to write a companion law
to protect the interest of the individual in cases where
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people in government agencies would make fraudulent
representations in order to protect the interests of the
particular government agency.
the AEC violate the second law?

Did the representatives of
It has been the intention

of this report, not to "prove" that the death of Sauter's
sheep was caused by radiation, but to prove that the
representatives of the AEC knowingly, willfully concealed
material facts, made false statements and representations in
order to protect the interest of the Atomic Energy
Commission.

When Dr. Dunning and W.W. Allaire agreed to

suppress the true levels of radiation on the Sauter farm to
prevent damaging the AEC, they were concealing a critical
material fact.

When Allaire reported to the chief

veterinarian of the U.S. Department of Agriculture that the
beta radiation on Sauter; s farm was within the "normal
background range, " he was knowingly making a false
representation.

When James Reeves, W.W. Allaire's assistant

manager of AEC Albuquerque Operations Office, wrote the
director of the AEC Division of Military Applications
stating "investigations reveal no evidence to support
Sauter's claim, " he was knowingly making a false statement.
And finally, when the Radiological Safety Advisor, C.L.
Weaver was putting together the legal defense position paper
and noted they could get witnesses to testify the levels of
radiaiton over Minnesota were less than 1 mr/hr, and chose
to use evidence taken over 100 miles east of Sauter's farm
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which proved favorable to the AEC ' s stand, he was willfully
prepared to make fraudulent representations on the behalf of
the Atomic Energy Commission.
Had Sauter knowingly filed a false claim, it would have
been easy enough for the AEC to prove the falsehoods. They
could have sent government investigators--from their own
security investigators to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation--to verify the facts stated in his claim. They
could have gone around to his neighbors and found out if
Sauter held any open hostilities toward the government in
general or the AEC in particular.

With the extensive labs

and scientists available to the agency, the AEC, if they
found no radiation on the farm and suspected Sauter of
willfully filing a fraudulent claim, could have more
thoroughly investigated.

They could have sent teams of AEC

scientists out to the farm to find out how Sauter "caused"
the leaves on the trees on his farm to be shrivelled up and
fall off long before the first frost of the year.

They

could have sent AEC pathologists out to the farm to take
samples of even the well-decayed sheep to find out if Sauter
perhaps deliberately used poison on them in order to make
the AEC "look bad. "
The AEC had scores of scientists and technicians at
their disposal to prove or disprove Sauter's claim.

What

did a 58 year-old high school educated sheep farmer in
western Minnesota have to do to prove the AEC willfully and
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knowingly misrepresented the facts?

He could have appealed

to the state government of Minnesota, or to the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, the congressional watchdog of
the AEC, but as will be pointed out in the next chapter,
they were having their own troubles getting the whole truth
out of the Atomic Energy Commission.
The AEC was probably the gove'rnmental agency most prone
to such abuses.
1.

Three reasons for this are:

through the use of "National Security" the AEC had

a virtual monopoly over the control of scientific data in
this area.

Findings which were critical of the nuclear

weapons testing program could be classified, and effectively
suppressed in the interest of "National Defense; "
2.

at the time, there were virtually no labs working

in the field of radiation that were not dependent on the AEC
for substantial monetary support.

For a scientist dependent

on AEC funding to generate findings highly critical of that
agency spelled a complete economic cut in support.

See the

cases of Dr. John Gofman, Dr. Ernest Sternglass, Dr.

Tom

Mancusco, Dr. K.Z. Morgan, Dr. William O. Caster, among
others; and
3.

the AEC was charged with two imcompatible roles,

mainly that of providing nuclear weaponry to the Defense
Department and promoting the development of commercial
nuclear power, but also that of protecting the public from
exposure to ionizing radiation.
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CHAPTER IV
AEC COVERUP:

KEEPING MINNESOTA UNINFORMED

During the same period in which the Sauter case took
place, the state of Minnesota made parallel attempts to
uncover information about radioactive fallout over Minnesota
and its effects on the plants, animals and people of
Minnesota.

A special Scientific Advisory Committee set up

by Governor Orville Freeman, called the Atomic Energy
Development Problems Committee, was trying to gather fallout
data for the entire state.

Task groups within the Advisory

Committee repeatedly made requests to the AEC for all the
relevant information to the public regarding fallout.
Later, Senator Clinton Anderson (D-NM), Chairman of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and Senator Hubert
Humphrey (D-MN), chairman of the subcommittees on
disarmament and international health, both specifically
requested all the information which the AEC had on
"hotspots" in Minnesota and North Dakota. Neither Gov.
Freeman, with his appointed Scientific Advisory Committee,
nor the two Senators were able to obtain information on "hot
spots" such as those on Joe Sauter's farm in western
Minnesota.
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State Finds Fallout Hot Topic
In 1957, the issue of fallout in Minnesota was a hot topic
in the Twin Cities ' newspapers.

The scientist most

responsible for bringing the issue to the forefront was Dr.
William

o . Caster.

He was trained in the filds of radiation

biology and nutrition.

From 1951-57, his studies

concentrated on the biological effects of ionizing radiation
on the heart and other organs.
On May 16, 1957, the Minnesota Daily, the university
newspaper, printed an interview with Dr. Caster entitled,
"New Evidence Shows Fallout from Atomic Tests is Greater
than Scientists have Generally Supposed. "
5/16/57, p. 1).

(Minnesota Daily,

In the article, Dr. Caster quoted a

statement made by AEC Commissioner Willard F. Libby the year
before when he noted in the Proceedings of the National
Academy of Science that the midwest, including Minnesota,
was the hottest spot on the globe because it was the first
place in the storm path of the fallout where there was heavy
rainfall.

Also, wind conditions above the region

exacerbated conditions favorable to fallout.
In the two weeks following the May 16 article on Dr.
Caster, over 45 related articles appeared in the Twin Cities
area newspapers.

They covered the spectrum: from Strontium

90 in milk to the psychological effect of "duck and cover"
drills on school children.
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on June 3, 1957, Governor Orville Freeman told a
meeting of Midwest state attorneys general of his concern
"about radiation hazards from nuclear weapons tests."

He

announced he was going to establish "an advisory committee
to study problems of nuclear energy and radiation fallout
hazards." The focus of the advisory committee was to gather
all the known facts of fallout in Minnesota and to release
the information in a manner understandable to the public.
Governor Freeman told the audience:
Responsible officials should no longer conceal
frightening facts on the grounds they might have a
· bad psychological effect' on the people (Minnesota
Tribune, 6/4/57).
Dr. Caster, a key figure on the Governor's Scientific
Advisory Committee, paid dearly for his unequivocal
statements on the hazard of fallout in Minnesota. Following
a June 27, 1957 article in Science, in which Caster
criticized the AEC for improperly calculating the maximum
permissible concentration of Strontium 90 in humans, an AEC
official met with his University of Minnesota department
head, Dr. W. D.

Armstrong, and told him that Dr. Caster need

not bother ever applying for another grant from the AEC.
In an interview on September 23, 1984, Dr. Caster
pointed to a reprint of the Science article and said, "That
one article cost me $30, 000 a year. "

Other established

scientists who were critical of the AEC also met with
" defunding" problems.

(See particularly the cases of Dr.
78

John Gofman, Dr. Thomas Mancuso, Dr. Ernest Sternglass, and
Dr. Karl

z.

Morgan.)

In July, 1957, Freeman appointed the members of the
newly created Minnesota Atomic Development Problems
Committee.

In the Governor's own words some two dozen of

the finest scientists and lawyers in Minnesota were
appointed to the Committee.

It was broken down into 11 Task

Groups which addressed areas ranging from basic nuclear and
health physics, radiation biology, and tolerance standards
setting, to the power of regulatory agencies and the law.
On January 24, 1958, the Task Group on the Biological
Significance of Ionizjng Radiation released an intirim
report.

The scientists had found that several samples in

river, surface, stream and lake waters in Minnesota had
exceeded the maximum provisional limits from gross beta
radioactivity.

The report stressed, however, there was not

cause for alarm since the treated city drinking water in the
Twin Cities was found to be below the maximum provisional
limits.

The interim report stressed that the real problem

was that the state of Minnesota did not have comprehensive
data with which to assess the present and future hazard to
its residents from weapons testing fallout. The Task Group
urged that a program begin immediately to collected the
needed information .
The chairman of the Task Group on the Biological
Effects of Ionizing Radiation was Dr . Maurice B . Visscher.
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He was the head of the Physiology Department of the
University of Minnesota Medial School, past president of the
American Physiological Society, and widely regarded as one
of the world' s leading physiologists.

His interim report

was sent to Dr. Gordon Dunning, chief of the Effects of
Nuclear Weapons Tests Branch, AEC, on February 20, 1958.
Visscher stressed to Dr. Dunning that the Governor's
Scientific Advisory Committee did not want to cause a panic
about present radiation levels in Minnesota water but wanted
to emphasize a feeling of urgency
because we are definitely concerned about the
possibility that Sr90 is accumulating in biological
material to a more significant extent than even the
recently published data by Kulp and others would
indicate (Visscher to Dunning, 2/20/58) .
(Dr. Lawrence Kulp was an AEC-contracted scientist who had
worked under the AEC's Sr90 analyses "Operation Sunshine"
studies in the mid-1950's) .
Dr. Visscher requested that the AEC send all their
information on levels of Sr90 in Minnesota's 1957 crops of
hay, alfalfa, legumes and other vegetables, which were not
available in current literature, and levels of Sr90 in
Minnesota milk (Visscher to Dunning, 2/20/58) .
On February 24, 1958, a meeting was held in Washington,
DC, between Gov. Freeman and K. E. Fields, General Manager of
the AEC (General Manager was the highest position in the
AEC, excepting that of the AEC Commissioners) .

Also present

were Dr. Charles Dunham, Director of the Division of Biology
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and Medicine (DBM), Dr.

Gordon Dunning, and Miles Lord,

Attorney General of Minnesota.

According to Dunning's

notes, the AEC and the Governor agreed on three points:
1. The Atomic Energy Commis sion would send one or
more technical representatives to Minnesota in the
near future to confer individually with Dr. Vis scher
and other appropriate scientists for the exchange of
information and data.
2. The [ AEC ] would accept selected samples from
Minnesota and have them analyzed for Sr90 and perhaps
other nuclides if desired.
3. After the facts and data were established, we
would meet with the governors's scientific committee
in Minnesota and have an open discussion, if he wished
(Dunning to Files, 3/12/58) .
Two days after this meeting, Dunning received a series
of fallout maps which showed fallout pas sing over Minnesota
at least 14 times from the "Operation Plumbbob" series of
nuclear explosions at the Nevada Test Site.

Dr. Lester

Machta, from the U.S. Weather Bureau Special Projects
radiation monitoring team, noted that Minnesota was in a
"favored position" to receive fallout during the spring
(Machta to Dunning, 2/26/58) .
On March 1, 1958, Gov. Freeman wrote the AEC General
Manager, K.E. Fields, thanking him for the AEC's cooperation
up to that time.

Freeman concluded the letter:

May I again emphasize that we are very anxious to be
completely responsible in this matter here and not in
any way unduly excite the people of the state .... On
the other hand, we believe that there is a real
hazard; that we are not adequately informed at present
to evaluate it; and that . .. until we have the basic
data... we have not met our obligation to the people
of our state. I trust... the cooperation. . . will
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continue to the mutual benefit of our state and
nation (Freeman to Fields, 3/1/58).
As promised at the February 24 Washington, DC, meeting,
Dr.

John Harley, Chief of the Analytical Branch of the AEC

New York Operations Health and Safety Laboratory (NYOO
HASL), and Dr. Dunning of the AEC Effects of Nuclear Weapons
Tests Branch met with Dr. Visscher ' s Task group on March 6,
1958.

According to Dunning' s memo to the files, Harley did

an excellent job of describing the analytical procedures for
sampling and interpreting data.
Dr. Harley left 20 to 30 reports with the committee.
One dealt with the level of Sr90 in Minnesota milk and was
marked "Official Use Only". Although "Official Use Only" is
an internal agency classification and not a security
classification, the Minnesota Task Group scientists were
told not to release the information in the milk report.
Dr. Caster says that Dr. Dunning told the Minnesota
scientists in the March

6

meeting that their calculations

for Sr90 were overestimated by a factor of three.

Caster

said:
Dunning did not make us look particularly good at
the time. Having a federal professional on radiation
come in and tell us we didn ' t know how to calculate
the Strontium levels made us feel pretty bad. A
couple of days later, however, we went over the
calculations and discovered that Dunning was
technically correct, but he had left the daughter
product Yttrium 90, out of his calculations. As with
Strontium 90, Yttrium 90 is also a bone binder.
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We, being radiation biologists, took both isotopes
into account for estimating the biological hazard.
One thing we discovered was that much of the fallout
from recent shots was the rare isotope Neptunium. The
half-life of Neptunium is 2. 3 days; [ its ] daughter
product is Plutonium 239. The problem with the feds
was that nobody was telling us what the hazard was
(Interview with Caster, 9/23/84) .
The Minnesota Star and the Minnesota Daily both ran
short reports on the meeting the next day which stated that
Harley and Dunning were not concerned about the levels of
radioactivity in the lakes and streams of Minnesota and that
future studies would ease any fears residents might have
(Minnesota Star and Daily, 3/7/58) .
On March 19, 1958, the New York Times published a
letter to the editor written by Dr. Visscher which sent
shockwaves through the AEC.

Visscher noted points of

"confusion" that "non-scientists" might have regarding the
nuclear weapons fallout controversy.

His first point

emphasized the lack of knowledge about the damaging effects
of low level radiation from fallout:
We think, but do not really know, that Sr90 is the
main hazard as far as cancer is concerned. . . We do not
really know how little Sr90 will produce cancer. The
fact that the magnitude of the damage is just an
'educated guess' is the first great difficulty.
The real effect may easily be only one tenth or
ten times as great [ as current estimates ] . The public
should know that it will be absolutely impossible to
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'know' how dangerous this element is for at least 20
years. . . The public should know that we scientists
have no actual data on the carcinogenic activity of
low levels of Sr90 (Visscher 3/19/58) .
The second point struck a particularly raw nerve at the
AEC.

Dr. Visscher asserted that the AEC had withheld

information from the public:
The second reason for confusion is secrecy. Right
now the most extensive data on Sr90 in milk in the
U. S. are in the hands of the [ AEC ] . On March 5,
1958, I was shown these data which are marked 'For
Official Use Only' and I am therefore now not
privileged to disclose the facts they contain.
There is one point about this situation that
disturbs me greatly. It is that the top
administrative officials do not have confidence in the
intelligence of the American people. They act as
though they did not really believe in the democratic
system. The facts in question have no conceivable
military significance. They are important only as
background information for policy decisions. To
withhold them from the public means one of two things,
either that our Washington administrators do not trust
our intelligence, or that they hope to control opinion
by monopolizing information.
Either conclusion would be distressing to me as
one who believes in the democratic process because it
would mean that we are imitating the practices of
authoritarianism, which I adbhor. (Visscher, 3/19/58) .
The day that Dr. Visscher's letter appeared in the New
York Times, Morse Salisbury, Director of Information
Services for the AEC, suggested that the head of the
Division of Biology and Medicine, Dr. C. L. Dunham, write the
Times and clarify the OUO (official use only) aspect brought
out in Visscher's letter. (Salisbury to Dunham, 3/19/58) .
The next day, Merril Eisenbud, Director of the AEC NYOO,
drafted a response to Visscher's letter which he sent to the
main AEC offices in Germantown, MD, for a "fast clearance. "
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In the draft, Eisenbud accused Visscher of obscuring the AEC
premise that data stamped " OUO" was of a provisional nature
and that it would be released when it was cross-checked for
intralaboratory errors .

Dr . Dunham, in his response to

Salisbury' s memo, wrote a report called " Allegation by
Maurice B . Visscher . . . 11 Dunham also stressed that the
material was not classified but merely held back because of
the provisional nature of the data .

Neither of these draft

letters saw the light of day .
Dr . Dunning answered why the AEC did not publicly
respond to Dr . Visscher' s allegations .

In a letter to Dr .

Caster ' s department head, Dr . W . D . Armstrong, Dunning wrote:
We are disturbed, of course, by the deliberate
distortion of facts that Dr . Visscher wrote in his
letter . . . however, rather than enter in a round- robin
of letter writing, we are officially ignoring Dr .
Visscher ' s letter (Dunning to Armstrong, 3/27/58) .
Dr . Caster felt there had been attempts by the AEC to
cover up levels of radiation using tactics other than
classifying them not for public release . Caster accused Dr .
Dunning of the AEC of hiding high exposures by averaging
those exposured into a large non-exposed population .

Caster

said:
It introduces a dangerous concept . . . that the
individual is not important . . . When the AEC stated
that the situation is safe, what they mean is that the
average situation is safe (Draft copy of " The
Biological Hazard from Atomic Fallout, " Caster, 5/58,
p. 9-10 ) .
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Dr. Dunning responded that averaging radiation
exposures into large populations was consistent with current
scientific practice.

He said of Caster ' s remarks:

Nothing could be further from the truth... than that
the AEC is not concerned with the individual... Let me
assure you... that the individual is most certainly
considered important and no data are averaged or in
any other manner manipulated to conceal important
information [ emphasis mine ] (Dunning to Caster,
4/10/58) .
Dunning later had James G. Terrill, Jr., meet with
Caster and two Minnesota health department representatives
to futher drive home the point that neither the AEC nor the
USPHS withheld fallout information from the public. In a
June 3, 1958, memo from Terrill, Chief of the Radiological
Health Program of the Division of Sanitary Engineering
Services for the Department of HEW, to Gordon Dunning,
Terrill outlined the major points of the May 29th meeting
with Dr. Caster and two other doctors form the Minnesota
Department of Health.

Terrill explained the functions of

the U.S. Public Health Services radiation monitoring
program.

Terrill wrote:

Item by item I outlined the principal objectives
and findings of each of these undertakings. I
explained that security was a relatively formidable
factor in our early deliberations, but that all of our
activities were now free of security restrictions, and
had been published in some form. I explained that
presently we were not handicapped so much by security
limitations as we are handicapped by the actual
methods of analysis and delay in preparation of
reports. Apparently Dr. Caster had been under an
impression that we were withholding information for
some type of security reason. However, at the
conclusion of our meeting I think he was satisfied
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that we are not withholding any information beyond the
point where we have had a reasonable chance to analyze
it and form conclusions in our own mind (Terrill to
Dunning, 6/3/ 5 8) .
Despite Dunning ' s emphatic denial that the AEC withheld
any information, three months later Dunning chose to
withhold information from Joe Sauter on the basis that
releasing it would be damaging to the AEC (Allaire to files,
7/ 15 / 5 8 ) .
AEC Denies State Support
Three weeks after Dr . Visscher ' s letter appeared in the
New York Times, chastising the AEC for withholding
scientific data on Strontium 90 in milk, the General Manager
of the AEC wrote Gov . Freeman .

Freeman had earlier

requested financial assistance from the AEC in setting up an
independent comprehensive radiation monitoring and analysis
program in Minnesota .

Freeman had reqeusted only $ 49, 000 to

set up the special lab in the Minnestoa State Department of
Health .

The AEC Division of Biology and Medicine ' s budget

in 1959 was $ 43, 242, 000, out of which $2, 648, 000 was devoted
to fallout sampling and analysis (JCAE Fallout Hearings,
Vol . 1, 5 / 5 - 5 / 8 / 59, p . 17) .

The General Manager, K . E .

Fields, refused to give financial assistance to such a
program:
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We would find it difficult to justify support
of . . . large scale state or local programs of monitoring
environmental radioactivity except in the areas in
which we operate large nuclear facilities. Perhaps it
is not generally understood that our own large scale
studies. . . [ were ] originally designed to obtain
information on concentrations which might result from
nuclear warfare and possible future nuclear weapons
tests, as well as to provide adequate information on
fallout from tests which have been held. • • Much large
concentrations of radioactivity than those observed in
air, water, milk or other foods would represent no
appreciable hazard to health except as they might be
maintained over periods of many years. It would be,
therefore, impractical to think of a detailed local
radioactive monitoring program as contributing to
public health, even at levels of fallout much larger
than those occurring from foreseeable programs of
weapons testing (Fields to Freeman, 4/11/58) .
Field ' s conclusion of no adverse effects as unknown
future levels was in contradiction to knowledge both within
and outside the AEC.
Dr. Caster pointed out in a June 15, 1958 editorial
addendum to the Task Group 5 (Quantitative Standards for
Determining Hazard to Humans from Radiation) report that the
level of Sr90 in the body causing injury to humans was
greatly underestimated due to recent findings of the
variance of the degree of deposition from one person to
another.

Citing a study completed in May by a group of

Swedish scientists, Caster wrote:
This 'meticulous ' investigation found that Sr90
will not be distributed evenly in the skeleton but
will concentrate in certain bones and that
concentration will vary with conditions. The
significance of this. . . lies in the conclusion that
Sr90 is 60 times more dangerous to humans than the AEC
statements. . . assume and. . . 10 to 12 times more than
assumed [ previously ] . . . by this committee. . . . This
would double, and perhaps triple, an individual's
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chances of having leukemia, and would place
an individual j ust above the threshold for bone
damage.
The reduction in x-ray tolerance levels in the
last three years suggests a parallel trend in the
evaluation of Sr90 hazards, [ but ] one great difference
exists... an x-ray machine can be turned off at will ;
Sr90 in the skeleton cannot (Basic Data...in
Minnesota, p. 57).
In summary, five points would have mediated in favor of
a state-wide radiation monitoring program in Minnesota:
1.

Libby ' s pronouncement of Midwest, including

Minnesota being the hottest spot on the globe because of
prevailing fallout conditions ;
2.

Gov. Freeman ' s Scientific Advisory Committee

finding several instances of untreated water in
Minnesota exceeding the provisional limits set for beta
radioactivity ;
3.

The predicted traj ectory maps of fallout from the

Operation Plumbbob series of nuclear explosions showing
fallout passing over Minnesota at least 14 times with rain
coinciding with the passage of several clouds over
Minnesota ;
4.

Dr. Caster ' s presentation of new evidence

indicating " hotspots" of Sr90 building up in the bone which
greatly increased the hazard of exposure to Sr90 ;
5.

and,

The presence of a team of qualified, aggressive,

yet non- alarmist scientists who would spearhead the program.
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Despite these points the AEC refused to consider any
support of a state-wide independent radiation monitoring and
analysis program in Minnesota.
State Attempts to Get Data from AEC
On July 29, 1958, Lee Loevinger, attorney, former law
partner of Gov. Freeman and chairman of the Governor's
Advisory Committee on Atomic Development Problems, wrote the
AEC on behalf of the Task Group which was chaired by Dr.
Visscher.

Loevinger requested a copy of the four- volume

AEC publication "Environmental Contamination from Weapons
Tests: A compilation of Data Concerning Transport,
Deposition, Distribution and Biological Uptake of World
Wide Radioactive Fallout."

Dr. Visscher's Task Group had

learned of the report ' s existence, not through the AEC, but
through a July 13, 1958 New York Times article. Loevinger
wrote:
Both the Minnesota Atomic Development Problems
Committee and its subcommittee on Environmental
Contamination feel that the data gathered by the AEC
and presumably contained in the publication referred
to, would be of great value to us in performing our
role, and that it is necessary that our subcommittee
be informed of the data that is available in order
properly to perform its function [ emphasis mine ]
(Loevinger to AEC, 7/29/58 ) .
Loevinger's request for all the data available on
fallout in Minnesota came less than four months after
Dunning's emphatic assertion to Dr. Caster that the AEC did
not manipulate data in any way to conceal information, and
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less than two weeks after Dunning ' s decision to suppress the
true levels of radioactivity on the Sauter farm in western
Minnesota.
On August 22, 1958, the Minnesota Atomic Development
Problems subcommittee called the Task Group on Basic
Research issued a detailed six-page report entitled, "Areas
in the Biological Sciences where Basic Information is Needed
in Relating to the Manner in which Atomic Energy May
Influence Residents of Minnesota."

The report reflected the

dedication and the competence of the Task Group which the
governor had referred to in his earlier letter to the
General Manager of the AEC.

The report addressed several

areas where there was a serious gap in the field of
knowledge on the damaging effects of radiation.

Information

was badly needed from the areas of soil chemistry and plant
nutrition to the pathway of Sr90 in the human body.

The

report recommended:
[ We need ] a well integrated interdisciplinary program
that is concerned with following the pathway of
isotopes from the time they leave the soil and enter
plants until they are incorporated into human tissue
and/or excreted back into the environment where the
pathway to the human will be repeated.
The final statement of the report by the subcommittee
on Basic Research reflected the overall problems and
positions facing the state of Minnesota:
It seems relevant to emphasize the almost
overwhelming magnitude of the problems that confront
the biological scientists in their efforts to contend
with the new physical environment that has resulted
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from the products of atomic fission.... It seems
obvious that an effective program in the areas
outlined must necessarily be a program which is well
integrated and coordinated.... However, to be
properly implemented a program of such wide scope must
be established on sound footing based on thorough
comprehension of the information that presently
exists. They suggest that a detailed appraisal of the
problems outlined in this report could best be
facilitated by holding a symnposium
in which experts in the fields of concern would be
requested to participate (Task Group on Basic
Research, 8/22/58) .
Such a well thought out, comprehensive approach to the
monitoring and analysis of radiation in the state of
Minnesota as that proposed by the Atomic Development
Problems Committee was beyond both the capabilities and
inclinations of the AEC.

Their own piecemeal approach to

monitoring fallout did not even meet their own standards for
scientific reliability.
Broad Assurances/Unreliable Analyses
As the pace of atmosphere nuclear weapons tests
accelerated over the years, the demand for biological
testing of its effects greatly increased along with it.
"Operation Sunshine" was initiated in the mid-fifties by the
AEC to test the level of Strontium 90 in the biological
cycle of plants, soil and animals (including humans) across
the country and in selected sites in over two dozen other
countries.

"Sunshine" referred to the unit of measurement

for Strontium in the samples.

One "sunshine unit" was
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equivalent to one micro-microcurie of Stronitium 90 per gram
of calcium in the sample.
Because of the overwhelming number of samples to be
analyzed, the AEC had to use outside, private contractors to
complete much of the work.

The outside contractors,

however, were not carefully screened ; they did not always
follow the extremely rigid procedures needed to get reliable
results.
Reports were completed in September, 1958, at the AEC
Health and Safety Laboratory (HASL) in New York, which found
that several of the private labs which the AEC contracted
with to analyze samples for Sr90 had produced results which
were scientifically unreliable.

The Director of the AEC New

York Operations Office had suspected for over a year that
the results coming in from the contractor labs were
unreliable.

It was not until the HASL had devised a program

to send the contractor labs duplicate samples of vegetation,
soil, feces and bones, that systematic proof could be
established to confirm their suspicions.

The report stated

that some of the private labs findings deviated as much as
8 9. 9% off the mark of the average values.

S. Lough, the

Director of the NYOO, wrote Dr. Dunham that despite all the
work with the private labs over the year to improve their
analyses, the work was still proving to be scientifically
unreliable.

Lough wrote:
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The analytical data submitted by the contractors have
been so unreliable that some participating
investigators have been unwilling to use them in the
preparation of scientific reports in connection with
the overall fallout program. To me it appears
entirely indefensible for the Atomic Energy Commission
to continue expenditure of funds for additional
contractor- performed analyses which we are confident
will be unsatisfactory (Lough to Dunham, 1 1/10/58).
Dunham agreed with Lough, and the contractor labs' work
on the analysis of Sr90 was suspended until guidelines for
The AEC

better quality assurance were developed by the AEC.

Health and Safety Laboratory would continue analyzing Sr90
in vegetation, but the private contractor labs would
continue their anaylysis of Sr90 only in surface rainwater
and gumpaper samples. Coincidentally, the vegetation samples
showed the highest counts of Sr90 as a result of atomic
testing fallout, while surface water and gumpaper analyses
showed the lowest Sr90 counts and gave the poorest picture
qualitatively of the deposition of fallout.

The AEC Health

and Safety Lab (the very lab which ran the Sauter vegetation
analyses for gross beta and Sr90) was singled out by Judge
Jenkins in the recent Utah decision Allen Vs. USA.

Judge

Jenkins noted it was a practice of the AEC lab to stop the
counting of an ashed sample for beta radioactivity when it
reached 640 counts per minute. Jenkins also noted the
samples were ashed at such high temperatures that certain
radioactive elements, such as iodine, were driven out of the
sample (Allen Vs.

USA, Civ #70-0515-J, p. 86).

For whatever
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reasons, suspending the private contractor labs programs of
analyzing Sr90 in vegetation insured that the AEC would
maintain a firm central control on the monitoring and
analysis of Sr90 in vegetation.
Strontium 90 in Minnesota Wheat
In July of 1958, Dr. Visscher sent the AEC several
samples of Minnesota wheat crops from different parts of the
state to be analyzed for Sr90.

It was not until January 25,

1959 that the results were reported to Dr. Visscher.

On

February 6, 1959, Gov. Freeman held a press conference where
Dr. Visscher released the Task Group ' s interpretations of
the findings.

Dr. Visscher reported:

The findings indicate that some further action is
necessary in connection with atomic energy problems,
especially in regard to the establishment of a
permanent State Commission and in connection with
appropriation of funds for its work. There are
possibly serious economic as well as health
implications to the entire North Central and Plains
region including Minnesota in the data we are
presenting (Visscher, 2/6/59).
The data was presented in terms of Sr90 per
gram/calcium in the wheat.

Visscher found that the average

samples for the 1958 wheat crops had exceeded the maximum
permissible concentration of 100 micromicrocuries Sr90 per
gram calcium by 50%.

Visscher stressed there was not cause

for alarm, since one derives only 5-10% of the calcium of
one ' s diet from wheat.

Dr. Visscher pointed out, however,

there was inadequate data on Sr90 in other foods, such as
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Comprehensive monitoring of milk would be important

milk.

because Americans derive more than 75 % of their calcium from
Although the average level of Sr90 found in the wheat

milk.

was not dangerous, levels such as 600 micromicrocuries per
gram calcium as found in one sample could present long-term
hazards.

Visscher noted that Sr90 in the food was more of a

hazard to children than adults (Visscher report, 2/6/59) .
At that time, findings indicated there was a forty-fold
difference in the levels of Sr90 which was found in the
average 40 year-old and the bones of the average 2 year-old
(Caster interview, 9/23/84) .
Dr. Visscher's report was intended to alert Minnesota
residents and officials, along with neighboring states, that
more must be learned about the Sr90 contamination problems.
Milk, meat, fish, poultry products, and vegetables required
intensive study.

Corrective measures must be planned and

prepared since there might be some localities in the future
where all the foodstuffs, including milk, would be heavily
contaminated, and if bomb testing continued throughout the
world, the situation would undoubtedly become progressively
worse.

It would seem essential, according to Visscher, to

be able to protect children from food containing as much as
600 micromicrocuries per gram of calcium.

To do this,

Visscher asserted the state of Minnesota and its scientists
needed much more analytical information (Visscher report,
2/6/59) .

Visscher concluded:
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It is the responsibility of the State Legislature to
decide whether to make a serious effort to minimize
these. . . hazards. It can. . . [ be done ] by establishing
the Commission [ an independent radiation monitoring
and analysis program ] that Gov. Freeman is
requesting . . . •Gov. Freeman's foresight. . . is
responsible for the fact that Minnesota is the first
state. . . to obtain information of the type reported at
this time.
There will be some. . . who will say that these
findings should have been kept secret, so as not to
disturb people . Their false logic would be that 'what
people don't know won't hurt them. '
In any democratic society people not only have a
right to know, but must know the facts if they are to
act intelligently. The role of the scientist is to
provide a sober interpretation of the facts, to allow
people to take precautionary and preventive measures
before it is too late.
Fortunately, we have a governor whose policy it is
to give the people the facts so that they may act
intelligently through their Legislature. The present
situation is not one to become panicky about. It is,
however, one that requires increased information to
avoid a panic situation in the future (Visscher
report, 2/6/59) .
Despite the fact that the highest count of Sr90 in
Minnesota report to Visscher was from the largest milled
wheat production center in Minnesota, the AEC did not make
any attempt to go back and do an intensive study of the
region.

As will be seen, their response to the problem

simply was to recalculate the permissible level of Sr90 in
foodstuffs in order to bring all but two of the samples
below the maximum permissible concentration of Sr90.
Three days after the press release of the Sr90 counts
in the wheat samples, Dr. Visscher wrote Senators Humphrey
and McCarthy asking for a Senate investigation.

Visscher

thought an investigation might induce the AEC to determine
the practical values of radioactivity in soil, plants, and
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animals, including man, and to obtain comprehensive data on
foodstuffs in the American diet.

He was shocked that the

AEC had not conducted a significant Sr90 analysis of Midwest
wheat.

Visscher wrote:

The AEC has been so concerned about reassuring the
public that there is no harm in what it has been doing
in the bomb testing area that it has failed to devote
enough attention to finding out the facts even as to
what the levels of radioactivity in foods are
(Visscher to Humphrey and McCarthy, 2/9/59).
As a result of Visscher disclosing the Sr90 levels
found in the wheat samples at the February 6 press
conference, a telegram was sent from London to the U.S.
Secretary of State requesting information on the validity of
the Sr90 data.
The British Ministry of Health asked for an authentic
copy of the data and an evaluation by the AEC Division of
Biology and Medicine because of the implications of
"possible health hazard though consumption of U.S. wheat
purchased by the U.K." (Werner to Wells, 2/12/59).
On the same day that the Division of Biology and
Medicine received the telegram from London, Dunning sent an
"official use only" memo to Dr. Dunham, Head of the AEC
Division of Biology and Medicine. In this memo, Dunning
recounted briefly the exchanges between the AEC and
Minnesota during the past year.

He said of the February 24,

1958, meeting with the governor:
In an effort to avoid a direct reply to their
request for the AEC to finance a laboratory for their
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use, it was decided to have HASL analyze some of their
samples . During and following these events not all
the problems were scientific in nature .
In light of the present events , and in the belief
that our problems are not ended in Minnesota, I would
suggest the following:
1 . There should be a definite assignment of
responsibility to follow on all of the factors that
bear on the collection and analysis of the wheat
samples .
. . . It is not advisable to accept blindly
whatever materials are sent us and then publicly
report the results without the necessary
information . . .
2 . The highest strontium units found in the wheat
samples (610 and 602 strontium units ) were greater
than the others not [so much, pencilled in ] because
of a larger Sr90 content but because of a les ser
amount of calcium . As you know, the subject of
calcium content in foods was discus sed in relation
to the Rongelap [Bikini Islands ] data . You may
wish to ask Hal Hollister to put further thoughts
to the calcium content problem [emphasis mine ]
(Dunning to Dunham, 2/12/59 ) .
Dunning also noted in the Official Use Only memo that
he was not against the state of Minnesota ' s plans for a
scientific symposium on fallout, but that he was against the
symposium being held in Minnesota "solely on scientific
considerations . ''

What those scientific considerations were,

Dunning never revealed .
Playing "Fast and Loose" with the Numbers
The AEC quickly came up with a solution to the report
of the Minnesota anaylsis of the wheat exceeding the maximum
permissible level .

When the AEC released the findings in

January, 1959, the levels were reported in terms of Sr90 per
gram of calcium .

Dr . Visscher accurately reported that
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those levels did in fact exceed the maximum permissible
level for human consumption (100 micromicrocuries per gram
calcium) but had said that there was cause for concern, not
panic, since wheat had such a low calcium content.

What the

AEC did was to draft a reply to the London telegram stating
that the Visscher report had been a product of
"misinterpretation. " The AEC's interpretation of the data,
sent to the British Ministry of Health, was that 22 of the
23 samples analyzed were actually well below maximum
permissible levels. They based this interpretation not on
the Sr90 per gram of calcium in the wheat but on the Sr90
level per kilogram of wheat.

Three months later, in the

hearings on fallout before the special subcommittee on
radiation of the JCAE, Visscher submitted written testimony
which found the basis of the AEC recalculation of the
permissible level of Sr90 per kilogram of foodstuff rather
than the earlier method of per gram calcium untenable (1959
Hearing Report, Appendix B, p.

2141).

Despite the recalculation of the data, bringing all but
one sample below the maximum permissible level, a member of
the British Parliament, Konni Zilliacus, was alarmed by the
report of the high Sr90 levels in the Minnesota wheat and
called for a ban on the importation of the U. S. wheat,
cereals and related products (Associated Press, 2/24/59).
The AEC responded to the threat of a ban on wheat by
having the United States Information Agency send telegrams
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to all U.S. Missions in countries which imported U.S. wheat.
The document was entitled, "Background on Sr90 in Wheat."
This document stated that it was the level of Sr90 in the
total diet which counted and that the present American diet
was estimated to have about one eighth of the permissible
level per kilogram of food.

The amount of Sr90 found in the

bones of children was only 2% of the maximum permissible
body burden.

The report noted that one would have

to eat at one sitting a few tons of wheat containing
80 micro-microcuries per kilogram of wheat before the
maximum permissible amount would accumulate in the
body (Background on Sr90 in Wheat, no date).
The British did not ban the import of U.S. wheat.
The conflicting information in the media generated a
flurry of requests for clarification on the hazard of Sr90
in wheat from concerned citizens, congressmen, national
flour milling associations, bakers associations,
correspondents from magazines and newspapers such as Time
Life, and from one presidential aide requesting information
for a presidential news conference.
One concerned citizen was Mrs. John Harms of Carmel,
California.

She wrote Clinton Anderson (D-NM), chairman of

the JCAE, on February 23, 1959.

She pointed out the

contradictions between Dr. Visscher's and the AEC ' s
interpretation of the Minnesota wheat data.

In a February 7

United Press International story, she said:
Scientists said the Sr90 average of all 1958 crop
samplings was one and one-half times the 'safe limit'
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set forth by the AEC. Visscher was quoted, ' We did
not expect to find as high quotas in the wheat as we
did. The situation undoubtedly will get worse if the
world continues nuclear bomb testing. '
Yet a February 17 UPI wire story flatly contradicted
the earlier article.

According to the AEC version of the

same strontium sample findings,
The officials said there is no indication anybody in
the world is getting anywhere near the maximum
permissible dose of Sr90 from food. The average of
Minnesota wheat sample for 1957-1958 was far below
permissible levels (Harms to Anderson, 2/23/59).
Mrs. Harms had written Dr. Visscher earlier to try to
clear up the contradictions between the two articles, and
she included his reply in her letter to Sen. Anderson. Dr.
Visscher wrote her:
The AEC has simply changed its basis of calculation
ofpermissible levels of Sr90 in foodstuffs. Earlier
maximum permissible dose levels were expressed in
terms of micromicrocuries of Sr90 per gram calcium.
They are now proposing to express it in terms of
kilogram of food or liters of fluid. This will hardly
be a tenable basis of calculation because if there
were as much as 80 micromicrocuries per liter of
water, we would in hot weather be getting many times
the permissible amount per day.
In the last analysis, it is only the facts that
are of any importance, and the facts are that the
levels in such plant crops as wheat have risen from
zero in 1945 to 155 micromicrocuries per gram calcium
in 1958. It is our hope that they will not continue to
rise. What is badly needed is more research on this
problem, and also, very much more information about the
actual levels of radioactive materials in all of the
foodstuffs which make up the human diet in various
parts of the world.
It is quite ridiculous to say that · there is no
indication anybody in the world is getting anywhere
near the maximum permissible dose of Sr90 because no
one in the AEC or anywhere else has actual information
on the complete diets of anyone in the world.
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What the world public has a right to resent is the
bland reassurances it has been given in the absence of
factual information (Visscher to Harms, 2/20/59) .
Dr. Visscher wrote Sen. Humphrey on February 29, 1959,
pointing out that the rising levels of radiation due to
fallout may become serious in the future and that the AEC
had "no excuse" for not having "basic data on all of the
major American foodstuffs" nor was the AEC devoting enough
research toward ameliorating Sr90 as a hazard.

Dr. Visscher

ironically noted that AEC Commissioner Libby's
"interpretations are in large part identical with those I
gave in a press conference with Gov. Freeman on Feb. 6,
1959" (Visscher to Humphrey, 2/28/59) .
On March 6, 1959, Sen. McCarthy sent Commissioner Libby
Dr. Visscher's earlier February 6 letter, asking the AEC to
respond to Visscher's allegations on the failure of the AEC
to conduct adequate radiation monitoring of all American
foodstuffs.
Libby passed these letters on to the head of the
Division of Biology and Medicine, Dr. C.L. Dunham, for his
reply.

Dunham did not directly respond to any of Visscher's

allegations, but instead sent McCarthy three documents for
his information (Dunham to McCarthy, 3/20/59) .

The packet

of letters included one from Libby to Visscher dated March
6, 1959 in which Libby stated:
I am particularly anxious that we in the AEC do
everything we can to make known what we know about
fallout and see that the most important unknown areas
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are investigated. We have been concentrating on human
bone, milk, rain, and soil and I am afraid thus
somewhat under emphasizing grain and vegetables (Libby
to Visscher, 3/6/59).
Libby asked Visscher to take part in the JCAE hearings
on fallout in May.

Dunham also enclosed a copy of the AEC

"Background on Sr90 in Wheat" to McCarthy. Without
responding to any of Visscher's allegations, Dunham's reply
gave the impression that Visscher ' s allegations were without
merit, since:
1.

Libby' s letter gave the impression the AEC was

doing everything possible to explore and release all the
known information on fal lout in America; and,
2.

the AEC report on Sr90 in wheat implied that a

comprehensive monitoring of major American foodstuffs was
unnecessary since the average American diet contained only
about one-eighth of the maximum permissible concentration of
Sr90.
In light of the "anxiousness" of the AEC to make
everything known about fal lout available to the public, it
is odd that on March 25, five days after Dunham's reply to
McCarthy, Dunham would send a memo to Libby recommending
against bringing the U. S. Public Health Services into the
arena of monitoring vegetation for Sr90.

Dunham wrote

Libby:
[ The DBM ] is aware of the problem of the need for
additional information concerning Sr90. . . in cereal
grains and vegetables. At the present time we are
preparing to increase our sampling program in this
area. . . . We definitely should not turn this over to
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the Public Health Service. Work is being undertaken
by the Pure Food and Drug Administration in this area
and we will coordinate with them to make certain that
our programs do not overlap (Dunham to Libby,
3/25/59).
Given the magnitude of the sampling and analyzing
needed to gather a complete picture of fallout in American
foodstuffs and DBM ' s past history of working with the Public
Health Service, it is not clear why Dunham would so strongly
recommend against seeking PHS help in this area. The USPHS
was the first agency Dunham listed in the May 1959 JCAE
hearings of agencies which the AEC worked with in gathering
fallout data.
The need for assistance in analyzing fallout data was
even s more marked by the fact that the AEC files did not
show the suspended private contractor labs coming back on
line for analyzing Sr90 in vegetation at this time.

With

the level of controversy generated by the release of the
Minnesota wheat samples, it is no wonder that the AEC wanted
to maintain a firm central control over the analysis of Sr90
in vegetation.
Congress Gets into the Act
The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was the primary
watchdog of the AEC in protecting the U.S. public.

The AEC

was mandated by law to fully comply with the requests for
information by the JCAE.

Sen. Clinton Anderson (D-NM) was

chairman of the JCAE during this time and was well known for
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his confrontations with the AEC. In December 1958, Sen.
Anderson learned of a DOD report which found that fallout
from the stratosphere, the upper atmospheric layer, "dripped
out" at a rate much faster than assumed by the AEC.

He

requested documentation from both the DOD and the AEC
supporting this new information.
General Herbert B. Loper, Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense (Atomic Energy), wrote Sen. Anderson on February 19,
1959 and informed him that the half-time residence of
stratospheric fallout was only two years rather than seven
years as estimated by the AEC scientists, most notably AEC
Commissioner Willard F. Libby.

The letter also contradicted

the AEC pronouncements that fallout scattered evenly across
the globe.

The Department of Defense found that fallout was

heaviest in the 35 degree - 50 degree latitude band north or
south, which covers part of the Northern United States.
Despite the new evidence, Gen.

Loper wrote to Sen.

Anderson:
The risk of damage resulting from the testing of
weapons is therefore extremely small and much less
than other common day occurences such as X-rays,
automobiles, chemical contaminants, household
cleaners, etc. However, the probable casualties
attributable to radioisotopes from weapons testing
when summed over the populations of thousands of years
creates a moral issue that could be of considerable
propaganda importance [ emphasis mine ] (Loper to
Anderson, 2/17/59).
The letter to Sen. Anderson was marked "Confidential
Restricted Data. "

Classifying the information infuriated
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Sen. Anderson.

He thought it vital that the information be

made available for scrutiny by scientists in the general
public.
Less than two weeks later, Commissioner Libby sent Gen.
Loper a letter classified "Confidential" which disputed the
DOD ' s calculations of the resident half-time of fallout in
the stratosphere being only two years. Libby said the AEC
had restudied the problem of stratospheric fallout and found
the half-time fallout rate to be "about four years, " rather
than the earlier AEC position of seven years, or the DOD
position of two years. Libby said the new position of the
AEC on stratospheric fallout would be made known in a study
which would be released on March 13, 1959 in a speech by
Libby in Seattle, Washington.
As to the notion of there being a band of maximum
"drip-out, " Libby called that an old argument which was
still not resolved.

Libby stated the findings were obscured

by the fact that high fallout in the "Northern Hemisphere is
due to tropospheric [ the lower atmospheric layer ] or local
fallout which was never in the stratosphere."

(Libby to

Loper, 2/27/59 w/cc to Sen. Anderson.)
On March 9, 1959, Sen. Anderson wrote the Department of
Defense.

He asked the DOD to justify the classification of

the Gen. Loper letter and asked what part of the letter
would he be able to discuss in public without jeopardizing
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the classified information (from Attchmt. #4, JCAE rel.
#211, 3/22/59) .
While waiting for a reply on the classification
problems of the letter, Sen. Anderson monitored the speech
made by Libby on the AEC' s " restudy" of the stratospheric
fallout problem, which was presented in Seattle on the 13th
of March.

Libby's speech stayed close to the previous AEC

party line on fallout in his "restudy."

He stated the

half-time residence of fallout was between five and ten
years, with a mean residence time of six years. Libby's
restudy of the problem made no mention of the Department of
Defense findings of the half-time fallout rate being only
two years, nor of his statement in a confidential letter
made two weeks earlier to Sen. Anderson of the half-time
fallout rate being four years.
Sen. Anserson was angered by all the contradictory
information and by the fact he was prevented, because of
"national security, " from speaking out on these glaring
inconsistencies.
On March 18, 1959, the Department of Defense downgraded
Gen. Loper's letter to "Confidential."

Only one sentence in

the entire letter contained classified information.

Yet the

DOD felt:
Although the remainder of the letter is unclassified,
the Department recommends that it not be discussed in
public because there is not full agreement as to the
interpretation of the data that has been obtained so
far. We believe it would be far better before the data
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and conclusions are made public that there is a close
agreement amongst the investigators concerned.
Therefore, we believe that until the results are more
than preliminary, the CONFIDENTIAL classification
should remain on the letter (Attchrnt #4, JCAE rel.
#211, 3/22/59).
It was clear to Sen. Anderson the reason the DOD wished
to keep the letter classified was more political than a
matter of national security.

He kept the pressure on DOD

until, two days later, the DOD declassified the letter,
minus the one classified sentence.

The AEC followed suit

the next day by declassifying the Libby letter which
disputed the DOD findings of a more rapid rate of
stratospheric fallout.
With the two letters declassified, Sen. Anderson went
to the press to report the contradictory findings, along
with the difficulties of obtaining information from the AEC.
The New York Times ran both letters on Sunday, March 22,
1959.
On Monday, March 23, 1959, Sen. Anderson brought the
whole matter to the Senate floor.

He introduced the

correspondence between the DOD, AEC and JCAE into the
Congressional Record.

He also introduced several news

articles on the issue into the record.

One news account

pointed out that although Sen. Anderson was frustrated by
the AEC and the DOD keeping the information secret, he
optimistically intrepreted the data as meaning that future
fallout would only be half that expected, since the fallout
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was coming down twice as fast than earlier presumed (Richard
Fryklund, "Anderson Sees Fallout Reaching Faster Rate--But
New Data Disclosed by Senator May Mean Total Quantity is
Smaller, " Washington Star, 3/22/59 ; in Senate Record
3/23/59, p. 4367. )
Another news article pointed out Libby's attempts to
suppress the information, with the help of Gen. Loper, until
Libby could release data that would come into closer
agreement with the DOD's findings.

Edward Gamarekian, in

"New Fallout Data Put AEC's Libby on Spot, " pointed out :
Some Congressmen said yesterday that this entire
episode may throw considerable doubt on Libby's
revised estimates and his predictions of the future
fallout pattern. Libby has been the AEC's leading
expert and theoretician on fallout.
This episode also throws into confusion previous
predictions on the amount of strontium 90 which will
be deposited on the United States over the next decade
as well as its rate. Both are important, since a
faster fallout means it will come down hotter.
Gamarekian concluded:
They [ Libby and Loper ] also talked in terms of
external radiation and omitted [ the effect of ]
internal radiation produced by the ingestion of
radioactive atomic end products. Loper mentioned
strontium 90, but gave no figures, saying only that
the fallout of this radioactive element is greater in
the United States than in any other area of the world.
Libby did not refer to it at all (E. Gamarekian, "New
Fallout Data Puts AEC's Libby on Spot, " Washington
Star, 3/23/49; in Senate Record 3/23/59, p. 4368-69) .
Finally, an editorial run in the Washington Post on the
same day summarized some of the most salient points :
once again the Atomic Energy Commission has used a
'secrecy' stamp to try to prevent the public from
learning this and other data vital to the health and
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safety of the Nation. Sen. Anderson. . . has expressed
outrage at this attempt to smother information. . . .
This faster fallout means that harmful particles
descend to earth far more quickly and in a much
'hotter' state than previously thought. Surely this
is the kind of information that the country has a
right to know.
Manifestly, the new information should not cause
any panic. The Defense Daepartment estimates that the
chances of an individual being immediately affected is
about 1 in 500, 000. Yet the new disclosure clearly
affords no grounds for smug proclamations that fallout
may possibly be good for everyone. There is also
something deeply distressing about a Pentagon
spokesman's cool notation to the committee that the
long-run damage of fallout creates a 'moral issue that
could be of considerable propaganda importance. ' Isn't
it conceivable that safeguarding mankind from the
malignant effects of fallout might be of more than
mere propaganda importance (Editorial, "Faster
Fallout,'' Washington Post, 3/23/59 ; in Senate Record
3/23/59, p. 4369) .
Sen. Anderson summarized briefly the major scientific
points gained from the new information, then focused on the
aspect of the suppression of information:
I was surprised and disappointed that although the
information sent to the JCAE was unclassified that
there was an admonition that the commmittee should
keep the information to itself and treat it
confidentially. I know of no obligation on the part
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to withhold
the truth about fallout from the people of the United
States. So far as it may be my responsibility on the
Joint Committee, particularly as chairman of the Joint
Committee, I intend to see that the essential facts
are made available to the American people for their
independent judgment as to their importance (Sen.
Anderson, Senate Record 3/23/59, p. 4369) .
Sen. Anderson then yielded to the other Senators who
wished to speak on the subject.

Most notable among them was

Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-MN) .

Humphrey outlined the steps

which the state of Minnesota had taken independent of the
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AEC in order to gather all the relevant data on atomic
fallout.

He entered into the record several other newspaper

articles and a report by the Subcommittee on Disarmament
( which he chaired) on the latest findings of fallout.

Sen.

Humphrey then made five recommendations to better get at the
truth on fallout:
First. It is becoming apparent that the Atomic
Energy Commission, with its important and primary
interest in the field of atomic weapons and the
production of atomic power, is not the best agency to
conduct research on fallout and its effects on human
health and heredity. This research should be lodged
in another Government agency, one which has adequate
funds to do its job and one which can be completely
independent in reporting its findings. . .
I say this, Mr. President, because I am convinced
the Atomic Energy Commission has been playing down the
dangers of radioactive fallout as it pursued its
weapons program. While we need the atomic weapons as
a shield of defense, we also need to be considerate of
the lives of human beings now on the face of this
earth and those yet unborn.
The second point involved placing the responsibility of
fallout monitoring and analysis in the U. S. Public Health
Service and providing it with enough money to do an adequate
job.

Third, Sen. Humphrey recommended that the next

commissioner, soon to be apointed to the AEC, be a biologist
or physical scientist, so that the Board could more
accurately assess the biological hazards of radiation.

Sen.

Humphrey made this recommendation on the basis of the
suggestions of "his fellow citizen" Dr. Maurice Visscher .
The fourth point involved getting more information to the
United Nations Scientific Committee so that they could be
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more involved in the U.S. discussions relating to the
international effects of American nuclear wepaons testing.
He continued:
Mr. President, I am not satisfied with having
political bodies of this Government screen materials
relating to the lives of the people. I have seen
enough of such screening through the so-called
censorship apparatus.
We are not given the information we need even for
our national security, much less for our physical well
being. I rise to protest this kind of self-styled
secrecy on the part of agencies of this Government
when it involves atomic energy information.
It is important that all relevant material on the
health effects of radiation be submitted regardless of
whether it confirms or casts doubts on Government
statements and conclusions regarding the extent of
the danger.
I am of the opinion that a good deal of the
material could be [ currently ] held back if it cast
doubt on some of the earlier statements of Government
officials. I am not willing to let statements of
Government officials be considered more important than
the lives of my children or the lives of children yet
to be born. We find ourselves today with an
overwhelming body of evidence coming forth day after
day as to the problems involved in bomb testing and as
to the dangers of radioactive fallout. There does not
seem to be the kind of deep concern in the high
councils of this Government that there should be....
Fifth and finally, it is one thing to conduct more
research so that we know more of the complete effects
of radioactivity on man and his environment. It is
another thing to try to see that this rising
radioactivity does not raise further. This means that
the efforts to halt nuclear weapons testing must
continue to be pursued vigorously.
The Senator from New Mexico [ Mr. Anderson ] told
this body today that the northern parts of the United
Starts happen to fall within an area in which the
radioactive fallout seems literally to gush down upon
us, and fall all over us. Because of geography, we
happen to be the victims of a larger dose of
radioactive fallout than other parts of the world.
Mr. President, the five recommendations and
suggestions above occur to me as a result of reviewing
the memorandum and articles that I have submitted for
the Record today. I hope that the administration will
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see fit to act on them. If not, further investigation
by committees of the Congress become a vital
necessity.
I assure my colleagues today, as I have done
before, that I stand ready to do everything in my
power, as chairman of two subcommittees, one on
disarmament and the other on matters relating to world
health, to study the danger of radioactive fallout in
meticulous detail.
This is something which we cannot trifle (Sen .
Humphrey, Senate Record 3/23/59, p. 43 71) .
Included in the congressional record were all the
correspondence between Dr. Visscher and Sen. Humphrey; the
February 6, 1959 Gov. Freeman press conference report on the
levels of Strontium 90 in Minnesota wheat; a report of the
Disarmament subcommittee which summarized the latest
findings on fallout; and six additional Washington Post
articles written in March on everything from the hazards of
Sr90 in milk to criticisms of the "maximum permissible
concentration" levels as being meaningless and without
scientific grounds.

The articles repeatedly mentioned the

need for getting the responsibility of health and safety
monitoring of fallout out of the very agency which
manufactures and promotes the bombs and nuclear energy which
produce radioactive fallout.
The following day the chairman of the AEC, John McCone,
issued a statement to the JCAE, responding to the
accusations by Sen. Anderson, and others, that the AEC was
withholding information from the American public.

McCone

said:
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No Atomic Energy Commission information relating to
the radioactive content of the atmosphere and the
amount of fallout has been withheld from the public or
from United Nations . ... Finally, I assure this
Committee most emphatically and unequivocally that so
long as I am Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission
I shall not be a party to the suppression or
distortion of any information bearing on
the safety and health of the American Public. I am
fully prepared to assist any competent body in
developing the facts now in controversy on fallout
issues and to disclose these facts to the public. I
am confident that the Atomic Energy Commission has not
been derelict in its duty in studying radioactive
fallout and revealing the conclusions of such studies
when the data have been collated and evaluated. If,
however, your Committee finds any shortcomings on the
Commission's part, I pledge you to initiate
immediately the most vigorous and comprehensive
corrective measures possible (McCone to JCAE,
3/24/59, pp.2, 5.).
Sen. Anderson responded to chairman McCone's statement
with an example of a study on Sr90 which was written by
Cowan, E.C. Anderson and Langham, and whose authors had
requested the immediate declassification of the report in
October of 1957.

The report was still classified.

McCone

had the report immediately declassified (Anderson to
Compton, 4/20/59).

Not to be put into such a position

again, McCone wrote a memo to the General Manager on March
27, 1959.

In the memo, McCone pointed out concerning the

remark that no information on radiation in the atmosphere
and the amount of fallout had been withheld from the public,
This statement was reviewed for accuracy by the
Divisions of Military Application, Biology and
Medicine, Finance, Classification, and Information
Services. However, I wish to check further on our
activities in this area to make absolutely sure that
we are not withholding or suppressing information
(McCone to General Manager, 3/27/59).
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McCone requested the General Manager to have on his
desk by April 1:

1) all the classified information relating

to fallout and the basis for that classification ; 2) an
independent survey by the Division of I nspection on the
procedures and policies of releasing fallout data and the
people under whose authority that data is released ; and, 3)
if there was evidence that information was being withheld,
it was to be included in the Divison of Inspections report.
McCone wanted to know what the Division of Inspections
"activities and responsibilities" were, and considered
creating an independent Inspector General in the AEC.
McCone requested that the General Counsel review the above
suggestions for duscussions on the following week (3 /27/59).
What McCone found as the result of his request is open
for speculation, since the documents are classified...
From May 5-8, 1949, the JCAE special subcommittee on
radiation held hearings on the fallout from nuclear weapons
testing.

The subcommittee conducting the hearings was

particularly sensitive to the two issues hammered home by
the committee chairman:

1) the suppression of information;

and, 2) the location of radioactive hot spots, given the
fact that the northern part of the U.S. receives the highest
amount of fallout of anywhere in the world.

Though AEC

chairman John McCone promised all the information possessed
by the AEC would be released to the American public, and the
116

fact that the 1957 hearing held by the same subcommmittee
was touted to hold the most comprehensive data on fallout in
the world, in the more than 2000 pages of testimony, the AEC
did not present Sr90 counts that were as high as those found
on the Sauter farm in western Minnesota.
The hearings opened with an introductory statement by
Dr. Dunham.

He claimed the earlier 1957 hearings before the

subcommittee had amassed the most comprehensive data on
fallout to date.

He stressed that one of the main

considerations of the AEC was "To bring to bear on the
problem all the information that can be made available; we
take maximum advantage of the combined judgement of able and
well informed persons" (Fallout from Weapons Tests Hearings,
1959, v.1, p. 46) .
Of all the samples taken in the analyses programs which
the AEC had conducted throughout the country, Dunham said,
"The sample highest in Sr90 which we have analyzed, however,
was of wheat submitted to us by the State of Minnesota"
(Fallout Hearings, 1959, v.1, p. 27) .
It is not surprising that the person who decided to
suppress the knowledge of the levels of radiation on
Sauter's farm in western Minnesota was also the person to
whom Dr.

Dunham referred when asked about specific

questions on fallout in Minnesota during the opening of the
hearings--Dr.

Gordon Dunning.
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Given the amount of publicity generated by the release
of the Sr90 analyses of Minnesota wheat, the AEC was intent
on downplaying the hazards of fallout from the recent
nuclear tests.

The congressmen were interested in finding

out if "hot spots" were created by fallout from the nuclear
tests.

But just as the AEC in the months before had

redefined the calculations on the permissible levels of Sr90
in the Minnesota wheat, Dr. Dunham offered a new definition
of the term "hot spot":
As I first encountered it, it was a word coined by
Dr. Kermit Larsen, who has done many of the studies in
the vicinity of the Nevada Test Site. When he talks
about a ' hot spot, ' he is talking about a number of
acres. He is not talking about whole counties or
whole states in which the radioactivity, fresh
fallout , is manifold that short distance away. What
we are talking about here is areas, counties, several
states wide, which in most instances we believe are
the results of rainouts occurring in trajectories from
weapons detonated at our test site.... These areas
are not severalfold in terms of Sr90 or cesium in
adjacent areas, but they may be as much as half again
to two or three times (Fallout Hearing 1959, v. 1, pp.
3 6 -7 ) .

The congressional representatives were under the
impression the topic of hot spots would be the subject of
in-depth discussion during the hearings.
not to be the case.

They found this

Rep. Chet Holifield, chairman of the

subcommittee which held the hearings, pointed out the AEC
failed to address the problem of hot spots in a scientific
manner.

On May 18, 1959, Holifield wrote the new General

Manager, A.R. Luedecke, on the issue:
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It had been our understanding that the hot spot
area problem would receive comprehensive treatment in
the hearings. Thus, our outline specifically
designated it for discussion in the general review of
developments since 1957 with the idea that it would be
further discussed at appropriate points by AEC and
other witnesses. It is true the hot spot problem was
touched upon at various points, but it was not dealt
with in any thorough scientific manner. I am sure
that much data was submitted bearing on the problem,
but again it was not teated as a subject of specific
concern .
It would therefore be appreciated if the
Commission would provide a statement describing and
evaluating the hot spot problem. Such a statement
might cover among other things:
a) why we have a hot spot problem ;
b) the extent of the hot spot problem, i.e., the
areas involved, and the radiation levels ( both external
and strontium). . . ;
c) the implications of these hot spot areas from
the standpoint of maximum permissible exposure levels,
both as to testing to date, and possible future
testing, using guidelines established by the seminar
on implications of testing. . .. It would be
appreciated if the Commission could supply the
subcommittee with a supplementary statement on these
two matters so that our fallout hearing record may be
complete on these two subject areas ( Fallout
Hearings 1959, Appendix B, p. 2114).
The AEC was mandated by law to fully comply with the
request by Rep. Holifield.

Instead of submitting any data

on hot spots, such as the levels found on the Sauter farm,
the AEC responded with a statement entitled, "The Hot Spot
Problem and World Wide Fallout, " which was a refinement of
the argument used in the earlier AEC document "Some
Background on Sr90 in Wheat."

The AEC stood by the new

redefinition of "hot spot" which Dunham made in the
introductions to the hearings, i.e. ,
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areas in which the external radiation dose from
fallout may be higher by a factor of two to three than
an adjacent area and the average Sr90 in soil be
double that in an adjacent area.
The AEC concluded their statement to Holifield that
what really mattered was that the level of Sr90 in the human
bone was so minute that the probablilities of anyone
contracting leukemia or bone cancer was extremely low
(Fallout Hearings 1959, Appendix B, pp. 2115-6.)
Rep. Holifield was not satisfied with the AEC ' s
response to his request for specific information on the
levels and locations of local hot spots in Minnesota and
North Dakota.

He again wrote AEC General Manager Luedecke

on June 17, 1959:
After reviewing the Commmission's supplementary
statement on the hot spot problem... I believe some
clarification is still required on the specifics of
the question for the purposes of a meaningful record.
In particular, it is requested that the AEC
provide the subcommittee with specifics on the actual
levels of Sr90 as measured in the various hot spot
areas such as Minnesota and North Dakota, together
with an interpretation of this information.
If such data are not available, the subcommittee
would like to know what measures would be required to
obtain such data and what increase in the current
levels of support would be needed (Holifield to
Luedecke, 6/17/59; in Fallout Hearing 1959,
Appendix p. 2116) .
Three weeks later, Luedecke responded to Holifield ' s
second specific request for all the relevant hot spot
information.

At this point, if the AEC had wished to comply

with the law of the land, they would have provided the
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subcommittee with the Sauter farm findings and other
information they had on areas in Minnesota which exceeded
background radiation by factors in the hundreds rather than
one or two ; especially since it was the Division of Biology
and Medicine, under which Dunning was the head of the
Effects of Nuclear Weapons Tests Branch which filed the
report.

The AEC, however, stuck to the broad definition of

hot spot, and lumped the entire North Central States
together as one hot spot region.

All number values which

they submitted to the subcommittee were for average values
of Sr90 in the soil, plants, milk, and other foodstuffs.
Luedecke said:
In summary, estimates of total dietary Sr90 referred
to as ' maximum diet ' applicable to the population of
the North Central States is calculated to be 16
micromicrocuries of Sr90 per kilogram of food. This is
to be compared with the International Committee for
Radiation Protection recommended level of 100 as the
maximum permissible level for populations outside
controlled areas, and 33 as their · suggestion ' for the
average concentration in the diet of the whole
population (Ibid. 1959, Appendix p. 2117).
The AEC conclusion to the second response to Holifield
was:
In summary, these studies show that:
1. Sr90 soil values in the areas of interest. . .
are not higher than the average for the United States
as a whole ;
2. these particular areas, considered from the
standpoint of Sr90 contamination over the long term,
which is the important consideration now, should not
be considered 'Hot Spots ' (Hearings, 1959, Appendix, p.
2119).
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The AEC summary was followed by about 20 tables of Sr90
in milk, water, air, soil, vegetable, hay, cereal and bakery
products (Ibid. 1959 Appendix pp. 2122-29).

The only table

which could be directly compared to the findings on the
Sauter farm were the pasture program hay samples (table 17).
Of the nine samples, the highest Sr90 level was recorded in
Logan, Utah.

The Logan, Utah, Sr90 level was 20 times lower

than the highest Sr90 levels on Sauter's farm.

The only

Sr90 level given for 1957 alfalfa on the table was 100 times
lower than the levels of Sr90 found on Sauter's farm.
Sen. Anderson persisted in requesting all the
information which the AEC possessed on hot spots in America.
In a memo to AEC Chairman McCone, Alvin Luedecke, General
Manager, noted in March of 1960 that the AEC had specific
values of localities which were subjected to higher than
average levels of radiation.

For instance, the infants in

the city of St. Louis were subjected to over 20 times the
background dose for I-1 3 1.

But, because the fallout

situation was not exptected to be repeated (considering the
probability of the reocurrences of one locality being the
subj ect of repeated high doses of radiation from fallout),
and given the adverse media reaction from reporting such
figures, the General Advisory Committee felt it advisable to
present only average, rather than specific values (Luedecke
to McCone, 3 /29/60).
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Dead Sheep "In the Ballpark of Causality"
It is clear that not only individuals, but state and
federal legislative bodies with oversight authority were
powerless in their abilities to obtain the whole truth from
the Atomic Energy Commission.
Two conflicting issues were at stake:
1) the protection of the health and safety of the
American public; and,
2) the future of the nuclear weapons testing program.
One might say the actions taken by Dunning in
suppressing the true levels of radioacvitity on the Sauter
farm were the actions of only on man.

It should be

remembered, however, that Dunning headed the branch which
dealt specifically with these types of claims within the
Division of Biology and Medicine.
Despite the magnitude of the problem, the Effects of
Nuclear Weapons Tests Branch was comprised of only three
scientists and two office personnel, of which Dr. Dunning
was the chief.

Though he was in a pivotal position, others

knew of the excessive levels of radiation on the Sauter
farm, and agreed to keep the true levels "in the family" of
the AEC.
John Harley (chief of the Analytic Branch of the Health
and Safety Laboratory) , who also participated in the 1959
JCAE hearings on fallout; Oliver Placak (who was in charge
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of the USPHS Nevada radiaiton monitoring and analysis
program); W.W. Allaire (Director of the AEC' s Albuquerque
Operations OFfice); and Roscoe Goeke (of the AEC' s Eniwetok
Proving Grounds) all received the July 15, 1958 memo which
stated that the true levels on Sauter' s farm were not to be
made public for fear of being misinterpreted and damaging to
the AEC.
If the counts found on the Sauter farm could not have
caused the damages which Sauter claimed, why did they
suppress the information?

Releasing the counts could have

set off a negative chain reaction for the AEC.
On the individual level, the counts would have
j ustified a much more intense sampling and analysis of the
vegetation and animals on Sauter's farm.

Independent

scientists could have calculated the level of radiation from
the initial fallout and found the levels to be closer to
10, 000 times above normal background radiation rather than
100 times.

Releasing the figures could have opened the

floodgates to countless other claims being filed against the
AEC .

On the state level, releasing the true counts would
have legitimated the findings by Dr. Visscher and others on
the Atomic Development Problems Committee and would have
lent great support to the implementation and funding of a
state controlled radiation monitoring and analysis program.
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If similarly high levels were found by independent
state scientists in Minnesota, concerned citizens,
congressional representatives and scientists could have used
this information in calling for a halt in the nuclear
weapons testing program.

For this reason, officials within

the AEC chose to protect the broader interests of the
missions set out in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to
promote the development of nuclear energy and to develop
nuclear weapons, rather than protecting the health and
safety of American lives.
The counts were not released.
The final question that remains to be answered, were
40% of the herd, or 92 sheep, killed on Joe Sauter's farm in
1957 as a result of radioactive fallout from the nuclear
weapons tests in Nevada?
Three independent scientists were asked to give their
opinion on this question.

Bernd Franke is the director of

the Institute for Energy and Environment in Takoma Park, MD.
He came over from Heidleberg, Germany, in 1980 at the
request of the scientific panel studying the doses of
radiation received by the people in the community
surrounding the Three Mile Island accident.

Dr. Karl

z.

Morgan, former director of the Health Physics department of
the Oak Ridge National Labs, and Dr. Roland Finston,
currently head of the Health Physics department at Stanford
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University were solicited for their opinions on the
question.
The most lucid analysis of the question is that of Dr.
Finston.

Dr. Finston met with me three times over the last

two years on the case.

In August, 1986, Dr. Finston

reviewed the narrative of the case, and compared the gros s
beta and strontium counts found on the Sauter farm, with the
fallout studies and their effect on sheep as a result of the
"Nancy" shot from the Operation Upshot-Knothole series in
1953. Dr.

Finston picked the "Nancy" study for comparative

analysis, because it ' s dose calculations fit the Sauter case
more neatly than any of the other AEC or DOE contracted
studies on fallout and its effect on sheep.

In that

instance, sheep in Nevada and Utah were dusted with fresh
fallout within 12 hours after detonation of the bomb.
August 30, 1986, Dr.

On

Finston wrote me with his analysis.

Rather than take anything out of context, his analysis is
included in full as follows:
Dear Cliff,
I have been pondering what to make of the Sauter
sheep story. The greatest unknowns are:
1.

How much weathering occurred, between the time the
leaves that fell to the ground in 1957 were
collected in May of 1958 ? We could conservatively
as sume none. (If there was any weathering, the
doses would be higher. )

2.

How much time were the collected leaves on the
trees (and weathering) before falling to the
ground? Although it is anecdotally stated that
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leaves started falling early, we don't know if the
leaves collected that (and therefore weren't eaten
by the sheep) might not have been the last ones to
fall to the ground. Let's assume the leaves that
were collected in 1958, fell to the ground about
Sept. 1, after 70 days of weathering, following
their contamination on 6/22/57.
3.

Using the weathering formula from "Nancy" sheep
report PNL-4278: UC-41
(0. 75e-0. 693t/5 day +0. 25e -0. 693t/18 day), the
70-day weathering reduced the amount on the leaves
to 0. 0387 of its initial value.

4.

What did the sheep eat from 6/22 on? Because the
fresh fission products have so many short lived
species, I believe if they were injured by Wilson
fallout, it was as the result of browsing on
vegetation on the ground at the time of the
rainout, rather than from the leaves, which only
began to fall a week later. One might assume that
the amount we calculated to be present on the oak
leaves was also present (same mCi/kg) on the
browse. What do you surmise about that? Were
that the case, and neglecting the weathering
calculation for a moment, if you back-decay the
gross B count (4900 d/m/g ash) to "unit-time" e. g.
1 hour post detonation) and assume the total gross
B count was all as the result of Wilson, then
assume all the fallout arrived at 96 hours post
detonation and the sheep began grazing on it at
that time then using
Fig. 9. 26 of Glasstone I calculate "gross B"
intake (total) 1. 7 mCi between June 22 and Sept. 1
as the result of eating 1. 4 kg/day (dry weight) of
food contaminated similarly to the oak leaves. If
you then take into account the weathering factor:
1. 7mCi/ (0. 0387) = 44mCi total intake gross B
activity.

5.

Would such an amount kill the sheep? 3 out of 8
of Sasser, Bell, and West's sheep fed 234 mCi (78
mCi/day for 3 days) of Yttrium 90 died, (on days
25, 102, 133 following dosing).
So we're "in the ballpark, " albeit, a bit low.
In another analysis, retrospective like ours,
Sasser et al calculated a localized dose of 200
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rems to part of the rumen wall of the "Nancy"
sheep who they calculated had ingested 3.5 mCi in
a week (the "40mr/hr (H+12)" group). So, it's
conceivable that Sauter's sheep had some local hot
spot doses (in their rumens) in the range
sufficient to produce G..I. damage 44/3.5 X 200 =
2500 rads).
6.

There are a lot of very loose ends in this
analysis. I would not stand up in a court of law
and try to prove that Wilson fallout caused the
kill. It would be better to see if any other
measurements on the diet the sheep were on from
6/22-6/29 might be inferred, for that is when the
major dose was inflicted (the first week); is is
plausible that local rainout from a 10kt shot ever
produced l0's of mr/hr at H+4 days, that far
downwind?
I look forward to your reaction.
Sincerely,
Roland

P.S. A parallel analysis using the "fresh" Sr-90
activity in the ash leads to a similar conclusion:
each sheep would have ingested 9.2mCi gross B intake
from 6/22-6/29; assuming a weathering factor of
0.038 7, ash is 10% of dry weight, ground vegetation
similar to contamination to oak leaves, ingestion
began with the rain out of 6/22.
That's about the best I can make of it, somewhere
between 10 and 40 mCi ingested (Finston to
Honicker, 9/30/86).
Dr. Finston made his analysis on the Sauter case twenty
nine years after the fallout took place.

He made his

analysis 15 years after the death of Joe Sauter.

As such,

Dr. Finston had to make several logical assumptions about
the fallout scenario.

In the AEC Claim form that Sauter

filed, he noted the first dead sheep were found under the
grove of oak trees, whose leaves were "shedding." Sauter ' s
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nephews remembered the leaves falling off well before the
first frost , because it was the first and last time they had
seen such an event , but they did not remember exactly when
that was.

Dr.

Finston made the assumption that , though the

leaves registered a high amount of radiation , it was not the
leaves that killed the sheep.

It was what they ate "on the

browse , " the week immediately following the initial fallout.
Dr.

Finston made the keen assumption that the leaves

Sauter collected , in all likelihood were not the same as the
more radioactive leaves that fell off the trees shortly
after the fallout hit his farms.
the sheep.

Those leaves were eaten by

The leaves that remained on the trees and were

not eaten by the sheep had a longer time to decay.
Dr.

Thus ,

Finston came up with the 70-day weather factor.
Dr. Finston points out that the 70-day decay factor is

the length of time the leaves weathered on the trees before
falling to the ground.

Since he had no equations for

figuring the weathering factor for the 250+ days that the
leaves reamined out in the open , on the ground , that
estimate was left out.

A longer weathering time factored in

would result in a higher dose received by the sheep. As
such , Dr.

Finston's assessment can be seen as conservative.

Despite the fact , Dr. Finston found that the level of
radiation was "in the ballpark , albeit a bit low" for
causing the death of the sheep.

But , there are too many
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uncertainties, too many times where critical facts are not
known and assumptions are made, for Dr. Finston to say that
the death of the sheep could be proved to be caused by
radiation.
One could be drawn into an endless controversy, trying
to prove or disprove the death of the sheep due to
radiation, based on the known facts.

A hundred different

factors could be introduced that would either increase or
decrease the dose estimates by several factors of magnitude.
Two very important questions, however can be answered.
One, is it likely that all of the fallout was from one shot?
And, two, did the symptoms that Sauter' s sheep exhibited,
resemble in any way those exhibited by Bell, and his
associates

after their experimental sheep were fed Yttrium

90 laced alfalfa pellets, which simulated fallout Bell, et
al., 1970: , 71-82)?
If either question is answered negatively, then there
is no point to continue any speculation.

If the vegetation

on Sauter's farm were contaminated by a number of different
(and presumably later) shots, then a precise measurement or
estimate would be impossible.

As equally important, if the

symptoms that Sauter's sheep exhibited in no way compared to
known symptoms of radiation sickness in sheep exposed to
simulated fallout, then a case of radiation exposure would
be very difficult to even consider.
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There were five other shots whose fallout clouds passed
over or near the vicinity of Sauter ' s farm in 1957,
according to the trajectory maps developed by Lewis Machta
of the Us Weather Bureau Special Projects office.

They are

listed below:
Shot

Kt

date det.

date passed

height

Wilson

10

6/18/57

6/22

10, 000 ft

Kepler

10

7/24/57

7/25, evening

30, 000 ft

Owens

9.7

7/25/57

7/26

30, 000 ft

Smokey

44

8/31/57

9/1 evening

20, 000 ft

Newton

12

9/16/57

9/17 evening

20, 000 ft

Morgan

8

10/7/57

10/8

40, 000 ft.

The rain data for the town of Alexandria (the town closest
to Sauter' s farm where climatological data was gathered) for
the days the shots passed over or nearby are as follows:
June 22nd..... • 1.3 inches
July 25th...... trace
July 26th...... trace
Sept. 1st...... 0.23 inches
Sept. 17th..... trace
Oct. 8th....... 0.01 inches

(source:

Minn. Star)

The Wilson shot distinguishes itself from the other
five shots in two important areas.

The clouds from the

other shots were in the stratosphere, high above the rain
clouds.

As mentioned earlier in the report, Willard Libby
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and others became embroiled in an argument with Sen. Clinton
Anderson on the mean, half-residence time for fallout in the
stratosphere.

The estimates ranged from two to seven years.

The fallout cloud from the Wilson shot that passed in the
vicinity of Sauter ' s farm was in the troposphere, or at
10, 000 feet.

Fallout in this cloud layer is generally

assumed to fallout close to the test site, and it generally
falls out of the sky within a few months at most.

Where

there were light to nearly non-existent rains at the time of
the other shots ( whose clouds were travelling above the rain
line), there was a comparative "deluge" of 1.3 inches at the
time of the Wilson shot passing over. The radioactivity from
the Wilson shot stands as the most logical candidate for
depositing the radioactivity found in the vegetation samples
on Sauter's farm.
The answer to the second question can be found by
comparing the symptoms Sauter's sheep exhibited with those
found in the experimental study of Bell, et al., ( 1970).
In the claim form that Sauter sent to the AEC, he
described the sheep as suffering from scours, shrinkage of
the flesh, paralysis, and the entire floor section of
bladder and "urinals" in one animal is absent.

He described

the area ( bladder and urinals) as looking cancerous.
Another symptom Sauter observed was weight loss:

one animal
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shrunk from 80 to 40 lbs.

Other difficulties centered

around the difficulties in birthing and reproduction of the
animals.
Bell and his associates found that animals who were fed
the higher levels of radiation (the 234 mCi that Dr. Finston
mentioned) suffered weight loss on the average of 1-2 pounds
per day (Bell et al, 1970: 73).

Sheep fed the higher levels

of radiation developed mild to severe diarrhea (Bell et al,
1970: 75).

And finally, lesions, blisters, polyps developed

where the fallout settled in the rumen and abomasum of the
digestive tract, although they did not see lesions in the
large intestine as earlier predicted (Bell et al., 1970:
77).
There are some similarities between the two.
said his sheep were suffering from "scours."

Sauter

Scours are

what farmers call a severe diarrhea in young animals. Bell
and his associates found mild to severe diarrhea in the
higher level radiation exposed sheep.
experienced weight loss.

In both cases, the

Anorexia is a well known symptom

of acute radiation poisoning.

Finally, Sauter apparently

cut one of the dead animals open and found gross
abnormalities in the "urinals and the bladder.

The region

is cancerous." It is possible that he saw areas in the
digestive system where the fallout settled, leaving black,
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necrotic, blistered, or polyp like growth areas, as Bell and
his as sociates described in their study.
In conclusion, it is conceivable,

even plausible that

the sheep on Sauter's farm were injured, even mortally
injured by radiation.

But it ' s not provable. The reasons

for this do not necessarily deal with the limitations of our
knowledge of physics.

They have to do with government

officials who, 28 years ago, covered up the true nature of
the facts regarding fallout, out of fear of damaging the
programs of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Had Sauter been given the true counts on the farm back
in 1958, even with a detailed denial from the AEC at the
time as to their blame for causing the damage Sauter
alleged, Sauter could have easily gone to Senator Humphrey
for help in finding independent scientists to affirm or
refute the AEC ' s position.

Sen. Humphrey, as reported in

the April 14th, 1958 edition of the Minneapolis Star, was
committed to helping Sauter on the fallout case.

Even the

state of Minnesota was committed to developing independent
sources for monitoring and analyzing radiation.

With

independent, or even Minnesota state scientists working on
the case with Sauter, all the unanswered questions that we
face today would have been answered.
The outcome of releasing the information, getting it
into the hands of Sen. Humphrey, Sen. Anderson of the Joint
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Committee on Atomic Energy, the Minnesota scientists Dr.
Caster and Visscher, could have ultimately affected the
momentum of the atmospheric nuclear weapons testing program.
That is the only interpretation that can be made by
Dunning ' s observation that "misinterpretation of the data
could prove damaging to the AEC. "
The AEC government officials, who were supposedly
making scientific decisions, made a political decision to
withhold information for fear of harm coming to the overall
nuclear weapons program.
to make.

But that decision was not theirs

It is the right and duty of congressional

representatives such as Sen. Humphrey and Anderson to openly
question government practices (such as nuclear explosions)
that threaten to endanger the lives and property of American
citizens.

But the AEC officials held a tight rein on

information critical to their program, and as such
manipulated the public ' s opinion about the safety of fallout
from nuclear weapon's test. The AEC had the absolute power
over the control of information coming in this arena.

As

Lord Acton said "Absolute power corrupts absolutely. "
For many years, the Atomic Energy Commission was openly
criticized for its dual role in both regulating and
promoting nuclear energy.

That is why, in 1973, the Atomic

Energy Commission was abolished.

Out of the ashes arose two

agencies, the Department of Energy, which controls the
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production of nuclear weapons, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, which licenses, and oversees the operation of
America's nuclear power plants. But, from the experiences
gained from the 1984 Congressional investigation, the
actions of the DOE in withholding information from the House
Energy, Conservation and Power Subcommittee in 1984, were no
different than the AEC withholding information from Sauter,
the scientists representing the State of Minnesota and Sen.
Humphrey in the late 1950's.
As long as secrecy and fear dominate, sectors of our
government will remain more authoritarian than democratic.
It is indeed ironic, that the nuclear weapons program was
first developed to stand as a bastian against
authoritarianism.

Yet, the men carrying out the day to day

duties of those agencies acted as though the development of
nuclear weapons was paramount. Individual's rights could be
sacrificed "for the good of the country. "
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION:
THE SOCIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE
Three Rules to Remember
As the son of Dolph Honicker , 25 year veteran news
editor of the Nashville Tennessean , I was given three rules
of writing and reporting:
Son , [ my father would say ) Number one , never make
assumptions if the facts aren't there to support them.
Number two , don't explain , let the facts speak for
themselves. And number three , never end a sentence with
a preposition.
It was for these reasons that the most conservative
reading of the documents found in the files has been
presented.

That is why it was stated in the first chapter

that Dunning "should" have known (but not that he did know)
about the laws regarding fallout and decay curves , and why
it was absolutely imperative to factor back to the time of
the fallout so as to assess the true level of damage on
Sauter's farm.

Despite the man' s prestigious position as

the chief of the "Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing
Branch , " I

could not categorically state that the man knew

the facts on fallout , and that he nevertheless covered up.
What if Gordon Dunning was incompetent , hired only because
he had a PhD in Science Education , and only as a figurehead
to deny any and all claims of radiation injury?

He might
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have known little about calculating the levels of radiation
and the unit dose to individuals (or animals) more than a
year after the initial fallout.
Before passing judgement on the man, and the AEC, I had
to determine if the man was capable of making certain
evaluations, regardless of his position.

The critical

scientific evaluation that was never done by Dunning in the
Sauter affair was the simple calculation of determining the
unit dose at the time of fallout.

Even excluding the

weathering factors, Dunning could have gone back to
Glasstone's The Effects of Nuclear Weapons and plotted the
decay curve.

To this point, following my my father's

injunction, I've given the man and the Agency that he
represented every benefit of the doubt.
Two new pieces of information concerning Dunning have
come to light.

Not only did this scientist know about decay

curves; when it came time for the Atomic Energy Commission
to explain the meaning of decay curves and its relation to
fallout at great distances from the nuclear test site, it
was Gordon Dunning who explained the scientific nature of
the rapid decay factors of fallout to Congress in his
address to the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in the hearings titled "The
Nature of Radioactive Fallout and its Effects on Man. "
(JCAE , 1957: 170-247) . Dunning's extensive testimony and
presentation of graphs and reports demonstrates the
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incontrovertible fact that he not only was aware of decay
curves, it was his duty to explain the nature of
radioactivity in relation to decay, the effect radioactivity
had on humans, plants and animals, including the function of
time with respect to dose.
Why, if he knew precisely how to calculate the true
levels of radioactivity on Sauter' s farm, did he not do that
and then use those true levels to make some sort of accurate
estimate of the dose that Sauter's sheep received to their
gastrointestinal tract?

In his testimony subheaded

"Internal Exposures, " he stated:
The principal hazards from intake of relatively large
amounts of radioactive fallout for several weeks
immediately following a nuclear detonation are doses
to the: (a) gastrointestional tract, from the gross
fission product activity; (b) thyroid, from isotopes of
iodine; and (c) bone, principally from isotopes of
strontium and barium-lanthanum (Dunning, in Hearings,
1 957: 1 7 7) .
From the symptoms the sheep exhibited before they died
(indicating severe gastrointestinal disturbances) and the
extremely high 1 year + post shot radiation findings,
whistles, bells, sirens should have been going off in
Dunning's mind, alerting him to the fact that there was
evidence on Sauter's farm that radiation might well have
been involved in the death of the sheep.
But instead of investigating, Dunning chose to coverup.
Thirty years later, Dunning's list of problems from
fallout have come to haunt Douglas County in Minnesota, the
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home of Joe Sauter' s farm. Cancer rates for Douglas County
have been compiled from the U. S. Cancer Mortality, Rates and
Trends Volumes 1-3 by Dr. Richard L. Miller (see Appendix
C).

Both thyroid cancer and bone cancer are statistically

higher than expected in Douglas County compared to the
cancer rate for the state of Minnesota as a whole.

The

facts are even more disturbing when one looks at the fact
that Douglas County has a lower cancer rate than the state
for "All Cancers Combined, " yet many radiogenic cancers such
as the two mentioned above, along with leukemia, malignant
melanoma, multiple myeloma are above the state cancer rates.
(For a graphic illustration of the problems, see Figures 3,
4, and 5. )
Government statisticians might retort that the numbers
of cancers in the county are too low to prove radiation
exposure and cancer causality.

Qualitatively, however, the

statistics point in the right direction of causality.
should have to go without saying that the family

It

survivors

of the people in Douglas county who died of thyroid and bone
cancers would define their own losses as "significant, "
regardless of anyone else' s opinion.
Because of one man's decision, along with the
concurrance of his peers at the highest operational levels
of the AEC field offices, a tragedy has been allowed.
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Why?

Why did he do what he did, when he knew what he

knew?
Dunning's own statements, as cited in Ball (1986),
provide the probable reason. Note that Dunning is referring
to the sanitized verson of the levels of fallout reported by
the government Ball prefaces the Dunning quotation:
AEC medical advisors testified at congressional
hearings in 1957 and 1959, and at the AEC
commissioner's meetings, that accepting the more
conservative safety figures 'would make it impossible
to conduct operations at the test site without major
changes in procedures'. Dr. Gordon M. Dunning,
Division of Biology and Medicine, in 1957 testimony
before the Joint Committee, stated that the AEC
scientists and technicians, ' with moderate effort',
could reduce even further the release of radioactive
materials into the atmosphere. However, if we
continue to reduce the fraction we are willing to
release, we eventually reach a cost of control which
makes the operation prohibitive. The dilemma is that
we must weigh the degree of undesirability of
radioactive fallout against the advantages which may
be anticipated from activities which are inevitably
accomplished by fallout (cited in Ball, 1986: 41).
Put in simpler terms, to significantly reduce the level
of fallout would cost so much, that it would be impossible
to continue nuclear weapons testing.
"advantages"

To gain knowledge, the

of nuclear weapons testing (superiority over

the Russians) Americans must accept some degree of
radioactive fallout.
Not to mention disinformation fallout.

It is

reasonable to presume that Dunning knew exactly what he was
doing.

He knew that if the Sauter case came to light and

established solid evidence for livestock injury due to
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fallout that was further from the test site than any other
recorded in history, then the costs for insuring that it
could never happen again might bring the nuclear weapons
testing program to a grinding halt.

Imagine that.

billion dollar weapons testing program.
dollar arms race.

A

A multi-billion

A poor, self-educated farmer in Farwell

with dead sheep on his hands and no place to turn.
Neal Shover defines organizational crime as
. . . criminal acts committed by individuals or groups
of individuals, thus including conspiracies, during
the normal course of their work as employees of
organizations, which they intend to contribute to the
achievement of goals or other objectives thought to
be important for the organization as a whole, some
subunit within the organization, or their own
particular job duties. Individuals may be well aware
while committing such an act or series of acts that
their personal fortunes and organizational career (s)
will be thereby enhanced or jeopardized. Still, so
long as, in their motivation, their acts contain even
a modicum of intent to benefit the organization, they
fall within the ambit of this definition (Shover,
cited in Ermann and Lundman, 1978: 39) .
From the data presented in previous chapters, it is
clear that Dunning committed governmental crime.
forethought and premeditation

With

he broke specific laws of the

United States Criminal Codes in the performance of his
duties as the head of the Effects of Nuclear Weapons Testing
Branch of the Division of Biology and Medicine for the
Atomic Energy Commission.

Keeping

information secret had

powerful effects on two different levels.
Six years after the fallout killed Joe Sauter's sheep,
five years after Dunning ' s decision to lie and coverup in
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the Sauter case, the above ground nuclear weapons test ban
His job done, Dunning then moved up the

treaty was signed.

AEC ladder to head the Division of Occupational Safety in
the AEC .
Meanwhile, Sauter' s neighbors thought he was crazier
than ever.
Dunning reached retirement age in 1975.

After his

retirement, he settled in an upper middle class retirement
community in Arizona.
Four years before, 1971, Joe Sauter finally succumbed
to the cancer that began in his bladder was found inoperable
and slowly twisted the life out of his body. He was found in
his one-room smoke-filled cabin by the county maintenance
He was barely able to move, but they got

snow-remover crew.
him to the hospital.

Ironically, radiation therapy was used, but to no
avail, the cancer took his life.

Now, the head of Radiology

for Boston University Medical hospital believes that
radiation may have caused his cancer.
Secrets: Their Impact on An Open Society
Although the files that comprised the Sauter case did
not have any classification markings restricting them from
public access, they were effectively kept from public view
for thirty years.

Several of the other cases that I

discovered were classified, from the lowest non-security
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classification, "For Officials Use Only, " to the highest
classification "Top Secret."
What such classification

means is that release of the

information could be injurious to the defense and national
security of America.

Though there is nothing in the

consitution about the right of the government to withhold
information in the national interest, the practice has been
with us since the days of our first President and commander
in Chief, Mr.

George Washington (see Barker and Fox, 1972).

The executive priviledge of classifying information was
minimal and flexible until the time of the first and second
world wars.

The rapid escalation of secrecy in government

coincided with technological development in warfare
equipment.
Security classifications were in three grades, top
secret, secret, and restricted data.

Barker and Fox give

the definition of the three levels of classification
The most stringent label was "Top Secret." It was
to be applied only to that information or material
the defense aspect of which is paramount and the
unauthorized disclosure of which could result in
exceptionally grave damage to the nation such as
leading to a definite break in diplomatic relations
affecting the defense of the United States, an armed
attack against the United States or its allies, a
war, or the compromise of military or defense plans,
or intelligence operations, or scientific, or
technological developments vital to the National
defense.
The 'Secret' label was to be applied to a document
when disclosure could result in serious damage to the
nation, such as by jeopardizing the international
relations of the United States, endangering the
effectiveness of a program or policy of vital
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importance to the national defense, or compromising
important military or defense plans, scientific or
technological developments important to national
defense, or information revealing important
intelligence operations (Barker and Fox, 1972: 1314) •
It's understandable in a time of war that we would want
to keep our technological advances in the art of warfare
from our enemies.

We certainly would not want them to know

the weaknesses in our planes, ships, submarines, tanks,
radars.

To have such information leak out would indeed

result in visible damages to the defense of our country. It
is understandable that the penalty for disclosing such
information could lead to life in prison if convicted (or
death, as in the case of the Rosenbergs) .
With the AEC, the license to classify information was
freely given.

Where other agencies in government, such as

the State Department must automatically declassify their
documents after 30 years,

once an AEC official classified a

document, it, by law, could stay classified forever.
During the course of my Congressional investigation, I
came across a set of files that listed about 80 cases of
individuals that, similar to Joe Sauter, had claimed injury
by radiation exposure, either at a nuclear weapons test, in
AEC-contracted nuclear facilities, or from fallout, as in
Sauter's case.

Half of the files were classified; from

" official use only" to " secret. "

To our amazement, when we

requested a file that reported on the levels of strontium 90
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in the soil of the Rongelap atoll following the detonation
of the 15 megaton shot "Bravo" on March 1, 1954, in direct
response to our request for the files, the Department of
Energy upgraded the national security classification of the
30 year old file from "Secret" to "Top Secret . "
I remember asking my supervisor who was Q-cleared to
review classified files for the reasoning behind upgrading a
30 year old report on radioactive dirt on a small pacific
atoll 5000 miles from the
of information

us top secret? How would release

on some hot dirt on a humid tropical island

that is smaller than Knox County lead to
exceptionally grave damage to the nation such as
leading to a definite break in diplomatic relations
affecting the defense of the United States, an armed
attack against the United States or its allies, a
war, or the compromise of military or defense plans,
or intelligence operations, or scientific, or
technological developments vital to the National
defense (cited earlier in Barker and Fox) ?
My supervisor just shrugged and said that they had the
Department of Energy power to do that, and besides, even if
she knew what was in the report, she couldn' t tell me, it
was a secret.
Atomic Power and Social Power
This case study of AEC cover-ups is a study of the use
of social power to promote atomic power.

But what exactly

is to be meant by the term " social power?" Debates over its
meaning have been voluminous and contentious (Martin, 1977 ;
149

Wrong, 1979; Miller, 1983). suffice to say that its atomic
structure has been delved. Still, one of the most
enlightening discussion os the concept is that of Steven
Lukes (1975).

Lukes provides a complex, three-dimensional

view of power, which is useful for deepening our
understanding of the material at hand.
The first dimension of power is the most easily grasped
of the three.

In Dahl' s (1957: 201) explication: "A has

power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something
that B would not do otherwise."

The emphasis here is on

observable behaviour, decision-making, key issues, overt
conflict, and observable expression of interests (Lukes,
1975: 25).
The federal agency, the AEC (here "A") conducted
atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons that created
potentially harmful fallout to the American public, the
citizens of Minnesota, and Joe Sauter (all "B"s).

The AEC

was successful in getting all of these (and their more
knowledgeable political representatives) to accept this
potential harm even though it was contrary to their
interests.

That is, it is unlikely that any of these

parties would have volunteered to be subjected to radiation.
The first dimension of power, as its name indicates,
tends to be one-dimensional, suface level, superficial. It
is a report of what actions were taken by whome and it may
include a report of how decisions were made.

The one150

dimensional view of power has a built-in analytic bias in
its focus on only those issues which are defined as such by
the decision-makers themselves.

There is an unstated

conservative assumption that even though decisions sometimes
may be inequitable, the array of issues in the political
arena do, indeed, represent the various interests of the
citizenry.

Although the legitimacy of the decision-making

process may be questioned from time to time, the legitimacy
of the agenda-setting process is not.
The second dimension of power focuses on non
decisions, non-issues, expressed grievances, and covert
conflict (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, 1963 ; Lukes, 1975) . The
central point of this dimension is most elegantly expressed
by Schattschneider (1960: 71) :
All forms of political organization have a bias in
favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict
and the suppression of others, because organization is
the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized
into politics while others are organized out.
Examples of second-dimensional power are pervasive
throughout the body of this case study.

At every step of

the way the AEC mobilized its resources (bias) to deny not
only Sauter's claim but also the concerns of the state of
Minnesota, the press, and Sen. Humphrey's and Sen.
Anderson ' s committees.

Issues became non-issues and

decisions became non-decisions.
The state of Minnesota requested from the AEC all their
data on hotspots in the state.

The state had a grievance.
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Its scientists had collected river water samples that
exceeded the maximum permissible level for human consumption
of gross beta radiation products.

It wanted data to

substantiate the need for extra precautions and it wanted
independent state-controlled laboratories to test
radioactive fallout.

Similarly, Joe Sauter had a grievance.

He filed a claim requesting compensation for radiation
injury in the death of 92 of his sheep.

Sauter wanted a

confirmation that vegetation from its farm was radioactive.
The AEC made autonomous decisions to report to both
Minnesota's Governor ' s Scientific Advisory Committee on
Atomic Energy Development Problems and to Joe Sauter that
there was not enough radiation falling out over Minnesota to
warrant an independent monitoring and analysis laboratory
nor to warrant compensation for the dead sheep.
Requests for information by the state of Minnesota, by
Sen. Humphrey, by the chairman of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, and by Sauter went through normal
bureaucratic channels.
nothing flowed out.

These were channels through which

By withholding information the AEC

prevented the mobilization of power resources by the
aggrieved parties.

The issue was removed from the political

agenda.
The mobilization of bias was stretched to absurd
lengths in the Sauter case.

On a claim against the AEC for

only $1556.40, the AEC actively involved or informed a dozen
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of their top officials for over a year.

The clearest

example was the employment on the claim of Dr. Donald
Chadwick, head of Special Radiological Services for the
Department of Health.

Dr. Chadwick was also a member of the

Federal Radiation Council, a committee that directly advised
President Eisenhower (Metzger, 1972) .

Of the radiation

injury claim against the government, only 0. 1% was for
personal injury ($15) .

Yet the AEC had one of its top

consultants investigate that portion of the claim. Why?

It

gave the AEC the appearance of expertise, even though the
evidence was not carefully considered.
Walking through the Sauter case, one perceives a clear
and pervasive mobilization of bias to insure that nothing
happened.

The case was not decided openly, equitably, or

scientifical ly.

From May, 1958, when the head official of

Albuquerque Operations first wrote Sauter denying that
fal lout from any Nevada Test Operations could possibly have
harmed his sheep, to the April, 1959 from the same official,
denying his claim for lack of any evidence, the AEC was
oriented toward damage prevention to the organization rather
than protecting the health and safety of the claimant and
the public at large.
Luke ascribes to second-dimensional power a "reformist"
value assumption.

This dimension gets at what goes on

behind closed doors.

It implies a call for openness, for

due process, for constitutional rights.

But the
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second-dimensional approach only deepens the description of
the problem.

It does not address the question of why people

do not openly rebel against such abuse.
It is at this point that third-dimensional power comes
into play.

The third dimension of power refers to the

control of information and knowledge as a form of power that
structures the process of issue formation.

For power is

expressed not only when something happens (an issue is
resolved) , and not only when action is taken to make nothing
happen (an issue becomes a non-issue) , but also when nobody
does anything at all (objective interests remain
non-issues) .

The third dimension of power allows for the

analysis of unexpressed interests and latent conflicts in
society.

As Lukes states, it is difficult, but not

impossible to study potential issues that do not become
visible as a result of the control of information. John
Gaventa's Power and Powerlessness (1980) is an empirical
case study of why people, in the face of glaring inequities
do not rebel .
Gramsci's (1971) "cultural hegemony" concept is
relevant at this point.

Social values taught at an early

age and continual normative pressure shape people's
preconception of what is a real issue, who has a right to
determine such issues, and how issues are to be constructed .
Faith in government, accepting the official stand , is
for many people an even more powerful influence than the
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media.

For example, some of Joe's neighbors condemn Joe

because he openly criticized the AEC officials for their
"willful and premeditated deceit."

One neighbor said, "You

just don' t talk like that about the government."

Her tone

was not that of fear (as perhaps a Russian might say, "you
just don' t criticize the Party like that") but more of some
one speaking of something distasteful.
Even on an institutional level often there are not
sufficient resources to reconstruct an issue once it has
been neutralized by second dimensional power.

Third

dimensional value consensus limits such attempts.

In a

sense, what could the Governor Advisory Science Committee do
when the AEC officials said, "We have given you all the
data, and as you can see, there is no danger from fallout,
now or in the future."

The scientific advisory committee

was compelled to accept the decision because of the cultural
hegemony of law and government.

The 1954 Atomic Energy Act

mandated the AEC, first and foremost, to protect the health
and safety of American citizens from any dangers or harm
that might arise from nuclear weapons testing operations.
Who could doubt that the AEC should abide by the law?
Moreover, the AEC was the only agency with the range of
expertise to adequately assess the problems involved.

The

AEC owned the experts and the cultural hegemony of
"expertise" ensured its powers. Governor Orville Freeman's
Scientific Advisory Committee, Sen.

Humphrey's Senate
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Committee on Disarmament , Sen. Clinton Anderson' s Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy , all deferred.
When the Atomic Energy Commission was charged with
promoting nuclear weapons development , and protecting the
health of the people from the deleterious effects of nuclear
weapons testing , the agency was put into a position of
irreconcilable conflict.

When forced to choose which was

most important , the continuation of weapons testing came as
a higher priority in the minds of the leading AEC officials
charged with protecting the health and safety of the
American people.

Their rationale:

a few must suffer for

the good of the many. That simple. The mechanism by which
they carried out their duties in perpetuating the nuclear
testing program: control of the production and flow of
information.
John Gaventa , in "The Powerful , the Powerlessness and
the Experts:

Struggles in an Information Age" (1985) notes

that our society has changed from an industrial society to a
post-industrial society based on information. Where , in an
industrial society , power was based in the hands of those
who owned , as Marx coined it , "the means of production , "
power in the post-industrial society is based in the hands
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of the people who control the flow, production and
dissemination of "official" knowledge. 1
Gaventa rightly points out that the primary mechanism of
the power of knowledge is the ability and practice of
withholding information from those who want it by those who
have it.
Withholding of knowledge by those who control it may
take blatant forms- -secrecy, lying, evasion. But
there are more subtle forms of knowledge control.
Professionalizing knowledge, making it available only
in obscure journals, or portrayed in obscure
language--all serve the same purpose of keeping it
from those those interests may be affected by it. In
a system already affected by inequalities in the
communication and production of knowledge, the
knowledge elite are the gatekeepers, further
controlling the dissemination of information, and thus
the emergence of certain issues and conflicts
altogether (Gaventa, 1985: page 18) .
When only experts have the knowledge necessary to
decide the critical aspects of a particular public program
(such as the nuclear question) in a controversial situation,
it simply reduces down to which experts one wishes to
believe, the established or the opposing experts.

The

1Gaventa's research makes a sharp break with the vast
majority of scholarly research in both the fields sociology
and political science. Gaventa points out that research by
experts is generally a one-way street where knowledge of and
about the powerless is conferred to the powerful. He is
openly critical of the present state of sociology:
" Sociology has worked to create and increase the unequal
distribution of knowledge. It has worked to make the power
structure relatively more powerful and knowledgeable, and
thereby to make the subject population more impotent and
ignorant. " (Gaventa, 1985: pp. 14-15. )
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Atomic Energy Commission used all the tactics mentioned
above to keep an iron grip on controlling public opinion on
the issue of nuclear testing in the 1950's.

Virtually all

of the funding for radiobiological research passed through
the AEC.

As Dr. Caster's and many other ' s experiences

demonstrated,

when research findings proved contrary to the

AEC doctrines, one could expect his research grants to be
abruptly cancelled.

In the small professional circles of

radiobiology, epidemiology and other radiation related
areas, word quickly spread of the experiences of Caster,
Knapp, Gofman, Tamplin, Morgan, Mancusso and others. Those
without a firmly grounded set of ethical principles, who
were wedded to the idea of financial security, thought twice
or even three times before publishing material that would
meet the disapproval of the Atomic Energy Commission.
Continuing on the control of information, as Gaventa
rightly notes, control of an issue is maintained when the
language is deliberately kept obscured, or printed in
obscure professional journals.

For an example of this, one

need only go to the 4, 000 pages of testimony and articles
submitted by the Atomic Energy Commission to the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy.

Much of the material is so

recondite as to be nearly unintelligible,

certainly not

written for consumption by the legislators or the general
public.

Rather, it was written to give an air of expertise.

The general attitude displayed in the testimony:

"The
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issues are very complex, but reasonable policy can be
established on scientific grounds ; if you can follow our
technical analysis, you will agree that our conclusions are
reasonable."

Many of the question/answer sessions in the

testimony bring out the evasiveness and heightened abilities
of the AEC scientists to obsfucate an issue when asked a
direct question.

Often the answers would become so

circuitous as to be meaningless.

But, given the loquacity

of the scientists, and the sheer volume of material
presented to Congress, the legislators were forced to the
conclusion that the AEC had provided them with the "truth, "
despite the uneasy feeling of some that they were not being
dealt with squarely, as the exchanges between the AEC and
Senator Clinton Anderson demonstrate.
Only through the near absolute control of the
interpretation of knowledge did the AEC have the ability to
influence public opinion so radically on the issue of
fallout in the 1950 ' s.

Uranium prospectors ' geiger counters

in Nevada would go off scale as fallout clouds passed over
head.

The AEC said "no problem."

Thousands of sheep were

killed in Utah following the shots passing over in 1953 that

were called "Nancy" and "Dirty Harry.11 2

Despite one AEC

2see Fuller (1985) for an action-packed journalistic
account of the trials and tribulations of the Utah sheep
(Footnote Continued)
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livestock inspector ' s conclusion that the sheep were "hotter
than a two dollar pistol" after passing his geiger counter
over their wool, the AEC was effectively able to divert the
cause of death to "range mismanagement" and "malnutrition."
Five years later, the same AEC officials involved in the
Utah case, Allaire and Dunning, would suggest the same
reason for Sauter ' s dead sheep.
By having a monopoly on the control of interpretation,
then, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary,
the AEC could effectively lie when all other tactics failed.
They could get away with it for a number of reasons.

First,

there was no outside agency monitoring the actions of the
AEC (except for the JCAE, which was impotent in their duty
as watchdog).

Sauter might have been able to find an

"expert" to further his cause. Being a rural uneducated
farmer in the backwoods of western Minnesota it is not
surprising that he found none. But for every expert he might
find that would publically support his contention of
radiation injury, the AEC could muster 20-30 experts to not
only refute the lone expert ' s position, but to publically
ridicule him as well.

Gaventa aptly notes that in a society

where people don ' t question the expert, "the greatest power
(Footnote Continued)
farmers. The book so disturbed Dr. Dunning that he wrote a
35 -page rebuttal to the book that was circulated within the
American Health Physics Society.
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of the monopoly of knowledge is the power to engineer its
own consent" (Gaventa, 1985: 24).
Tom Cochran accurately summed up the problem in his
ariticle "Secrecy and Nuclear Power, "
The federal government has repeatedly abused its
classification authority to deflect public concern,
minimize nuclear fears and avoid embarrassments and
debate. To my knowledge, no public official has ever
been punished for these abuses. Instead, some of
those most responsible receive commendations and
promotions for their valuable public service. And
those who have sounded the alarm-- the whistle
blowers--where their identity is known, have been
rewarded with poor performance evaluations and removed
from their jobs (Cochran, 198 1: 37).
Problems/Solutions
Given that I have spent over 150 pages pointing out a
serious problem in the byproducts of the creation of the
nuclear age, I would be remiss in not pointing out a few
solutions to the problem.

Mortin Halperin, former assistant

secretary of defense, and a key figure in the Pentagon
Papers controversy states quite clearly the first change
that must take place before any hope of rectifying the
problem is possible:
If we are to have less secrecy we need to change the
rules of the game, to take away from Presidents and
bureaucrats the unfettered authority that they now
have to determine what should be kept secret in the
interests of national security. We need in short,
laws that will require more disclosure and greater
respect for First Amendment values (Halperin and
Hoffman, 1977: 4) .
How does one change the law, especially on an issue
that calls for a radical curtailment of power in the hands
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of officials long used to such power.
not relinquish it readily.

Certainly , they will

Wilson and Rachal note:

A government agency operates in a milieu of
politically supervised autonomy. All organizations
value autonomy and strive to reduce threats to it.
There is no businessman who would not prefer less
competition to more , certain markets to uncertains
ones , and guaranteed revenues to contingent ones.
Given half a chance , a firm will try to acquire as
much of a monopoly position as it can. But government
agencies share in the authoritative power of the
state , which preempts all rivals and establishes a
monopoly position itself (cited in Ermann and Lundman ,
1978: 316-317).
The AEC was firmly in control of this issue when the
reins of power passed to the ERDA in 1973 (which was later
abolished.

In the separation of powers , the Department of

Energy was charged with the production and testing of
nuclear weapons components ,

the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission was charged with the regulation of the nuclear
power industry in America).

Efforts to bring outside

intervention into the processes of decisionmaking concerning
health and safety issues , recognition or compensation for
radiation inj uries related to AEC/DOE Activities have failed
miserably (e.g. , the Glenn/Wirth Radiation Reorganization
Act failed even to come to the floor for a vote).
Howard Ball , (1986: 201-02)

sees the only solution as

court action.
The picture is a bleak one when one reviews recent
compensatory legislation for the downwinders. Since
1979 , it has languished in the legislature ,
unsupported by legislators and roundly attacked by
White House bureaucrats who have periodically visited
the Capital to lobby against the Kennedy and Hatch
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proposals. While there was a slight chance of adding
an amendment to the Marshall Islands Compact of 1984
to create a trust fund for the American downwinders,
the legislative picture is generally discouraging for
the survivors. It is especially poignant that a
national dilemma has been turned into a local one,
perceived by legislators as Hatch ' s 'pork-barrel ' bill
for a few Mormons who live in southern Utah.
The Reagan White House, committed to reducing
nonessential, government financial support in the
domestic arena, has completely opposed any kind of
legislation that would provide taxpayer funds for
persons injured by negligent governmental activities
in the past. Reaganomics is based on reducing
entitlement programs, and the Reagan personnel see a
compensation bill as a type of entitlement that would
commit the federal government to an expenditure of
untold billions of dollars to these and other victims
of the government's lack of due care. Consequently,
it has made every effort to kill the legislative
effort and has been unwilling to discuss a settlement
with the plaintiffs' attorneys in the Allen litigation.
The downwinders ' best and probably only hope for
the foreseeable future, therefore, is the judicial
remedy. Despite the very nature of the federal
judicial system, with its lengthy time delays and
prohibitive costs, the plaintiffs have the ability,
at least in federal court, to mount a substantive
challenge to governmental negligence--within the
limits of the existing law. Until the political
branches reevaluate the complexities of the
downwinders' problem and develop a public
policy that addresses society ' s responsibility to
react to governmental wrongs committed against its
citizens, the only remedy is the one found in the
federal district courts (Ball, 1986: 202).
Although the book is less than a year old, Ball's
solution is already sadly outdated.

The judicial remedy

that Ball . counted so heavily was the class action suit of
Allen, et al. Vs USA.

Judge Bruce Jenkins heard before his

court a handful of the plaintiff's cases from the more than
1100 downwinders represented by Stewart Udall.

After

hearing months of testimony from both sides, reviewing over
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7, 000 pages of documentation, Judge Jenkins recessed. He
then spent over 14 months in preparing his memorandum
opinion.

His was a landmark decision.

He broke with past

judicial rulings and found that the government had been
negligent in its duty to warn and adequately protect the
lives of the people downwind from the nuclear tests.

He

found exception to the discretionary clause of the federal
torts claims act that holds the government immune from
prosecution.

His logic was that the stated policy of the

government at the time was to protect the health and safety
of the American public from deleterious effects of weapons
testing.

Jenkins noted there was a breakdown at the

operational level, specifically the field managers failed to
provide the protection and adequate warnings needed to
protect the public.

He awarded the plaintiffs $2. 3 million,

opening the way for the other 1000+ cases to be heard.
case was settled in 1984.

The

As a ruling of the court, it

provides not only some of the most elegant demonstrations of
the use of logic, but it is also one of the most
comprehensive and thoroughly well written treatises on the
weapons testing/radiation exposure issue. 3
3The document most frequently cited in the ruling (over
35 times by my count) is Dr. John Gofman's Radiation and
Human Health. Dr. Gofman is probably the most well-known
critic of America's nuclear power program. A former
(Footnote Continued)
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The Allen decision was appealed by the government
attorneys from the Justice Department and the Department of
Energy's General Counsel's civil Litigation Branch. The hope
that Ball and so many other attached to the Allen decision
were dashed to the rocks in April, 1987 ago when the Federal
District Court overturned Jenkins decision finding that the
government had sovereign immunity in such cases.
The decision will be appealed to the Supreme Court, but
it is unlikely that the appeals court decision will be
overturned.

In this, as in many other radiation injury

cases, the government has spent several fold over what it
would cost to settle so as to avoid setting a "bad"
precedent.
My reading of Gaventa (1985) would suggest another
solution the problem.

The legislative or the judicial

strategies, in which

experts are pitted against other

experts, duking it out on behalf of their constituencies is
simply a perpetuation of the existing problem, the problem
of the control

of knowledge being in the hands of the few,

rather in the minds of the many.

Gaventa would advocate a

shift in that control of knowledge to the powerless.

He

(Footnote Continued)
assistant director of Lawrence Livermore Labs, his funding
was abruptly cancelled after a critical report from him and
his colleagues showed expected increases in cancer from
normal routine releases of radiation from nuclear power
plants. (See Gofman and Tamplin, Poisoned Power.)
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points out the many problems attendant to the shifting of
the power of control and production of knowledge to the
powerlessness.

In a majority of instances where outside

researchers come in and work with disenfranchised groups,
the skills, knowledge, and resources that the researcher
brought with him, often leave when the researcher decides to
move on to greener pastures.

Gaventa (1985: 33) stresses

that the loop of dominance/subordination between the
researcher and the powerless group must be broken.
Ideally there is some accountability between
researcher and researched: the researcher begins with
questions that the powerless group has posed, the
information is provided back to them in a usable and
understandable form.
He goes on say that the real power of a researcher is
not so much to provide the group with information so much as
it is to provide the powerless with the skills to produce
their own information, thus making the researcher's presence
no longer necessary. Gaventa cites Oleiveras on the problem:
The group must gain control of the research process,
meaning that they have succeeded in appropriating to
themselves the knowledge and science which the
researcher brought. Acquisition by the group of
methodological tools which were once the monopoly of
the researcher, prevent the repetition of the
dependence relationship'... (Oleivera cited in
Gaventa, 1985: 34).
The difficulty with Gaventa's solution to the problems
outlined in this thesis is that, in Minnesota at least,
there is no clearly definable group which might go through
the empowerment process that Gaventa advocates.

Gaventa's
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approach of empowerment using participatory research works
best when there are specific groups of people (such as
families adjacent to strip mines, or workers in an unhealthy
workplace, etc) with a common and somewhat easily defined
common problem.
With fallout from radiation, even if the person
received a dose well exceeding maximum permissible standards
and died within a few years of known radiation related
disease or syndrome, proving causality is next to
impossible.

To further compound the problem, in fallout

cases over great distances, the number of people affected
might be only 1 in a thousand, ten thousand or a hundred
thousand.

There may be only a few here, and a few there.

Yet, the damage may be quite severe when the number of
people, over the years, and across the country are all added
together.

Gilbert Geis (cited in Ermann and Lundman, 1978:

285) wrote on this very problem. Geis credits C.

Wright

Mills for posing a most eloquent statement of the problem.
The first prerequisite for imposing heavier
sanctions on corporate criminals involves the
development of a deepening sense of moral outrage on
the part of the public. A number of factors have
restricted public awareness of the depth and cost of
white collar crime. That the injuries caused by most
corporate violations are highly diffused, falling
almost imperceptibly upon each of a great number of
widely scattered victims is undoubtedly the greatest
barrier to arousing public concern over white-collar
crime. 'It is better, so the image runs' C. Wright
Mills once wrote, ' to take one dime from each of ten
million people at the point of a corporation than
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$100, 000 from each of ten banks at the point of a
gun.' Then Mills added with wisdom: 'It is also
safer' (Mills, 1956: 95).
Analogously, public outrage is diffused, sanctions are
limited, and government crime is safe when victims are
scattered.
Postscript
When I began this work, I was convinced that the only
way to seek a solution to the problem was through Congress.
An individual or group would be stymied in any attempts to
gain access to the needed information on other cases,
because of the privacy act and the national security
restrictions.

A congressional oversight committee has the

power to override both.

My solution, turning to a

Congressional subcommittee turned out to be a mistake.
After this thesis is "put to bed, " the work
Minnesota case will continue.

on the

Rather than seeking an

experts solution to the problem, however, a few things will
be turned upside down.

After a March, 1987 trip to

Minnesota, a number of radio, newspapers and at least one TV
station reported on my findings.

I had asked that people

ask their representative Gerry Sikorski (D-MN) to meet with
me on the issue.

He has invited me to DC, where to inform

him of my research. Given that Congress has failed to
effectively regulate the actions of the agency and its
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predessors for the past years, it is more likely they will
continue to be part of the problem rather than part of the
solution.
After that trip, I will be going back up to Minnesota
to work with the Minnesota Public Interest Research Group on
the issue.

Several people have called in to the radio

stations, newspapers, and MPIRG with their own stories of
strange happenings that coincided with the nuclear weapons
tests.

Some people in the far western part of the state

want to know if the unexplained clusters of rare cancers in
their areas might be connected to radiation.

I will be

going back up to Minnesota to help set up participatory
research groups,

and begin the process shifting knowledge

from the experts to the people in rural western Minnesota.
Because of the magnitude of the problem posed by
radioactive fallout and the concomitant suppression of
information spanning over 30 years, any "solution" such as
just compensation for the victims,
nor quickly.

will come neither easily

The solution will certainly be of no use to
The

those who have already died from fallout's ill effects.
solution may not even come in time for the immediate
survivors to reap from its benefits.

But if people learn

the truth, and learn the truth in such a way that their own
lives are enriched and empowered by the participatory
research methods outlined in Gaventa's "Knowledge Struggles
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in an Information Age, " then something will have been gained
from all this.

If, out of this tragedy, some people at

least recognize it for what it is, a case of governmental
homicide in the name of national security and a case of
criminal bureaucratic cover-up in the name of scientific
expertise, perhaps such abuses will be limited in the
future.
Governmental homicide is an extreme example of raw,
first dimensional power.

It is mystified by the exercise of

second dimensional power, the ability of government to
stifle protest by keeping grievances off the agenda.
Classification of information, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, and criminal withholding of information are
examples of such power.

If power is to be gained by common

citizens, they must gain the power to set agendas. But such
power is mystified further yet by a third dimension of
power, deference to legitimate authority and expertise.
Only when common citizens learn to break omniscient
deference to experts will they begin to increase their
ability to create public issues and thereby mobilize publics
to action.

If the hegemony of expertise is to be broken,

common people must come to recognize the legitimacy of their
own "local" knowledge.

The raising of such consciousness is

a long road to travel.

My desire is that this research will

draw people in Minnesota and elsewhere across the country a
few faltering steps along that path.
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CLlIH
Th!s t l &.l;J ror as,erteJ d:uui;e fl-� ra.ll out noted on my Red Clo·,er June �8, l9S7
1.n .ro:-:n or ccp:ocr rr-d er ru=t c::ilor.:iti::n on t op side or le.ve:oi &."ld 10::e or t�
c lovor tc-;:,:i turned ov�r L"ld S O.."'le ru::ty loc}:ini holos were t..'lrou�h the leiives.
Tho dcp::i�it v:u (taken from rush color.:itien and turn--:i,cr cf!ect o! clover )
r.orc rlcn::o on :;outl-.c rly lcndin& alop�, &."le! also in l,.nd 't-11.:!.r. or ra.·.�e area::.
The usub.l lst ci;ttio� \."ll,.l; taJ;cn orr for h:?y llbout Jul:,· Lth and fed on a raticn
ba:;is o! L to 6 bales per d.:iy to 1:Jic atnek ewes be&ir.n!.nl! about Dcet."lbe:- l, 1957,
i.o About 6o aniltals . They were &lso reeeivin& about I. to 6 bales o! l:t and
:'r.:i cut.tine al.!.:u!a dw-in, th!. s ti::e p::r c!a.j'. Eiccept fc,r rceurrcnc:es 0! hut
rcrio.S io :10111e 0! =Y best � , in::ludinc S o! the l5S7 he.V}· wci.ht eve l�t-s
ar.d \.'ith a tot� o! .3 proi:d.nent 1C&Sters. No other ill &!feet w.s noted until
a!t.er the SP.ed crop { nur ba.rrP.n) c:lc,ver '\.�S entered into the fee d r:ition about
Y.�c:h 1st to 15th - 2 cues or tei=:por:iry p:ir�•sis occ:ured a;,;i::r�tly 1ti!.!'er.ine tha
forcleis (joints ) et.tirels• . One o\mce 0! lir.e 1o � our,ccs -i.a.ter d:-tneh -wu eiv�n,
tJ:e t'\.-es surviTed and both birthed pri:cat1lu dend and near ceac! le::-.�:: a re-.: cays
lntcr, in one case , and about 2 \.-eebl lat.er in the ot.l":er c� e. The clOYer
fcei!inc \.-U discontinued a.t th:.a oecur:.r.ce end other !ud �eh&s ed.. ·
J!istcry, rii.nch oper:itional since l9$'l on these. land:J. Lu:binc pa:a.1)·�, � not, ; ::�c-:d • .A. field o! the entire �...11:ar 'bt:ets, 2 ae2·e::, civen av-er to the �u
;. .:-ep:ir:itory to breeding in the !ell o! 1 S7. Ho\lenr the tree petri.ric .. tion u
nov !e>und creater ar.d less, denotes the ccx:ntour 'beet field -..-:i:: ili tho � order a.t
lu::t o! tM fall-out atre:id o r felt. The e.rly 'brecciini, pen 'bred a.r.d t o sehe;t
si re , '-'..S ta.k en up di;rini; the but fora(:i!'-C period, a pro.en hi ch :ase�i sex
throw �::t<.:r !or 2 year:; previous, an:! a e>r-.c 0! the sr:c � d.:live:-cc only no?T.;u
J11ale out o! the !ir::t l4 lar.i'bs born. A tctal o! 3 =lcs were bi!"'t.t,cd, both other
1'1:\les ver� di::b birth a.nd were one or t,.rin la.':lbs c,d per:i..!'hed 1r. :i-x:r.s 'by t..�i> c!u�.
T"nc::e were nomal brc�dinC md not 11::in:le er interbred . Appc-1.r!tly t�.c trend 0!
r.,.le s ex dellve-:-y ilr.;,rc--r-cd a.rte:- lic:,vei.1bc:- 10 to t:ov�bcr 1.5" b:-ccdir-= :::l,ed�e.
1:ca:-ly 1111 sir.:;le birth:: sired bc:�ore liovc:nbc:r 10th 1:c2·e P!fe lG.':lbs �d 3 sires
r c:;:rcs c:ntcd in 'brceoir,e reduction from t'-"in to 1in1:lc l.K-:bs is aonre, an:1 ill
S-1 bo:it. stt,ck, both }for:;,shire ..-id Cclt..-::ir.n a. total o! 95 l.&."lcS ar.d 80 e,:e s:.h!.'c!�e
a:; co:-:p:ircd to l.LCJ on this �ch priviol!!l opcrAt.:icm or 25 � lo:::: in red\;cticn.
�hcrcfc:-e continu.,.ne e o! clll!l:i in pa.rt through l9S8 :
(1) l�;e clever a corch noted Ml\1" 2eth.
{ ? ) l��C corn burt2 noted J\:ne 9th, rcfcnnee loccl. agr-�c-ul.t-cr..l .field i:ia.n, l0ur,l.: C o . ,
0 ) Ti:Lcr �r.e C&Jmot be fully- use::scd at. this cat�.
( L ) Per::enit.l l:llic!t-r,ti!'itd eyes and ha.nds b= 0! .April 21 1 1950, ha::d:.inl 11.-:ha.:;e ,
•eye:: net ewer it.
.
l9S7 Llr.ib Los:: Schcdlllo
�l:c first llUl!b losses oeci:n-ed ab-,ut Sey-,t. l, 1957 . T\.--o were !'o-mld dc:id lyir.j; -c;,ri�ht
•t foot of sl0re an d un:1er grove, or cal: an:i a::h trees in lDt S, Sec. 17 or "t:l!f
r:-o;:crt.ic:s in this I cet.or only 'bll:c (;?'�:s ar.d shed.;.in� tree lc�e!l and J:'(!t,rifi cd
, , e:d azid no approach to -..-ater. They •�oared to have c!j ed slcc;n.nc. Thi: �a.,
!cllc-.'t'd :ibout !.cpt • .3 , l !o-.::r 7ear old H ...
�:-.hire cvt: ne:.r the s:..--r.e a.ren 11:ld
�-v:l:, sl s !'c.rolci:,:s and shoulccrs noted about 5 :CO P.1i. and li ea� :it 8 : C-0 P.l!. . LL."lb
h:isc::; 1r,erc:i:od to 6 !our.c! about .Sept. l5 near watering and re::tinc st.:itior.$ L"1d
••-iu n U?M cht, 111u:zl�!: :resting on ground, ,p;:,:irii.n"l.ly �r.d slc:c:p:..n;. A. fe\f CU el
..,•. r.. nnt�d, Slldd�n de.th follow:1.ng t.6.lcinc "'atcr at :in inland -i.-at.c ring suti or, &."ld
•. ".! :, :t.:ition, untrentc,d, ,r..th l.:lJ::inc ;:ro!.'c::s 'but pct.ri:ie:! r.!:iplc trees and o:ik
r ·,h,rh l ovcrt-..an ciin, the c!rinJ:j.nr, �:i. Only a re,.: ct.ended case::, thestr dcvelc;,ed
'-:0�, L.,d shrinr.:ice or rlc::h, r..1!! jo�nu in 111ost. c:i::c:1.
llotcd i:o�t, lmc.-c C. htl:k
�. • c n•l�i:� . also hlp . A rc:w no �d !lJj rht !roth !r ..� =uth hc�cre de•t.'l, av er:: re li.!e
•-= t • ntJ,-1! cn::c :: tone to three d..
case sur:iv l'! ri 'but ti":�
--ys . OTllj l c:,::c t.1oo \Ic e!:: .
": :•.� :-e floor !lcetion o! bl:idtlc,r or un. n:>ll! r a ,P on 1� absent. '!'he re[:ion is crie crow;
a:-.·1 a n i l': :\l sh ru:il-: fr'1m about 80 l't-:, to abvu:. l. O 1:.:: at this da.:.c . I I. ::iy b� J:!au.c! at.
tl . ! s r�"l ch only, �:rovi ::i on pcr:,:it.tcd or ri :tiuncd evic!cnce, ope:-i.ti cm:.l 19 6 r.
� =: h cd\lle.
�ai.�cr, Jcr J..
�-- C'\"�.,.. ,:.,: , r::�•-�ll� Y.� r_�.

en�
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CLIDl
�-:-chued llS ho�d, &Teratc -.:�. SS lbs . Tucn Sept . 1, l9S7 c..rri &�c ot o-.-n
r.1 l srd :i..,:�:h:, , ll2 &\"erai;e wi:t,. 70 lbs . Total CB head loss (b�th vo._"!'IS ) . T.r.en
LO head 0-..-:1 l.t.�bs loss, 1chedili A._�ra,e .2� per J>OU."ld ..1es . Taken !i B he�d
pw-ch.uc 1�m loss.
$616.00
liO head, vit• 70 e .tt
· 1.8 head, vet,. SS O .22

.

e

e-seo.so

.

.

or
19S7 eve lambs adc!ed to herd, S hud bL"'T�, t.ake:i prc�tion lou 1chec!ule
or SO% • 2.S lar.ibs anra,e aales a:hcdule t 20.00 per head or $So.oo.
Jlcuorable z::a.:dn= de:ith loss ei
ta.�• o::i]Jr, barren, 1.ot&l �

- claill loss l.m�

t-1101.06.
$ SO . oo

Clonr aecd loss, 1L acres, tar.en � production 100 lbs, per acn O .2S
;>r.r pound , 80;: chimd • $280.00.
tcr,onsl, unic!e::,tif1ed bUffil o! qu and h&.-.:!.s li:,nl 21, l.958.
Schedule doctora
$ 6.C.V
J-:ediciDO " &lasHI
$9. 60
£:Jtiute �t tor bzl::D t
S c:ul.ons & 7 . oo per •
:1.:lbor to ap;il3
Tot&l

t3S.oo
$70.00
tlli;,.G:l

T"�"bcr c!�:�:11 1?e 200 more or hss trur� � as�, 1:hite oak, ha:-d :.&?le, red oal:,
i:ilver ca?lc and bo:.celder Cll."'.:.ot be � sses sts: at this d•�•• Per1Q� (e7;s ) are
net in c��?l�ta rQcov�r,- at t�.is date . O;,er&tio�al 19�3 s chedule ca:�t be
assessed at this c!�te, t.here�ore th• :1:lser.. ill t.ha ,ove:n::.ent !or= ar.:1 not to
ae e rr,t in !'in�l 1ctth:11ent or �.is c�.

Sauter, .Joa J..
Jlout.e
1.�,11, Kimluot&

STATUS V IFIEO UHCUSS1Fl£I)

. ,n

./.�

John H. um;ibell
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APPENDIX B .
DUNNING TO REEVES 10/23 / 5 8

P."alall-. ..... ... ..

TO

1 James E. Reeves , AssistAnt Man�ger for
Tes t Opera tions , AI.00

DATIi, Oc tober 23 , 1958

Cordon M. Dunning , Chief, Radiation E ffects of Weapor.1 Branch
Division of :Biology and Medicine , Washin;ton
;:.D
I
lmJ]-CT: CLAIM OF JOE A. SAun:R, 'FARWEU., Mil.NESOIA
ftOM

k.t.

S!MSOL: mmzw:CMD

- ..

•.

,If "·

_. .

,,;: ; I :
....
·

- ! .. !. • .

This 11 in reply to your memorandum o f September 1 6 , 19S 8 requesting
our opinions on the claim of Joe J.. S auter for radiation damage from
fallout.

There i s nothing in our experience of radiation effects that vould
suggest that fallout, in the amount experienced at Fan:e ll , Minnesota
and environs , could have produced the alleged damage a1 described in
Mr . Joe A. S auter ' s claim. The external ga=a radiation exposure in
that area probably has been les1 than 100 milliroen tgens 'Wl-.i ch would
not produce any obsen•able effects on humans , Fl•nt1 , or animals •
• The amount o f radioactive fAllout material that would produce this
external ga=a exposure could also produce external and int•rnal bet&
exposure. However , these potentiAl beta doses do not change OUT
overall evaluation of the damage ha:ard. The potential beta doses
WO"Jld be mos t pronounced in plant life and might be 1: the order o f
- tens of rads t o the plant ti11ues in the Farvell , Minnesota area.
Experimental and field data collected at 1uch placect" a1 :Brookhaven
and Oak Rid 6 e 1how that uceedingly higher racliation d�ses than these
are required to produce observab le effects in planta.

I t 11 correct that there is �onsiderable information that is not know
on radiation effects , especially for low level chronic a:cpcsures . It
i1 possible for � claic.ant to raise these question, as they did in the
sheep trial in Utah. This aspect , I believe , can be handled by •�ert
tes timony as was done for the 1beep case. Bovaver , if the Sauter claim
does come to court you probably vill need more 111onitoring data than
now exi s t• , e specially in li&ht of the radioc.hemi�l analyses made by
,'
HASL ou sele c ted S&lllplu from the Farwell, Mimiesot& araa.
cc: J>T. Dunham
Dr. Shi lling
Dr. 'Wes tern ·

.

!

I

/
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APPENDIX C .
CANCER RATES

CANCER I N DOUGLAS COUNTY AND STATE OF M I NNESOTA < F'ER 1 00 , 000 )
1 950-59

1 9 60-69

1 9 70-79

THYRO I D CANCER

o. o

0. 6

1 . 1 ( h i gh )
0. 3

DoL1g l as M a l e
Mi n n . Ma l e

2. 4
1.0

1.4
1.3

.;;.

Doug l a s Fema l e
M i n n . Fema l e

1.8
0.9

3 .o
1. 1

1.4
1.2

Doug l a s M a l e
M i n n . Ma l e

0. 4

0.5

MAL I GNANT MELANOMA

EYE CANCER

.. .�.

1. 9

( n o k n own CaL1Se )

Doug l as Ma l e
M i nn . M a l e

0. 8

1.4
0. 3

0. 0

Doug l as Fema l e
M i n n . Fema l e

3. 1
0. 3

0. 0

o. o

4. 3

6. 0
6. 1

6. 3
6. 6

0. 7
0. 3

3. 7
4. 6

6. 4
4. 8

DoLtg l as Mal e
Mi nn . Mal e

0. 7
2. 1

2. 6
2. 8

4. 5

Doug l as Femal e
M i n n . Fema l e

3. 0
1. 3

1.7

1.7

2. 1

7. 5
6. 8

8. 0
6. 6

6.2
5.6

L YMF'HOSARCOMA
Doug l as Mal e
M i n n . Ma l e
Doug l as Fema l e
M i nn . Fema l e

0. 3

......, ..,...

0. 2

0. 3

o.

1

MULT I PL E MYELOMA
3. 3
3. 9

LEUKEM I A
Doug l as Fema l e
M i n n . Fema l e
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L I VER AND GALLBLADDER
DoLtg l as Ma l e
Mi nn . Ma l e

1.5
3. 1

DoLtg l as Fema l e
M i n n . Fema l e

Doug l as Fema l e
M i n n . Fema l e

5. 4
4.8

4. 8
4. 1

0. 8
1.5

1.3
0. 8

1.4
0. 9

2. 1

2. 6

0. 7

0 . (>
0. 6

1 52 . 0

1 60 . 3
1 75 . (l

1 65 . 0
1 82 . 4

1.0

ALL CANCERS COMB I NED
Doug l as Mal e
M i nn . Ma l e

Doug l as Fema l e
M i n n . Fema l e

7. 1
4. 2

5. 1
5. 4

BONE , i nc l ud i ng J aw c: anc: erDoLtg l as Ma l e
M i n n . Mal e

0. 8
3. 6

1 65 . 3

1 50 . 1
1 39 . 6

1 35 . 6
1 29 . 7

1 16. 0
1 24 . 6
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APPENDIX D.
CAST OF CHARACTERS

CAST OF CHARACTERS
Joe A. Sauter - sheep farmer who claimed that he, his sheep,
and his hay crops were damaged by radiation (fallout)
Mary Lou Sauter Young and John Sauter - children of Joe A.
Sauter and wife, Rose
Joe Sauter - nephew and namesake, spent more time with
Sauter than anyone
William Sauter - nephew
William W. Allaire - Director, Nevada Operations Division,
ALOO
Gordon M. Dunning - Chief, Radiation Effects of Weapons
Branch, Division of Biology and Medicine
James E. Reeves - Assistant Manager Office of Test
Operations, ALOO
Fred Driver - Veterinarian in Charge, USDA, St. Paul, MN
Dr. Alfred Peterson , Leon Fleisher , Jr. , and James E.
Wentworth - Veterinary Livestock Inspectors
C. L. Weaver - Radiological Safety Officer, , ALOO
Roscoe H. Goeke - Radiological Safety Advisor, Office of
Test Operations
Dr. Donald R . Chadwick - Chief, Radiological Health Program,
Public Health Service (PHS)
James G . Terrill , Jr. - Assistant Chief, Radiological
Division, PHS
Oliver R. Placak - PHS liaison officer, Las Vegas Branch
Dr. Robert Letson and Dr. Gordon E. Lee - Sauter's
physicians
Brig. Gen. Alfred D. Starbird - Director, Div. of Military
Applications, AEC
Lewis Strauss - AEC Commissioner 1946-50, Chairman AEC
1953-58
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Kenneth Fields - General Manager , AEC 1955-58
Charles Dunham - Director , DBM Div. of Military Applications
John Harley - Chief , Analytical Branch of the Health and

Safety Laboratory , NYOO

Richard D . Elliot - Director of Information , Santa Fe

Operations Office

Senator Hubert Humphrey - Senator from Minnesota
Senator Clinton Anderson - Senator from New Mexico
Senator Eugene McCarthy - Visscher appealed to McCarthy to
investigate AEC on fallout studies
Dr . William o . Caster - Minnesota scientist involved in
fallout studies Atomic Energy Development Problems
W . F. Libby - AEC Commissioner
John McCone - Commissioner , AEC 1959
Maurice Visscher - University of Minnesota scientist
Gov. Orville Freeman - Governor of Minnesota
Lester Machta - Director , US Weather Special Projects Bureau
Morse Salisbury - Director , Information Services , AEC

1958-59

Dr . Armstrong - University of Minnesota scientist , Dr.

Caster's superior

Lee Loevinger - Attorney , represented state of Minnesota
S . Allan Lough - Director , HASL , NYOO
Konni Zilliacus - British Parliament member , called for ban

on US wheat based on Minnesota findings

Mrs. J . Harms - concerned U.S. citizen
Gen . Herbert B. Loper - Asst. to Secretary of Defense for

Atomic Energy , accused by Sen. Anderson of withholding
fallout data

Rep. Chet Holifield - JCAE member , requested hot spot data

from AEC
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Alvin R . Luedecke - General Manager, AEC
Eisenbud - scientist
Kulp - scientist
Samuel Glasstone - editor, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons,
Washington, DC: AEC, 1958
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